One vector belongs to the longer history of modernization and the centuries-long societal shift from the mass to the individual. The opposing vector belongs to the decades-long elaboration and implementation of the neoliberal economic paradigm. … [Translation:] Every unicorn has a hunter.¹

Shoshana Zuboff, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*.

Evolution has transformed cell-to-cell signaling from an activity in which cells simply broadcast their signals to whoever is close enough and listening into something different: an organised network. […] Picture a filmy lightbulb in which the rhythms of nervous activity first begin.²

Peter Godfrey-Smith. *Other Minds: The Octopus and the Evolution of Intelligent Life*.

**précis**

The image of thought, indeed thought ‘itself’ has endured a long and somewhat tedious history, with debates circling around the role of representation, reason and rationality.¹ Those debates have often infected the very terrain of the photograph (and, for that matter, image) and have done so to such a degree that often image is either presented as the metaphysical god-fairy of the photograph, with the latter acting as documentation for, or representation of, the former; or, as more recently the case, where skill inherent in the world of imaging is left to one side or ignored altogether. This chapter will offer a completely different approach. It begins by staging a minor narrative of our contemporary world in the form of ‘Alexa’. It then double-strands that narrative with, on the one hand, an interlacing of Newtonian physics, modern political thought, and the importance of ‘exit[ing]’ for the material-conceptual development and inhabiting of what it means to be human – and indeed, what society might become, in the best sense of community, possibility, invention, democracy. On the other hand, it draws upon an interlacing of post-Newtonian physics, big data, artificial intelligence, and the importance of ‘encounter[ing]’ in order to develop a wholly different picture of what it means or could mean to be human, and with it, what it means or could mean (ethically, politically, democratically, substantially) to be alive in this wildly shifting world of bots, conceptually activated vectors, multidimensional time warps. The chapter ends with a provocation: that these double-strands have something in common. It is the quiet, but no less peculiar, use of an old logical tool called the counterfactual, an alt-objective x from which the entirety of the philosophical, aesthetic, ethical and/
or political scaffolding unfolds. In the former case, that is, in the pre-information age of industrial capitalism ‘case’, one could name (and did name) this counterfactual ‘the state of nature’. In a postmodern age of complexity, derivatives, big data, distributed and artificial intelligence, that is, the post-Newtonian, neoliberalist ‘case’, that counterfactual could be named, and is named: the photograph.

the Alexa complex

The presence of intelligence (any intelligence: sentient, erotic, distributed, emotional, spy, octopus, or otherwise) suggests a certain kind of durational ‘aliveness’. It is an aliveness that enables (or at least gives the sense of enabling) decidability, direction, encounter, perhaps even companionship. It might also include curiosity, possibly attraction, unquestionably feedback loops, and, in today’s climate, has the capability to do all this and more, often without a bounded, corporeal, objectively tangible, host-body. This is a kind of bloodless intelligence, light years ahead of its, now quaintly old-fashioned, ancestor: the ‘machine’. It goes by a number of descriptors, of which a current favorite remains the benignly fetching ‘Alexa’, who (or that) without anger or despair, answers to a variety of commands, such as ‘Alexa find me a restaurant’ or ‘Alexa turn on the lights’. A kind of superego cum concierge, this strange, headless, aliveness to presence; one that manages to strengthen the collective mindlessness of its commanding voice-owner, whilst simultaneously consolidating, in that same Alexa-dependent commander, an easily roused-to-anger fireball of bruising impatience at the very instant the command (desire, pleasure, tantrum – call it what one may) cannot or will not be succored, entertained, catered, delivered. Trauma suffered from a problematically repressive phase, say oral or anal – hell, even the Oedipal or Electra complex – shrivel in comparison to this mind-numbingly effective banality.4

...Eichmann in Jerusalem, move over; there’s a shiny new update ready, willing, and able.

alchemies of logic (counterfactuals)

It is worth noting that all political theory, and especially modern political theory, begins with a counterfactual or set of counterfactuals sometimes disguised as myth, allegory, fable, fiction, poetic license, straw dogs, or downright invention, closely resembling a lie.5 All require a leap of faith as the single most important condition of acceptance to an otherwise relentless and impeccable logic. In the case of ‘early capitalism’, as the story goes, classical liberalism emerges in the wake of a rising mercantile class disrupting the ancien régime’s feudal order, and, in so doing, foregrounding the rise of the individual, the separation of church and state and the importance of change as the fundamental driver for a truly well-governed society. Hobbes’ 1651 Leviathan, arguably the first detailed modern theory of human sociality (now framed for the first time as a science; that is, as a political science), relies on a variety of counterfactuals, including the privileging of an entity that heretofore never existed though – irrespective of this logical fiction – it enables a raft of legislation enshrining inequality, loss of freedom, penury. In the case of classical liberal theory, that particular counterfactual is called ‘the state of nature’. It conjures a palatable, easily digestible imaginary that any ‘natural’ environment prior to a civilizing covenant is famously, ipso facto, ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.6
Logically speaking, then, if one wishes to move away from this nightmare, one agrees ‘in principle’ to a social contract that establishes a covenant whereby people leave the state of nature, join civil society, and, in exchange for protection, give up typical liberties inherent to the state of nature – say, for example, the right to plunder, pillage, and put one’s self-interests above and beyond any communal approbations. Importantly, too, it expresses what would become the ‘wild sciences’ of the times; namely that bodies are always-already in motion and as a result require an open-ended possibility/infinite access to movement (read: an infinite right to so-called progress, development, resources, always-already in counter-position to a ‘nature’ that must be dominated, tamed, expunged). Here the very notion of the classical liberal commonwealth demands, on the one hand, a tiny almost unnoticeable exchange: that all commoners trade their individual stakes in society (read: individual self-interested liberties) for the overall benefit of society; that is to say, for one’s own and the community’s protection in the form of order and good governance. Here also, and on the other hand, the nation-state, comprised, as it is meant to be, of ‘bodies in motion’, requires also a certain manifest destiny now pictured as ‘natural’ to the social order. This ‘manifest destiny’, this so-called ‘right’ includes embarking on the ruthless and infinite expansionism of a nation’s boundaries, an expansion otherwise known as colonializing and plundering – and often includes grotesque internments of whole swathes of humanity who might otherwise refuse to play the game (or not realize there is one).

For the sake of simplicity, picture a square, edges firmly intact. Now draw a line from one side to the next, naming the one side, ‘friend’, and the other, ‘enemy’ (or leaders vs. led, phallus vs. lack, Brexit vs. EU, and so on). This is the zero-sum game, at its most counterfactually sophomoric, often leading to politically barbaric stereotyping, collective fear-mongering, lazy cultural analysis, and a raft of social anxiety disorders. Its (not so elegant) simplicity dovetails with the culturally watered-down ‘law of physics’ developed by Zeno in the 6th century BC, expanded on by Aristotle (4th century BC), and usually attributed to Newton (1687); to wit: that bodies in motion traveling from opposite directions cannot occupy the same place at the same time. It has an equally watered-down corollary, initially coined by Machiavelli in 1532 as ‘the first law of politics’: that there are always ‘leaders and led’, and if not, one must strategically develop the divide. In so developing, the Prince (or the party or the populist weltanschaunungen, organic intellectuals, media, or other collective hegemonic bloc) need also to be cognizant of the leader-led push-backward or push-forward moveability within a closed field (as in ‘if they push forward, then we will have less’ or ‘if we push forward, they will have less’); and, in so cognizing, must strategically organize to become or remain Leader / Phallus / Friend, and not the Led / Vagina-Lack / Enemy (etcetera and ad nauseam). Simultaneously the leading bloc must maintain a vigilant, often militarized, weather eye on the, also shifting, boundaries of state.

What one is left with, in these peculiar classical liberalist alchemies of logic, is a fierce protectionism coated in manifest destinies, and bloated by the outward expansion of a nation’s boundary, with varying degrees of ‘success’, if, by success, is included the removal of liberties for both commoners and those who are accused of not ‘fitting in’ or not ‘belonging’ to this newly expanding zero-sum nation-state mock-democracy for the few.

Health warning: just because it is impossible, does not mean there are no consequences. Don’t die wondering.
excluded middles

Let us take pause to picture a different counterfactual logic underpinning how reality and its discontents may be noted, this time doing so in such a way as to work alongside (or even express and repeat in social form) the great paradigmatic upheavals and paradigm shifts of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, where social freedoms have concurrently been enshrined in law. This picture requires a unified (totalized) realization of the world, one that includes all that makes up the ‘whole picture’ – absence, presence, excess, otherness, sameness, inside, outside, movement, social agency, identity, concept, abstraction, economic modes of production, sex, junk food, etc. (that is, everything one can think of + everything one cannot think of, taken together to form the whole of reality). This version may appear at first glance to be repeating the zero-sum game as above, but it is far more nuanced. Instead, it puts change as its ground and, as importantly, does so by ensuring that the logic (political, philosophic, economic, historical, metaphysical, speculative) is fully contained within the movement, be that unfolding, teleological, immanent, transcendent, or becoming. Ushered in by Heraclitus with emphasis on movement/flow, this singular totality (uni) ‘in and of itself’ contains movement (plural ‘edgeless’ versatilities), which come to be held objectively-subjectively ‘fully true’ in all cases – and hence is called: ‘universal’.

The counterfactual required here is not just ‘counter to the fact’. It is a negation of the counter-true, a negation which does not put it in the realm of a zero-sum positivity (as in the opposite to nothing is something) but requires a whole new game, a game that instead involves a slightly complicated foray onto a temporal-spatial surface, a surface which, in turn, gives meaning to that which it is attached. In a lay sense, one could picture, say, a table, and if asked to point out ‘where is the surface’, one might point out everything that faces the air. If I took a knife, sliced off that surface and, say, threw it away, another surface would immediately pop up in its place. In this sense ‘surface’ acts as the expression of the table’s structure – it both belongs to (i.e. is attached to) the table, but is at one and the same time, extraneous to that table. In this sense, too, ‘surface’ is something which gives structure, recognizably so, but, simultaneously, it is expendable, an excess to the table itself.

Now let us picture a more complicated version of surface. Let’s call that surface ‘the present’ (the ‘is’, the ‘naught-time’, the ‘no-thing’), a seemingly bizarre conceptual creature whose immediacy (im-[dash]-mediacy; that is, a ‘not-mediated’ presence), can only be grasped through the that which enables an ‘is’ to take shape. As with our table, we could take our secret blade and slice off an ‘is’, throw it out, and voilà, like the excess surface of the table, another ‘is’ would make itself present, once again as both an expression of, but not part of, the structure. In Hegel’s Science of Logic and elsewhere, that which first shapes ‘the is’, is point-for-point ‘attached’ to that ‘is’ – similarly to the way in which our the table is point-for-point ‘attached’ to its surface.10 Crucially in this imaging, ‘point-for-point’ means that its surface can never be bigger or smaller than the table itself. In the case of the ‘is’ (or naught-time, or immediate or no-thing), the initial point-for-point structure that enables this unmediated x of present tense reality to come into being, Hegel names ‘Intuition’. Intuition grasps ‘the is’ (whilst simultaneously expressing it, as the table ‘expresses’ its surface) enabling ‘the is’ (‘the naught-time’, the ‘no-thing’, the unmediated x) to come to presence, that is, to become ‘concrete’, fully realizable, or in a word: ‘universal’, and therewith, fully graspable. Logically speaking, this movement is achieved through a mediation,
a dialectical mediation, which includes sublation, then synthesis, then immanence or transcendence and, in so processing enables the concept (in this case, Intuition) to give ‘ground’ or meaning to what otherwise existed heretofore only as an unmediated abstraction; to wit: the present (is).\(^\text{11}\)

To take a slightly less obscure example, one might start with an abstract term, say, ‘thesis’, which, for the sake of argument will be named ‘wet’. It’s point-for-point antithesis would be called ‘not-wet’ (rather than ‘dry’). This ‘not-wet’ can never exceed or be less than our abstract term ‘wet’. Even if one were to crumple up the ‘wet’, one would not find its ‘not-wet’ running to keep up – both are conjoined for all time, no matter what, how, when, or why. One might say, given this conjoinment, that there is always-already ‘plurality’ in this odd-bod couple, one which admits a kind of air, or movement embedded within this unity (albeit a ‘unity’ still existing in abstraction).\(^\text{12}\)

That seared unnameable sticky nano-slice-of-contradictory-conjoinment that keeps the wet tied point-for-point to its not-wet (or thesis to its anti-thesis) has a name. It is called ‘the excluded middle’.

This seemingly innocuous excluded middle is not an ‘in between’; it is not a non-man’s land; it is not a transfer point, a quasi-transcendental or a yet-to-be. It is the necessary complex negation – the non-existing impossible counterfactual – required to make the whole system work. Once granted, it ensures that ‘plurality’/‘movement’ is placed at the core of the system. It enshrines change as ‘a something’ always-already taking place within the structure whilst simultaneously, enabling change to be a point-for-point expression of the structure. More than that, it enables the rather clever move by Hegel and other dialectical logicians, from speculative to materialist (and back again) to maintain that there is only one reality, one world, one system of subjectively objective knowledge without resorting to the simple equation of posing reality as the summation of ‘all that there is + all that there is not’. And yet, clearly, if the argument were left at that point, a basic tautology would ensue, and we would be no better off than with our zero-sum comrades.

So to that equation (all there is + all there is not), Hegel ‘adds’ the excluded middle; i.e. the negation (now as movement, sublation, immanence, transcendence – depending on where one is in the process) which enables a fully formed concept to emerge.\(^\text{13}\) This fully formed concept (now let’s badge it with a capital ‘W’ Wet) is the mediated/sublated synthetic unity of wet/not-wet. One could say that ‘Wet’ is not only the expression and process of wet/not-wet, but is its ‘goal’, it’s end-point platform. In being ‘goal’, Wet comes back to enable the initial abstract pairing of wet/not-wet to make sense (literally: to create the very meaning-sense of an otherwise abstract wet/not-wet). Crucially, then, this synthesis or goal becomes the very ‘ground’ of meaning to the two otherwise abstract contradictory conjoined entities. This complex teleology ensures that there is always already a strange plurality at the core of any system of knowledge, political, historical, aesthetic, or otherwise. Or, as is often expressed in the common sense parlance of modern-day culture regarding the social totality ‘itself’: the whole is always-already greater than the sum of its parts.\(^\text{14}\)

This is one of the most important conceptual moves in speculative and historical dialectical materialism. It foregrounds ‘movement’ and ‘change’ as both core to the very nature of reality, and, simultaneously as something objectively ‘subjective’; that is to say, something that requires knowledge, reason, indeed the input of living entities, to make change happen, without resorting to an outside force, Archimedean point, or God. It famously paved the way for Marx to draw into the picture of change, social
agency and, with it, organized political action, including strategic planning, tactical
end-runs, even revolution.15 This form of change was and remains quite distinct from
the kind of change one finds when growing from a baby to an adult, or the teleological
unfolding of an ‘x’ (say, an acorn) positioned to become what it was ‘always-already’
meant to be (that is, in the case of an acorn, an oak tree and not a Maserati car).16
Indeed, it was the kind of change that paved the way for Nietzsche’s infamous procla-
mation ghosting modernity itself: that ‘God is dead. And we have killed Him [sic].’17
Since that proclamation, various surgeries have been called to the front, not neces-
sarily in order to revive God, but in order to revive humanity away from searing alien-
ation, reification, starvation, absurdism, general ennui. These surgeries have included
the idea of an ‘open totality’, a ‘relative autonomy’, a ‘quasi transcendental’, a ‘de-
centered subject’ with whole swathes of invective, damning finger-pointing, specula-
tion, and etc. as to whether the objective was primary over the subjective (or vice versa
or both denounced all at once).18 Despite cries to the contrary, these moves often have
involved a return to logocentrism, foregrounding the infamous Phallus in perpetual
tango with the less beloved lack. Without falling back on description, exceptionalism,
the dialectic, or even so-called ‘natural selection’ principles of evolution, there did
not seem to be a system of knowledge able to incorporate analytically the nuances,
glitches, and wildly genocidal ‘complications’ of a modern industrial capitalism rap-
idly shifting toward global forms of a corporatism underwritten by post-Newtonian
logic(s).19 ‘Change’ so much the core of 17th–20th-century political, psychoanalytic,
and social science methodologies, seemed to shape-shift as though old wine in new
bottles: now in terms of its negative or its indexicality, sometimes in terms its probabili-
ty, or its uncertainty, or undecidability; and when in doubt returned to the old theatres
of superstructure, interpellation, sign, signifiers, and signified. Sometimes knowledge
systems were (and continue to be) dipped in the erstwhile pools of identity politics
with or without essentialism to boot.
All seemed pitched into the dragon’s den of the here-and-now, hoping to create
collective agency, individual social responsibility, and a complete shift in this seem-
ingly obsessive race to mass destruction, but instead managing to play into the hand
of major societal horrors, including the rise and rise of fascisms, seductive populisms,
increasingly bold racisms, homophobias, misogynies, and nationalisms. For alongside
the question ‘what does it mean to be human, and what can our humanity become’, the
dark questions of hell remained (and remain): the questions of genocide, concentra-
tion camps, refugee centers, the dispossessed, all proliferating at unimaginable rates.
The stink of sexual repression, lack of clean water, toilets, food; the mass shootings;
the callous destruction of the environment; the dropping of the atom bomb, not to
mention cruise missiles, carpet bombings, drone strikes, guerrilla warfare, knife crime,
suicide vests; the exponential growth of global militaristic weaponizing (as in the mil-
tary-industrial complex), the corporatizing of culture (as in the culture industry), the
onslaught of new social movements (civil, sexual, countercultural), and, more recently,
the advent of ‘new media’ (computing, Internet, digital), along the mass proliferation
of plastics and petroleum, buoyed by the buying and selling of futures, the destruction
of the ecosphere, and extinction of species (or in a word: the technosphere).20
These cesspools of hell are so profoundly horrific, so grossly shocking, so incredibly
debilitating in their all-encompassing bombastic obscenity, that it is hardly surprising
collective agency, indeed agency of any kind, tends to find refuge in an Us vs. Them
deep-cut image of life, replete with all the counterfactuals thus far exposed. Given this
sorry state of affairs, one would be forgiven if they surmised, in contradistinction to Nietzsche, Duchamp, Cage, Lyotard, Foucault, Stengers, Barad, and many others who proclaim that all the grand narratives of science and life are dead (or should be) – that despite all odds, these totalizing structures and their political ethical and aesthetic responses, are either alive and well, surviving quite happily in, for example, Trump America, or, if dead, not quite gone. 

It is very hard to kill a certain kind of metaphysics.


It is this seemingly death-defying image of thought – so eloquently developed by Hegel and, so equally eloquently, trashed by Nietzsche et al. – which Deleuze and Guattari begin to redress. Damning the dialectical move and the sociopolitical fallout from it as a form of ‘arboreal philosophy’, they argue that this particular metaphysics is weighted down by its roots (always-already becoming its fully formed expression, its unfolding, totalized and universal concept, idealist, historical, speculative or otherwise), in order to form the ‘ground’ of its truth, its being, its fullness of meaning and the very making of sense. Instead, theirs is an image of thought which is expressed as difference, as bodies without organs, as a vegetal philosophy; one where meaning and the making of sense – in the fullest, practical-political-aesthetic use of the expression ‘to make’ – emerges on the multiple, transversal playing fields of encounter. This happenstance is not something predetermined, discovered, or planned; nor is it a rational, cogito-led meeting of the minds. It is the sensuous, pluralized ‘coming toward-together’ entangling the ‘that’ which lies to hand. This ‘coming toward-together’ forms, in its multiplicity, a cohesive, radically material ‘something’ that enables meaning to take place, take shape, add to the flow of the real. Its discursivity is neither immaterial, virtual nor objectively material, be it historical or speculative. It presents instead, a radicality that is ‘ana-material’, existing and not existing on the same plane, same surface or instant; one where its aliveness emerges simply and only from the granular entanglement of its attraction. There is no underlying structure, no telos or unfolding. One could say that Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s image of thought express the event of groundless grounds, an event that, at the very moment of encounter forms a kind of cohesion without requiring structure, end points, purposes, processes, or goals. It just ‘is’.

Picture this: 1913 with that wild rush of horses, whipped ever-onward, ballistic mud spray ricocheting off their collective gallops, volcanic snouts spitting fire for air. A combined frenzy of lathered sweaty sinew, powered focus with one goal in mind. Crowds shouting, bets being laid. And out of nowhere jumps Emily Wilding Davison, suffragette. (She didn’t have a chance – though, in some sense, that move, that blood, that cracked neck, was precisely her chance, and she took it.) Or take 1917, with Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, a move, couched amongst the ravages of World War I, where the entire paradigm of modern art shifts. Or take 1939, an auspicious year to be sure, where one finds Wittgenstein debating with Turing in his famous Cambridge Lectures on Mathematics, whilst simultaneously in that very same year, Kristallnacht ushers in the brutal, hideousness of the Holocaust, whilst unbelievably, The Wizard of Oz takes to the screen, in technicolor, with over-the-rainbow dreams and the debuting of the fabulous Judy Garland. 1945: the Atom bombs disseminate Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One does not have to go back that far to feel the torrential shifts;
the multiple warps, black holes, radio and microwaves; to witness the student revolu-
tions, the civil rights movements, the Pill, feminism, and the fight for individual free-
doms, including the right to have same-sex, drop acid, vote, burn the flag; go to school,
irrespective of race, class, gender, or ethnicity; the destruction of unions, the overturn-
ing of European colonization, the rise of the African National Congress. And we have
not even mentioned the 1905 revolution in physics or the invention of the computer, or
Mandelbrot’s invention in the mid 1970s of fractal geometry, and associated discover-
ies around morphogenesis, artificial intelligence, robotics, genetic mutation.

So the question must be put: How does this Deleuzian image of thought progress
an epistemological ‘way in’ to understanding, interpreting, and most importantly
to disrupting, breaking, re-imaging – revolutionizing – the seemingly eternal return
of totalizing brutality? In what way does an analytic move from a logic of dialecti-
cal materialism to a logic of radical matter/logic of sense break the seemingly rabid
cannibalizing of humanity, Gaia, and all that stands in the way of friendship, love,
generosity, peace? For as Adorno so mournfully intoned:

The more total society becomes, the greater the reification of the mind and the
more paradoxical its effort to escape reification on its own. Even the most extreme
consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter. Cultural criticism
finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism.
To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowl-
edge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reification,
which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to
absorb the mind completely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge
as long as it confines itself to contemplation.24

One more piece to the puzzle must be added to the mix.

photograph of thought

Deleuze and, in their joint writings, Deleuze and Guattari developed an image of
thought along three interconnected axes: the rhizome, the plane of immanence, and
the chorus. This image of thought entails deterritorialized flows, with collective and
individualized fits and starts of knowledge systems present, past, and future. It is
a different logic, a logic of sense, one no longer ‘rooted’ in mastery, logocentrism,
instrumental reason, cogito, and yet, nevertheless, forms in its multiple-singularity a
minor system of grasping, comprehending, listening, knowing.25 This minor system is
nothing more, and nothing less than ‘surface’: an intelligence of sense that is neither
‘natural’, ‘instrumental’ nor ‘artificial’. It is a move that sidesteps the, now unneces-
sary, bloodless coup of a deep-cut/excluded middle grounding to reason. Rather, it can
enable/express political, aesthetic, and ethical agency, though sometimes does nothing
at all. This image of thought, in other words, offers a certain kind of weight (as in, a
certain kind gravitas, a certain kind of accounting for and/or including) of agency, be
that agency courageous, dull, collective, individual, inventive, sacrificial, pre-emptive,
lazy, driven – all of which may otherwise get lost in translation or accepted as a ‘one-
off’ or seen as not all that important or not even seen at all. It ‘makes’ sense, enables
ducking and diving, punctures totalizing logics, produces change.26 It is the postmod-
eran version of counterfactual, with a bit of a twist.
In the case of this image of thought, meaning (truth, post-truth, alt-truth, multi-versal-truth) no longer requires the ‘deep-cut’ to generate movement, create horizons, give a ground or even a backstop to change. For this is just a surface scratch, a ‘minor system’ pockmarked by the nodal points of encounter, circulation, and exchange. It is an image of thought always-already ‘plural’ which, in its plurality, expresses intensity, movement, energy. Moreover, and as its plurality is energy, intensity, and etc., this counterfactual takes on the garments of immanence and the possibility/ies of enabling a ‘becoming-x’ to take flight. Most interestingly, it also offers a completely different way to ‘visualize’, to ‘picture’, one that carries with it the corporeal trace of the real.27

Let us push this argument further. In a postmodern world, where materiality is proliferated via the radical materiality of socio-ecological networks, a different image of thought can now be envisioned. It is one that shows itself without falling prey to the metaphysics of concept. Indeed, it is one that shows itself without falling prey to concept at all, if by concept, the invective of universal is called to account, with all the trappings of excluded middles, and teleological unfoldings of ground, process, strategy, and goal removed from the image. Instead, it is an image of thought that requires a different sense of ground, of logic; one that admits to minor surface systems of knowledge, ones that must include (and are expressed by) distributed intelligence, circulations, and technologies (digital, analogue, chemical, biological). It is one that simultaneously expresses and is comprised by segment (slice, fractal, nodal point), whilst instantaneously also expressing plane/surface (say, zeroes) stretching in all directions at once.

A strange kind of counterfactual, one that lives amongst us as both corporeal trace and transversal logic, an ana-material granularity of thought capable of puncturing totalities, and, in so doing, bringing to presence distributed knowledge systems of multidimensional encounter, intensity, movement, event – a filmy lightbulb (without edges) in which the rhythms of nervous activity begin. This is nothing more nor less than the photograph of thought.

Notes


3 Representation as linked to symbol, semiotics, sign, and signifier pepper certain classical works in the canon of contemporary and modern philosophy and political science. In counter-distinction to this, the term ‘image of thought’ from which this chapter unfolds, takes its lead from the seminal works of Gilles Deleuze, 2001 [1968], Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, London: Continuum, Chapter 3, pp. 129–167. But see also the earlier work of bell hooks, 1984, Feminist Theory from Margin to the Center, Boston: South End Press, and the more recent work by Greg Lambert, 2012, In Search of a New Image of Thought: Gilles Deleuze and Philosophical Expressionism, Minneapolis, MN, London: University of Minnesota Press).

4 The erudite Hannah Arendt first coined the phrase ‘the banality of evil’ in reference to the almost commonsensical manner in which fascism wormed its way into the popular/populist imagination. Tiny shifts, subtle and often unremarkable, take hold, leading a populace almost sheep-like toward an unrelenting, unthinking conformity. Add to this the often heard ‘excuse’ provided by the postwar testimony of various Nazis during the Nuremberg trials – that they were ‘just following orders’ – and the searingly pathetic banality of one


Initially described by David Hume in his 1748 treatise, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, it has since taken on a peculiarly haunting twist when linked with artificial intelligence; namely, the automatic generation of default rules which condition the improbable ‘as if’ true. For an early assessment of that twist, see M.L. Ginsberg, 1986, ‘Counterfactuals’, *Artificial Intelligence*, 30: 25–79.


Here it should be noted that the ‘classical liberal’ canon is quite a far cry from the contemporary liberalism of say, Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine, or, more recently, of any political movement demanding ‘our bodies ourselves’ alongside the right to education, health, and religious securities. Classical liberalism in its nascent form follows the pathways of, amongst others, Edmund Burke, with modern-day equivalents aligned to Tory conservatism.


For the abstraction to become a concept, a fully formed concept, ‘meaningfully’ or indeed just ‘fully’ wet (or fully dry), the antithesis is sublated to the thesis (or vice versa); its synthesis will be in this case Wet (a fully realized concept), which enables the abstract ‘sides’ of wet/not-wet to exist as something other than a tautology. Hegel has ‘added’ negation to the process. It is a brilliant move. Thus is born ‘Idealism’ (and various offshoots, including speculative idealism). See Hegel, ‘Preface’, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, especially §§15–520.


First attributed to Aristotle, it has become well known as part-and-parcel of a Marxist historical materialist conception of history. See K. Marx, 1977 [1859], *Preface, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 4.

16 We will return momentarily to the question of acorns and oak trees and the teleological moves required for change to make an x unfold to what it was always-already meant to be, so that, its goal/purpose (tree) becoming also its ‘start’ (ground) and its ‘getting there’, its ‘movement’ or process (change). Suffice to point out that teleological unfoldings may be a fantastic logical positioning for some, unless, of course, one happens to be, say, a slave and is therefore forced to unfold (‘be/become’) what they were always ‘meant to be’ (sic), i.e. in this case, an adult slave. Ditto for stereotypes of women, men, transgender, queer, acorns, fill in the blank.


19 A point Foucault underscores in his *Discipline and Punish*, rhetorically surmising that if history really were nothing other than natural selection, this would of necessity imply that death machines were nothing other than the ‘evolution’ of invention, with the result that had Christ been executed ‘today’, it would not be the cross that one wore around one’s neck, but the electric chair or even the needle.


23 Deleuze puts it like this: ‘Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. […] It is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given. Deleuze,


