

describes the conference as a dance-cum-wrestling match between all three leaders. Before the conference, FDR avoided finalizing a common agenda with Churchill, and by the first day of the meeting, the president emerged as a moderator, while his disagreements with Churchill on Britain's imperial interests often undermined the common Western cause. After the first day, Stalin demonstrated a "knowledge of military strategy and tactics, which was far superior to that of either Roosevelt or Churchill" (p. 90). Already in Moscow in 1944, "to Churchill's great relief, the Soviet leader responded like a pragmatic imperial strategist rather than a preacher of the communist gospel" (p. 146). This was clearly not just a stand-off between Stalin and the Western leaders.

The diplomatic and military calculus unfolds unrelentingly on the pages of Plokhy's book. The bombing of Dresden aimed to aid the Red Army's winter offensive, but also to demonstrate the superiority of the Western Allies' airborne potential on the eve of the conference. Within the U.S. delegation, divisions often played into Soviet hands—while the State Department balked at territorial concessions in the Far East, the U.S. military supported them in order to get the Soviets into the war against Japan. Churchill supported Soviet plans to remove German factories as part of the reparations because this would stimulate British exports after the war. However, during the last dinner hosted by Churchill, he vented his disappointment with Stalin by proposing an opening toast to the heads of the three states—His Majesty the King, the President of the United States, and President Kalinin—diplomatically cutting out the Generalissimus.

The spectacular details balance out some shortcomings of the volume. As a trade book, *Yalta* avoids the historiographic justification of its revisionism to which the newly accessible Soviet archives contribute little. The footnotes overwhelmingly cite published Western sources. Plokhy delays the analytical synthesis until the epilogue, although some of his insights would have been more beneficial in the introduction. "The Western leaders," he writes, "dreaming of a world government by consensus, could not accept the Augsburg principle of *cujus region, eius religio*" (p. 397). Except for the fact that such noble plans did not apply to all the British dominions and other strategic areas (such as Greece), this is an interesting way of characterizing the different interpretations of spheres of influence between London and Moscow. While Churchill hoped that "mutually agreed percentage deals" could become the basis of cooperation in Eastern Europe, Plokhy maintains, Stalin thought in terms of "immutable ideological and cultural divisions" (p. 381).

The patient reader will relish all the parts in this fateful drama, for Yalta was simultaneously a stage and a boxing ring where three larger-than-life personalities circled, tested, and engaged each other. Indeed, readers who approach this book as a screenplay (with meticulous descriptions of the *mise-en-scène*) will get the most out of it.

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Péteri, György, ed. *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010. vi + 330 pp. \$27.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8229-6125-3.

The stimulating essays in this anthology contextualize imaginings of the West in Russia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe in the pre-Cold War and Cold War eras. This is both trans-national and trans-systemic history rendered with insight and subtlety that make for an important contribution to scholarship.

Four essays center on the Soviet Union; two on the German Democratic Republic; two on Czechoslovakia; one on Hungary; and one on Poland. They closely analyze ideological and cultural tensions emanating from discourse, propaganda, travelogues, consumerism, music, film, cultural diplomacy, and other forms of cross-cultural interactions. All of them focus, as the title suggests, on various imaginings of the West and how they played out in the East.

In a brief theoretically oriented introduction, György Péteri situates the essays, which collectively, he argues, "offer valuable observations concerning the dynamics of discursive processes of identity

formation along the Cold War East-West divide” (p. 5). The opening essay by Karen Gammelgaard actually considers the pre-Communist era with a focus on Czech travelogues from Russia. The Czech writers positioned themselves as part of the West while mostly viewing Russia as non-European by contrast. Paulina’s Bren’s evocative essay (“Mirror, mirror on the wall ... Is the West the fairest of Them All?”) also focuses on Czechoslovakia, but centers on the postwar era in which Czechs saw in the mirror the alien image of Stalinism.

Erik Ingebrigtsen analyzes a Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored export of U.S. public health reform models that Hungarians both absorbed and remolded while at the same time both associating and disassociating themselves from the West. An essay by Catriona Kelly interprets Soviet participation in a UN forum on children’s rights as a means of pursuing cultural diplomacy with the West. Greg Castillo’s rich essay focuses on architecture and cultural design as a battleground between socialist realism and international style modernism. Somewhat related, David Crowley found, in a nicely illustrated chapter, that Polish architects crossed borders from Paris to Moscow and contributed to the evolution of modern architecture in both the East and the West. A chapter on music by Elaine Kelly unveils efforts within GDR cultural policy to embrace a “socialist” Wagner. Anne Gorsuch deftly analyzes film in the post-Stalinist era of the Thaw and finds favorable imagery of the West somewhat offset by the efforts of Soviet filmmakers to counter the allure of the bourgeois world. The films mirror the tensions of the Khrushchev era in which vows of burial of the West competed with the promise of peaceful coexistence. Susan Reid offers a close analysis of the 1959 U.S. national exhibition in Moscow’s Sokolniki Park, arguing that Soviet citizens were less enamored of the gaudy displays of American consumerism than previous studies have suggested. She tends to essentialize the earlier accounts but offers an important corrective nonetheless. Barbara Walker offers insight into the subculture of Soviet dissidence by probing relations between them and the Western journalists who sought them out. This essay makes revealing use of oral history.

Taken as a whole, the essays in this anthology hold together better than most such volumes as they hone in on the tensions, contradictions, and layers of cultural understanding and conflict between East and West, mostly under the long shadow cast by the Cold War and its competing modernities. As Michael David-Fox notes in a useful conclusion to the volume, “With no other part of the world could sentiments of inferiority and superiority, admiration and enmity, emulation and rejection become so intertwined” (p. 261).

The authors, mostly historians, are skillful and meticulous but all of them are Western or work in the West. The absence of East European and Russian scholarship is the only notable weakness of this otherwise important volume.

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Fürst, Juliane. *Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xiv + 391 pp. \$99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-957506-0.

Many readers of Juliane Fürst’s new book may already be familiar with the various chapters and articles she has published in recent years that have provided a tantalizing insight into her formidable research on youth and youth culture in the postwar Soviet Union. Fürst makes a convincing argument here that if we are to look for significant turning points in the broad sweep of Soviet history, it is essential that the immediate postwar period is not neglected. The Second World War itself has long been trumpeted as the legitimizing myth of the Soviet Union, but in this book Fürst examines the important role played by “Stalin’s last generation” as they developed their own sense of identity and understandings of socialism, and, in some cases, opposition to and dissent from its Soviet variant. “Generation” is defined here not simply by age, but also as shared memories and values, and it was these new ways of interpreting Soviet reality, Fürst argues, that were to determine the country’s fate