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Art and the Public sphere: From controversy to opinion formation in the making of contemporary art.

Abstract

Mitchell’s pairing of Public Sphere theory with public art is based on a semiological account of artworks, thus he places significance on the interpretation of the meanings constructed from artworks and how various speculations on an artwork’s ‘meaning’ generates conversations in the public realm.
I argue that this emphasis limits the way in which we consider the production and function of art because it forces a type of ontological engagement with public art which foregrounds the question ‘what is art of?’ Rather than, ‘what does art do?’ Mitchell’s account can be considered a public sphere in so far as it causes discussion in the public realm however I believe that there is more to be gained for arts social and political significance if we consider how art functions for opinion formation.
I propose that art also operates towards the construction of culture and society rather than simply reflecting upon it. And following Georg, W. Bertram, I consider Walter Benjamin’s formation of ‘critical practice’, which proposes that critique is essentially a change of practice as opposed to a negation of society.

Keywords
Art & the Public Sphere
Public Art
Picturing
Doing
Critical practice

_The Bourgeois Public Sphere_

The theory of the bourgeois public sphere - a term commonly confused or used in place of the terms public space or the public realm\(^2\) - means in-between private and public. The historical bourgeois public sphere is generally thought of as civil society - the totality of voluntary, civic and social organizations and institutions. According to Habermas’ theory the bourgeois public sphere is where collective opinion formation takes place, which can challenge oppressive state bureaucracy as well as capital (Habermas, [1962], 1989).

Collective opinion formation operates as a shared force to monitor the decisions made by the state and the market; a united view by a particular group of individuals can persuade the state and the market to reconsider its actions and policies. To enable collective opinion formation, individuals require public forums, arenas of communal interaction where people meet together and discuss the deeds of the state and the market. This can take place in any space, ‘private’ (in Armenia during 1990s the public sphere took place in the kitchen), ‘commercial’ (the coffee house) or ‘public’ (the city square) as long as a collection of individuals are present declaring their opinions on current affairs (Habermas, [1962], 1989). In Habermas’ ideal, citizens discuss issues rationally in order to arrive at a consensus that satisfies the public good. Individuals are required to put aside their private interests in order to think altruistically about the needs of all; decisions are (anticipated to be) arrived at for the public good\(^3\).

The public sphere is always made up of private individuals, what makes it public is simply that they publish their opinions; these shared opinions remain the views of private individuals, but by being published they become part of the collective attempt to arrive at shared values, decisions, and potential actions.
‘The public sphere is nothing but the socialized expression of individuals reciprocally constituted autonomy: individuals are autonomous not in isolation from but in relation to one another, that is, in relation to a public of autonomous beings.’ (Susen, 2011, 42)

Questions of dissemination are central to Habermas - as he describes the historical development of the bourgeois public sphere; the public sphere is brought to life with the flow of information and exchange of cultural opinion, via the publication and distribution of ideas in newspapers, journals, clubs and coffee houses. However, Habermas’ conception of an ideal public sphere was short-lived due to what he saw as the professionalization of politics with the rise of the liberal constitutional state and the refeudalization of the press as it came to be controlled by a few individuals (Habermas, [1962], 1989).

Habermas’ version of the public sphere has since been criticized and developed by other theorists - a desire to think about what the theory of public sphere means in a contemporary and pluralist context has meant the introduction of expanded versions of the public sphere. The exclusion of women has been contested, (Fraser, 1990); new class-based antagonisms and race issues are deliberated (Benhabib, 1996), the public sphere is extended by the efforts of various aggrieved and excluded counter-cultural publics (Warner, 2002). Habermas has also been criticized for developing a conceptual framework of the public sphere that is also idealistic and overly rationalistic (Susen, 2011).

It is widely acknowledged in public sphere literature that society is no longer a singular public sphere as Habermas' historical account of the bourgeois public sphere, but is composed of numerous public spheres with opposing as well as sometimes overlapping spheres of discourse and action. (Fraser, 1990, 61).

In his book ‘The Function of Criticism’ Terry Eagleton (Eagleton, 1984) indexes the inauguration of a specific literary public to the development of the bourgeois public sphere. ‘The periodicals of the early eighteenth century’, Eagleton writes,
‘were a primary constituent of the emergent bourgeois public sphere’ (Eagleton, 1984, 17).

‘In the eighteenth century public opinion could take shape in the public sphere whereas today, in the debased public sphere of the mass media, public opinion is administered, monitored, managed and manufactured by the private interests of big business, including the private interests of the owners of global media companies and the commercial interests of advertisers and sponsors. The very sphere which was meant to mediate between private interests and the state has been colonized by private interests. Thus, in Habermas’ social theory, contemporary politics is characterized by the struggle among groups to advance their own private interests in which citizens become spectators, via the media, of a political process with which they do not participate. Habermas’ social theory of the debased public sphere is a bleak account that, despite its limitations, depicts a persuasive historical trajectory of the emergence and degradation of an effective civic society, echoed by Richard Sennett in ‘The Fall of Public Man’. (Beech, Hewitt & Jordan, 2008, 117).

Public Art and the Public Sphere

On 16 September 1989 the one-day symposium, ‘Art and Public Spaces: Daring to Dream’, took place at First Chicago Center, USA. The conference was organised by John Hallmark Neff and sought to explore a series of questions about art and public spaces:

‘what role, if any could art play in a public context today? Are “monuments” and “memorials” really possible within the alleged vacuum of mutually respected beliefs? Is it possible for sculpture or even site-specific work to avoid the obsolescence of supposedly “public” art if the work has no intellectual or contextual resonance beyond itself? Is artwork in public venues justified at such low level of ambition?’ (Hallmark Neff, in Mitchell 1992, 7).
The conference papers were published as an anthology entitled ‘Art and the Public Sphere’, edited by W.J.T. Mitchell (Mitchell, 1992). The twelve chapters in the book address Hallmark Neff’s wide-ranging conference questions in relation to existing public art practice, function and purpose. Although Hallmark Neff, regards the symposium ‘as an opportunity to step back from the mechanics of public art and dream’ (Mitchell, 1992, 8), the contributions cover both conceptual and technical responses from artists and theorists on contemporary public art practices.

The title of the volume, ‘Art and the Public Sphere’, is addressed specifically by Mitchell’s editorial, ‘Introduction: Utopia and Critique’ and is further developed in his essay, ‘The Violence of Public Art’. Mitchell’s argument is an early instance of public art being considered in respect of the public sphere as set out by Habermas’ in his book, ‘The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere’, (Habermas, [1962], 1989).

Public Art as Imagery & Public Art as Publicity
Mitchell’s claim for art and the public sphere is based upon two concepts; public art as imagery and public art as publicity. For Mitchell public art functions through the creation of ‘images’ (even though the artworks he cites are not necessarily pictorial), which are ‘decoded’ by the viewer in order to create a talking point between audiences that generates both critical and manipulative publicity (Habermas, [1962], 1989).

By means of Habermas’ theory of the bourgeois public sphere Mitchell succeeds in expanding the definition of public art from a hitherto spatial version of art in public towards an issue of public accessibility enabled through the proliferation of mass media images. However, whilst Mitchell extends the notion of public access to art (and images of art) in the field of public art I believe his claim for art and the public sphere is incomplete.

As D.S. Friedman says in his 1995 article ‘Public Things in the Modern City: Belated Notes on Tilted Arc and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial’
‘Mitchell and Neff would probably agree that what couples the Vietnam Veterans Memorial6 and Titled Arc7 is not form, but controversy.’
(Friedman, 1995,63)

Mitchell’s use of the public sphere theory with public art is concerned with ‘the relation between beauty and publicity’ (Mitchell, 1992, 2) and in his essay in the volume, ‘The Violence of Public Art’ he states,

‘Even in the United States the “publicness” of public images goes well beyond their specific sites or sponsorship: “publicity” has, in a very real sense made all art into public art.’ (Mitchell, 1992, 30).

Habermas warns against the misuse of publicity to undermine the concept of the public sphere, ‘Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity’ (Habermas, [1962] 1989, 178). He asserts that it is manipulative publicity that debases the public sphere,

‘Publicity loses its critical function in favor of staged display; even arguments are translated into symbols to which again one cannot respond by arguing but only by identifying with them’ (Habermas, [1962] 1989, 178).

Contemplating the colonization of public art by publicity, Mitchell alerts us to the potential of public art to function for the interests of, ‘state media management’, suggesting that ‘public art will be the province of “spin doctors” and propagandists.’ (Mitchell, 1992, 2). Nevertheless, Mitchell is hopeful of the role art and culture could play in supporting a public sphere.

‘Or does the internationalization of global culture provide opportunities for new forms of public solidarity to emerge, leave openings for intrusion of new forms of public resistance to homogenization and domination?’ (Mitchell, 1992, 2)
Mitchell believes,

'The very notion of public art as we receive it is inseparable from what Jurgen Habermas has called “the liberal model of the public sphere”, a dimension distinct from the economic, the private and the political. This ideal realm provides the space in which disinterested citizens may contemplate a transparent emblem of their own inclusiveness and solidarity, and deliberate on the general good, free of coercion, violence or private interests.' (Mitchell, 1992, 35)

This is in fact imprecise; Habermas historical account of the bourgeois public sphere describes a space of institutions and practices between rather than, 'distinct from' the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power (Habermas, [1962] 1989, 3). Habermas’ acknowledges that the private and public spheres are mutually dependent. As Simon Susen sums up,

'Paradoxically, the relative autonomy of the private and the public was contingent upon their reciprocal determinacy. Given the structural interdependence of the two spheres, the public/private polarity can be conceived of as a public/private reciprocity. The socio-historical analysis of the public/private dichotomy is essential in that it enables us to explore the material and ideological contingency of the public/private reciprocity, which is rooted in the spatiotemporal specificity of every society.' (Susen, 2011, 39)

Mitchell categorizes two versions of public art practice: ‘utopian’ and ‘critical’. Mitchell’s utopian model of public art practice attempts to facilitate an ideal public sphere through ‘a non-site and an imaginary landscape’ which he compares to Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere which he claims as being,

‘an all-inclusive site of uncoerced discussion and opinion formation, a place that transcends politics, commerce, private interests and even state control.’ (Mitchell, 1992, 3)
By aligning his ‘utopian’ model of art to the above definition of the original Bourgeois Public Sphere Mitchell suggests that art is a field that can rise above material and cultural considerations due to its apparent ‘functionlessness’ (Beech, Hewitt, & Jordan, 2002); in this way Mitchell develops his utopian model of art alongside the modernist idea of art’s autonomy (Crow, 1987).

In Mitchell’s account of his ‘critical’ model he says,

‘art that disrupts the image of the pacified utopian public sphere, that exposes contradictions and adopts an ironic subversive relation to the public it addresses and the public space where it appears.’ (Mitchell, 1992, 3).

This suggests that ‘critical’ art has an antagonistic relationship towards the public it addresses and the place where it is sited which is expressed through irony to deliver unsavoury messages of subversion.

Mitchell’s use of ‘utopia’ and ‘critique’ rely on generalized considerations of the terms, i.e. there is no clear explanation of what he believes constitutes utopia and its relationship to critique is not addressed. Ernst Bloch and Theodore Adorno shape a critical and material outcome of utopian thought, asserting that utopia is a way of thinking about the future that demolishes the present. Utopia refers to what is missing; in this way utopia and critique are both part of the same function for art (Bloch, 1989).

Mitchell considers artworks as ‘images’ (Mitchell, 1992, 37) and therefore develops an interpretative reading of the public artworks that he examines (utopian and critical) consequently he fosters a decoding of the works to extricate their meanings. For Mitchell artworks in the public realm represent violence and politics, and it is the ‘critical’ publicity they create through this representation that he believes constitutes a public sphere.

In this arrangement Mitchell implies that art’s function is to reflect the world back to itself, and through the revealing of new types of truth art helps us to
understand society more critically. Yet art also contributes to the construction of the world; it adds to the way in which we form opinions beyond a critique of social and political actions. It is in this way that it shares methods of practice with Public Sphere theory; rather than operating as a trigger of controversy for conversations in the public realm it works upon the formation of values which we collectively agree with or decide to dismiss.

Mitchell cites Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1987) as a violent artwork but rather than discuss the agonism in the work he prefers to describe the empathy in the artwork,

‘It achieves the universality of the public monument not by rising above its surroundings to transcend the political but by going beneath the political to the shared sense of a wound that will never heal or (more optimistically) a scar that will never fade’ (Mitchell, 1992, 37).

Although Mitchell is clearly interested in the public sphere as a mechanism to consider the future and function of public art the other essays in the volume return more conventionally to contesting the technical and legal considerations for the production of public art; in the case of James E Young he extends the idea of controversy within public art practice and Christopher Griswold develops the interpretation and describes the function of imagery in memorials. Certainly Mitchell uses the theory of public sphere to shift public art into a new constellation - beyond the notion of the primary audience and into the realm of the mass media. This may constitute an innovative shift for the articulation of public art by Mitchell but it does not address the potential of public sphere theory for contributing to our understanding of art.

‘What is art?’ and ‘Is it art?’
The pursuit of newness and uniqueness in art has fuelled the idea of nomination; ‘what is art?’ and ‘Is it art?’ being a preoccupation of the writers and critics of 20th century art. In his essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935) Walter Benjamin, argues that mechanical reproduction
liberates the work of art from its historical dependence on ritual, (Benjamin. W, 1969). He believes that the breakdown of the authentic within artistic production reverses the function of art, stating:

‘Instead of being based on ritual, it [art] begins to be based on another practice - politics’. (Benjamin. W, 1969, 6)

He famously gives the example of the photographic negative, whereby, because of the technical conditions of the process, several prints can be produced from the same negative. As there is no one authentic print but many versions of the same image or artwork, the technological condition of photography affects the way it functions as an artwork. Thus art’s uniqueness is brought into question by the process of production and a change occurs: art’s relationship to ritual is altered and with the acknowledgement that there is no one original event, thus the ritualized view of an image or artwork calls to be reconsidered. Photography no longer reviews the social conditions of production but reforms these conditions through reproduction.

Benjamin also identifies the way that the means of production cannot be seen as separate from the final artwork or its content but that it is central to and embedded in the continued function of art. Thus emphasizing the importance of the apparatus of art in understanding what art does and is enabled to do.

Benjamin’s essay is not a semiological account of the meanings constructed through the combination of processes and content in the production of art works, or a celebration of mechanical production as a means of aesthetic innovation, but rather a way of understanding how we produce and reproduce our own conditions of existence. It is concerned with art’s role as one embedded within the material practice of living.

From Picturing to Doing
Picturing poverty as well as promoting political causes has undergone various 20th century considerations - including Benjamin’s essay ‘Author as Producer’, in which he uses the example of documentary photography to demonstrate the difficulties in relying upon picturing as a representation of politics.
He says,

‘It (photography) has succeeded in making misery itself an object of pleasure, by treating it stylishly and with technical perfection. For the ’new objectivity’, it is the economic function of photography to bring to the masses the elements which they could not previously enjoy – spring, movie stars, foreign countries - by reworking them according to the current fashion; it is the political function of photography to renew the world as it actually is from within, or in other words, according to current fashion.” (Benjamin, W. 1998, 95)

Here Benjamin alerts us to the dangers of reworking content in a formal way; even ‘traditional’ political content such as poverty, can be incorporated in the bourgeois apparatus of production; the artist’s preoccupation with technical and formal concerns can fail to reveal the very existence of the apparatus and the class that owns it. In Benjamin’s view ‘this is a drastic example of what it means to pass on an apparatus of production without transforming it’ (Benjamin, W 1998, 95).

American minimalist and conceptual artists working in a climate of increasing cultural and political radicalism, (Wood, 2002, 7) rejected the seeming detachment of late modernist painting. Although abstraction was cast aside there was no universal return to figuration and no going back to allegory as a technique to represent ideas and create meaning (not in its earlier formation anyway).

A particular set of artists (not necessarily classified as a group) engaged with the question of arts social function and sought to enquire into the relationship between art and the everyday. Allan Kaprow initiated informal events as part of everyday culture (Kaprow 1962), Morris explored the subject object relations of sculpture (Morris 1966). Adrian Piper and Mierle Laderman Ukeles considered their identity as artists through their gender resulting in a series of actions on the street.
Allan Kaprow initiated a series of events and performances called ‘Happenings’. Starting in 1956 and continuing through to late 1960’s Kaprow insisted that ‘Happenings’ were based on everyday life, ‘the line between art and life should be kept as fluid and perhaps as indistinct as possible’ (Kaprow, 1993, 62). A significant part of the 'Happenings' was a construction of an environment for which to immerse everybody; the viewer and spectator became the participant.

Robert Morris stressed the relationship between the physical body of the viewer and the space of sculpture in his notion of the ‘nonpersonal or public mode’. Morris was concerned with the context of the object, the situation of the object (environment) that also included the beholder (Harrison & Wood, 1992, 813).

Adrian Piper used her body, for example in the artworks, ‘Catalysis III’, ‘WET PAINT’ and ‘Mythic Being’, in order to produce artworks which ‘decreased the separation between original conception and the final form of an idea; the immediacy of conception is retained in the process/product as much as possible’ (Piper, accessed 5 May 2017).

The significance of Mierle Laderman Ukeles 1969 ‘Maintenance Art Manifesto’, is not only the question of the difference between the lowly domestic work of women; what she calls ‘maintenance’, and that of the ‘development’ work of men (Wood, 2002, 63). The ‘Maintenance Art Manifesto’ in its material production addresses the difference between the social and the representational in art practice.

An excerpt from The ‘Maintenance Art Manifesto’ states:
‘I am an artist. I am a woman. I am a wife.
I am a mother. (Random order).
I do a hell of a lot of washing, cleaning, cooking, renewing, supporting, preserving, etc. Also, up to now separately I “do” Art.
Now, I will simply do these maintenance everyday things, and flush them up to consciousness, exhibit them, as Art.’
These practices literally take art out of the studio and the gallery and place the production and display of art into the public realm. Furthermore these artworks transform the pursuit of art from the arena of representation to the place of action. Essentially these artists are publishing their opinions in the public realm; my point here is that is here we begin to see a public sphere develop through actions in the social fabric rather than the formation of a controversial discussion about art and its function.

These practices might appear to be engaged in extending the potential of what art can be as a formal or technical activity, the 'Happening', cleaning, etc. However these artists do not inquire into the limits of, or the extent of art but rather they consider what they want art to do or what art does.

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that Mitchell’s conference and his subsequent book are a precursor to the continuing debates around the function of art for society. And furthermore Mitchell anticipates the contemplation of public art in a broader context of social and political theory, as seen by art theorist Rosalyn Deutsche in her book *Evictions* (Deutsche, 2002). Deutsche provides a close consideration of the political outcomes of public art via the gentrification process realized in New York City (Deutsche, 2002).⁹

Habermas’ theory of the bourgeois public sphere was translated into English in 1989 (Habermas, [1962] 1989) there was little available discussion of his conceptual framework of the bourgeois public sphere until the early 1990’s¹⁰. Certainly later theories of the public sphere (Fraser, 1990, Benhabib, 1992) as well of accounts of representational democracy (Mouffe, 2000) have enabled a more thorough consideration of the potential of the public sphere and therefore (including contributions from social art practice) new potentialities of art and the public sphere.
Even so, Mitchell’s articulation of art and the public sphere places emphasis upon the function of artworks to achieve a tangible reaction from audiences. For sure different types of responses from viewers will get people talking about an artwork’s form and content, but this results in a description of the effects of art upon its audience not a theory of what the artworks do or how they contribute to the construction of the social world we live in.

Habermas is interested in conversations for the reason that a new opinion can be shaped in dialogue; if this dialogue is limited to the meaning of a particular artwork or whether it is deemed art, then the public sphere of opinion formation is incomplete and subsequently replaced with criticism. Certainly this initial discussion might be the start of a new relationship that leads to further exchanges of opinion but Mitchell neglects to comment on this temporal account of public artworks or the public sphere, limiting his description to the controversy that artworks in the public realm evoke. Therefore, Mitchell’s theory of art and the public sphere is concerned with the technical and formal aspects of public art as opposed to the political conditions of art and the public sphere.

Additionally Mitchell’s concept of art and the public sphere stresses the critical function of artworks to reflect, echo, disclose and expose ideas about society. One of the problems with giving art this task is that it follows a dialectical procedure, where art is assigned a type of critical autonomy. Although this is far in advance of the self-sufficient approaches of the art of high modernism it neglects to consider the comparable ways in which Benjamin’s ‘critical practice’ can be likened to the processes of the public sphere. Benjamin does not reduce art to the application of critique in terms of a ‘content and form arrangement’, but rather, he introduces the concept of aura in order to explain the sensuous perception of subjects as a historically determined process.

‘According to Benjamin, the structures of perception that are established in communal practices (“being based on ritual”) determine the particular perceptual practices of subjects. (G.W. Betram, 2015, 5)’
Although Habermas would have it that Benjamin’s version of art is too affirmative (G.W. Betram, 2015, 1), I consider Benjamin’s ‘critical practice’ to be associated with the way in which the public sphere operates. The public sphere works as a process to collectively produce opinions and establish shared values, therefore leading to a shift in the practices of subjects that participate in various exchanges with others. Hence I think there is a correlation between the methods of the public sphere and the means in which art is engaged with by subjects. For example, in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ Benjamin is arguing for a un–auratic practice. When explaining this Georg W. Betram says ‘Within the framework of an auratic practice subjects are set at a distance from what they perceive’ and ‘Auratic objects are in this sense objects that have a primacy in relation to subjects that perceive them.’ (G.W Betram, 2015, 5). Benjamin in fact calls for a post – auratic art,

‘Post-auratic art, which is brought about in a special way by technically reproduced arts is constitutively connected with a change of modes of sensuous perception within communal practices. (G.W. Betram, 2015, 5)

If art is considered in conjunction with the public sphere, as in the title of Mitchell’s book ‘Art and the Public Sphere’, then it must be concerned with the formation of publics, collectives or groups not the representation of politics for publics.

‘The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people coming together as public’ (Habermas, [1962] 1989, 27).

What is more, a thorough understanding of the material means of art’s histories, theories and production must be employed in order for a more politically productive pairing of art and the public sphere. I prefer to imagine a materialist version of art and the public sphere that calls attention to ‘action and affect’ over ‘allegory and picturing’ in contemporary art practice.


The conference was organised by John Hallmark Neff and hosted at First Chicago Center, USA sought to explore a series of questions about art and public spaces.

For example Naomi Klein in her book *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* 2007 continually misuses the term public sphere, when she means ‘state regulated’ or even ‘public sector’ (Klein, N, 2007).

The notion of ‘public good’ as an interest free concept is contestable, no doubt there has to be a collective understanding of what constitutes ‘public good’ therefore it is always ideological as well as contingent.

Thomas Crow does articulate the relationship between modernist criticism and the public sphere in his essay of 1987, ‘The Cultural Public Sphere’, Discussions in Contemporary Culture, No. 1, edited by Hal Foster, Dia Art Foundation.

See Doreen Massey and also Ernesto Laclau for their critiques of urban space. Massey believes space is formed by discourse and that we must reject the notion of space as an unchallengeable objectivity, whilst acknowledging this Laclau also considers discourse to be essentially spatiotemporal.

Vietnam Veterans Memorial, is an artwork by Maya Lin produced in 1982.


For a more detailed account of functionality see Freee’s (Dave Beech, Andy Hewitt, Mel Jordan) essay *Functions, Functionalism and Functionlessness: on the social function of public art after modernism*, in Jordan & Miles (2008)

Deutsche extends Sharon Zukin’s argument in her book ‘Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change’; (Zukin, 1989), by considering artworks that are antagonistic to the changing shape of the city; Deutsche cites Krystof Wodiczko’s *Homeless Projection project: A proposal for the city of New York*, 1986 as an example of critical art practice within the public realm; this project uncovers the tensions between disenfranchised publics and ‘strong’ socially dominant publics (Deutsche, 2002, 6).

Although Habermas published a short account of his work on the Bourgeois Public Sphere in *The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)* in New German Critique, No. 3. (Autumn, 1974), pp. 49-55.