Worn.
Footwear, Attachment And
Affective Experience

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This research by practice explores our relationship with and attachment to shoes. Focusing upon the shoe as an everyday object, and on the embodied experience of wearing, it examines how through touch and use we become entangled with the things we wear. Drawing on anthropological and psychoanalytic perspectives on attachment, affect and the self, it asks: How can the act of wearing create attachment between the wearer and the worn? What is our relationship with the used and empty shoe – the shoe without the body, the shoe no longer worn? It suggests that our particular relationship to footwear is located in our intimate and tactile relationship to it; that touch and duration of wear create attachment. This research suggests that through use and wear shoes become, not only a record of the wearer’s lived experience, but also an extended part of them - a distributed aspect of the self. That the affective power of the worn shoe is a result of this intermingling, the cleaving of garment and self.

Despite a growing body of research on footwear, the worn and the used shoe is absent from much of fashion research. The shoe tends to be interpreted as a symbolic, metaphorical, or imaginary artefact; its material qualities and the embodied experience of wearing the shoe are seldom referred to. This research seeks to place the artefact, the shoe, at its centre. Through an iterative process of making, wear, and observation, it aims to make apparent the intimacies of our relationship with shoes. Rather than record the narratives which we apply to footwear, it seeks to highlight the material traces of these relationships: to present the ways they are embodied within the artefacts themselves.

This research is research through practice, into the nature of our relationships with shoes, through making artefacts and images (installation, film and photographs). It is material culture research enacted through the production of artefacts. It situates itself as art practice; the shoes produced are not footwear in a conventional sense but instead are objects designed to amplify and make explicit their role as records of gesture and experience. These empty shoes are records of an absent performance, of gestures which are lost to the viewer, so that only their traces, the marks upon the shoe, remain.
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Acknowledgments

Dedication

This research is dedicated to Tim Stelfox-Griffin 1979-2007; who knew the value of examining the everyday.

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During the period of registered study in which this thesis was prepared the author has not been registered for any other academic award or qualification. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

Signature:

Date:
This is research about the material culture of clothing, about the artefacts we hold closest to our bodily selves. It is an examination of our relationship to the things we wear through focus upon a single group of garments: shoes. It seeks to shed light on the intimacies of our relationship with shoes: how they may work with us, for us and upon us. Analyses of clothing form an increasingly large part of research into material culture. However, these works tend to address garments as objects of commerce, consumption, and exchange, focusing on the junctures where clothing is distributed or acquired. They address the new garment, ready to be bought and worn, its transformative potential yet to be unleashed, or conversely the points at which the garment no longer serves practical or symbolic purpose and may be discarded. Though the choices and processes through which we acquire and dispose of our clothes are important, a far greater part of this relationship is of wearing, of habitual tactile contact, maintenance and repair.

This research seeks to bring into focus the processes of wearing and the materiality of wornness – the experience of the body enveloped in clothes and the resultant imprints upon the garment. It addresses the reciprocal touch and counter-touch of the body and the shoe, the ways that they may cleave. It brings to the fore the sensory and psychic experience of wearing, the intimate and unarticulated relationships with clothing that constitute a part of our daily lives.

This research is about the self, about the surfaces and substances that bound us; the ways that we intermingle with the material world. It is an exploration of how material artefacts can come to hold a place within our psyche, how the tangible and intangible may interact within our interior and exterior worlds. Locating itself within a psychoanalytic and phenomenological approach to material culture, it asks how our relationships to footwear can be interpreted. Eschewing the symbolic or
historical tendencies which often bound the study of clothing, it addresses the shoe as a material artefact. It asks how shoes may afford us certain behaviours and what they might take in return – the materials that are sacrificed, and the bodies which are altered, through wear. It investigates the unspoken intimacies that we have with the things we wear and how garments make these tactile relationships manifest. This is research about the trace of the body upon the garment, about the presence of absence, about things left behind.

This research is about wornness, about the particular affective experience of viewing the worn and the used, about the way that used artefacts may act upon us as viewers. It explores the experience of an object outside of verbal narratives, the impact of these seemingly unintelligible markings made by the body over time. How does the empty shoe impact upon us, not as a symbol, but as a materialisation, a trace? This research suggests that in their wornness our shoes are not simply signifiers of absence but indices of the gestures performed within them. It investigates how making apparent the traces of this unspoken relationship might create a resonance for the viewer that is akin to the auratic experience of the artwork.

This research is about the artist, about the role they might play in uncovering our relationships to artefacts, about the intimate and sensory relationship the maker has with the artefacts they produce. What remains of the maker in their artefacts? What traces of their physical and psychic experience are retained? It is about the relationship between the tacit, the auratic, and the verbal; the interplay between seeing, touching, thinking, making and writing. How words and artefacts may work together to create new knowledge, and how the viewer might experience that knowledge.

This research embraces the role that an artist may have in the study of material culture; how the work of art may produce new knowledge for the viewer, and the importance of this knowledge for our understanding of the material world. It is about the places where knowing and not knowing meet, where the subjective and objective remain intertwined. It is about the liminality of the art object, never fully separated from or wholly part of its creator, and about the way that these objects may act as transitional phenomena (Winnicott, 1971).

This research is about my garments, my body, my psyche, as the locus of this research, the subject and object never fully cleaved.


Critiques of the everyday make up an important part of social science and historical research, both in terms of the politics of space and the enactment, perpetuation and subversion of social structure through practice. The turn towards a critique of practices of the everyday has its origins in the works of both Lefebvre and De Certeau. Interestingly, both De Certeau (1984) and Lefebvre (1987) use walking (the ‘work’ that the shoe aids) as a central example of the intersection between the structures of the social and the personal. What I suggest here is not that everyday practice has been ignored but that a focus upon the materiality of the everyday, on the mundane practices of use and wear, is still largely absent from academic research.

Feminine desire, and particularly feminine desire as articulated and enacted in and through consumer culture, has often been presented as pernicious, negative or damaging. In particular, excessive and frivolous shopping is presented as dangerous and potentially deathly. The pursuit of beauty and the sin of vanity, are seen as dangerous and at times deadly. This trope is particularly evident in fairy-tale, where uncontrolled desire for shoes or other garments is presented as harmful; something to be fought against and overcome. In fairy-tale those who give in to their desire for shoes are chastised, punished and shamed. In the real world, the particular fascination and ridicule of women killed or harmed by their clothing by the Regency and Victorian press, is indicative of this vilification of vanity. Mathews David (2015) highlights multiple cartoons, of women harmed in some way by their clothes citing in particular a French cartoon, ‘...like clerics, doctors also cast moral judgments on the erotically charged fashions of their female patients. Low-cut ball gowns were thought to be responsible for a range of epidemic diseases, including influenza, dubbed muslin fever, and tuberculosis, a concept satirized in a Charles Philipon caricature of the 1830s. Copied from the type of fashion plate popular at the time it supposedly advertises a “Dress à la Tuberculosis, from the workshops of Miss Vanity”’. (Mathews David, 2015, p.19)
'The everyday is the most universal and the most unique condition, the most social and the most individuated, the most obvious and the most hidden’ (Lefebvre, 1987, p.9).

Shoes are amongst the most ubiquitous items of material culture, and amongst the most symbolically and culturally loaded. Across multiple cultures and societies shoes are used as metaphors for behaviours, moralities and lives, becoming signifiers of social status, rites of passage and different forms of enfranchisement. Shoes and their representations are pervasive, from the shoes on our feet, to those standing empty in shops, museums and memorials, from fairy tales to advertisements for life insurance and recruitment posters; the image of the shoe has multiple iterations and forms. The shoe is, to borrow Freud’s (1900) term, an ‘over-determined’ object, the bearer of a multiplicity of meanings. Yet in spite of its ubiquity, the shoe is under-represented in current writing on clothing and the body. For many the shoe is both everyday (and thus vulgar or mundane) and superficial (a site of spurious feminine desire or of capitalism gone mad). The shoe is such a habitual object that unless it is exceptional it is rarely considered worthy of further enquiry. When the shoe is addressed it is usually interpreted as a signifier of identity, or as a marker of cultural or social capital. Fetish shoes (Steele and Hill, 2013), hip-hop trainers (Heard, 2008) and fairy-tale shoes (Davidson in Riello and McNeil, 2006; Davidson in Persson, 2015; Sampson in Hill, 2016) have all been examined for their symbolic function and cultural capital. However, the shoe that is missing from these discussions is the real shoe; the habitual material shoe; the shoe as a worn and bodily object.

This research was developed in two parts – the thesis is designed to accompany an exhibition of installation and film; to be read alongside objects and images. The material outputs explore both the experience of wearing and the affect of the worn.
Over the past decades there has been a resurgence in interrogations of materiality and the material, a turn away from post-modernism’s preoccupation with the textual. Hicks and Beaudry (2010), in discussing the ‘material turn’ state: ‘Material culture, objects, materiality, materials, things, stuff: a rock-solid, firmly grounded field for interdisciplinary enquiry is provided, it appears, by research that considers … what “matters”. The idea of material culture studies represents, then, for many a prototype for post-disciplinarity. … In doing so, we set out what is perhaps a reactionary view of material culture studies, which involves unpicking the culturalist uses of materials that developed during the 1980s and 1990s.’ (ibid., p.2). This resurgence of interest has engaged both with concepts of materiality, and the nature material artefact itself. Miller (2005) suggests that social beings are preoccupied with the problem of materiality and aim to transcend it in a quest for immateriality or spiritual transcendence; that the concern with the immaterial or spiritual has obscured for us the agency of everyday artefacts. That we are so preoccupied by the dualism of subject and object that we have reified social relations above all else. Drawing directly from Latour’s (2005) Actor Network Theory, Ingold (2011) explores how people and things occupy spaces, how their networks are produced and performed in the material world, calling for a shift of focus from the ‘materiality of objects to the properties of materials’ (Ibid., p.26). For Hodder (2012) this shift requires us to look at the artefacts themselves. An archaeologist, he critiques social anthropology’s failure to directly observe material forms of the artefacts, instead focusing on their role in social interactions. Hodder tells us that people and things are ‘entangled’; drawn together in a mesh that links and binds. That if we are to understand the ways artefacts work upon us, how alter and impact upon our lives, we look directly at artefacts and the intimacies of our relationship with them.

This linguistic model of fashion, while prevalent, has received multiple critiques. Carter (2012) in particular has criticised Barthes’ formulation of ‘the tendency of every bodily covering to insert itself into an organized, formal, and normative system that is recognized by society’ (Barthes, 2006, p.7). Carter instead suggests ‘one of the problems attendant on placing garments into neat, definitional boxes, for instance protection, modesty, or communication, is that neither the category nor the garment seems to fit easily with one another. Only very rarely will clothing assume a form that is congruent with its designated use.’ (Carter, 2012, p.347) That is to say, though we may attempt to taxonomise the garment, users do not abide by these taxonomies; they appropriate, subvert and alter garments to fit within their lives.

Jeans, which like shoes are often laundered only occasionally, are another garment for which marks of wear may come to embody the experiences and behaviours of the wearer. In her article ‘A Garment in the Dock; or, How the FBI Illuminated the Prehistory of A Pair of Denim Jeans’, Hauser writes of how the traces of wear on a pair of jeans were used by the FBI to convict a bank robber. The article posits that these traces of wear, which are unique to the garment’s owner, emphasise the particular bond between garment and wearer. Hauser states: ‘Furthermore, Vorder Bruegge’s findings remind us of the indivisibility of clothing and the bodies that make and inhabit them; and not just in abstract terms, but understanding bodies as physical entities with their own habits, movements and suppurations. His work offers, then, an intimate engagement with the materiality of garment, wear and the body often called for in the study of fashion and material culture but rarely achieved.’ (Hauser, 2004, pp. 309-310)

Clearly not all garments enfold the body; a garment that is too tight, too loose or cut wrongly for the body upon which it is placed will constantly remind (and discipline) the wearer. Though traditionally undergarments have served as disciplining garments (bras, girdles, corsets and the like), stiff materials like denim may have a similar effect. Eco, in the essay ‘Lumbar Thought’, writes of the bodily experience of being gripped by his jeans: ‘As a result, I lived in the knowledge that I had jeans on, whereas normally we live forgetting that we’re wearing undershorts or trousers. I lived for my jeans, and as a result I assumed the exterior behaviour of one who wears jeans. In any case, I assumed a demeanour. It’s strange that the traditionally most informal and anti-etiquette garment should be the one that so strongly imposes an etiquette. As a rule I am boisterous, I sprawl in a chair, I slump wherever I please, with no claim to elegance: my blue jeans checked these actions, made me more polite and mature. I discussed it at length, especially with consultants, of the opposite sex, from whom I learned what, for that matter, I had already suspected: that for women experiences of this kind are familiar because all their garments are conceived to impose a demeanour – high heels, girdles, brassieres, pantyhose, tight sweaters.’ (Eco, 1986, p.192)
This thesis explores those same ideas in language, a related but distinct body of work. The practice speaks to the viewer in an embodied language; knowledge produced through making, wearing and watching. This embodied knowledge informed the writing which, in turn, was further developed through the written research itself, so that the processes of making and writing became iterative and self-reflexive. Together the thesis and the exhibition produce a whole, the outcomes of my research in objects and in word.

Within fashion theory, as within much of the arts and social sciences, there has been a turn towards more materially focused research. This ‘material turn’ directly engages with the materiality of the research subject: authors such as Miller (2005), Ingold (2013), Connor (2011), Hodder (2012) and Sennett (2008) have led a move towards research that engages directly with the materiality of artefacts and the means of their production. The ‘material turn’ in fashion research has addressed topics as diverse as sensory histories of wardrobes (Chong Kwan, 2015) and the ambiguous nature of seamless garments (Lee, 2015). These studies unpick the complex and entangled relationships we have with the materials we wear, bringing the garment’s materiality into focus. However, footwear still tends to be addressed in terms of its symbolic function or the narratives ascribed to it: for what it represents rather than what it is. Whilst no artefact is ever free of its role as a signifier, this focus on the shoe as metaphor, signifier, or symbol obfuscates the shoe’s material presence. Though shoes undoubtedly do function as symbols in the language of fashion, they warrant further study as material objects in themselves.

As garments, shoes are unusual in that the same pair is often worn day after day for extended periods of time. The shoe, unlike a shirt, a dress, or trousers, is not laundered between wears, but instead becomes increasingly bodily, abject, and individualised with each wear. The shoe as a structured garment does not enfold and wrap the foot, as a softer fabric garment might, but over an extended period of time, stretches and alters to accommodate the foot. One has only to think of blisters and bloody heels from wearing in new shoes to know that the shoe is not always an altogether accommodating artefact. Importantly, shoes impact upon and occasionally determine their wearer’s ability to walk. The shoes we wear often determine our mobility and motility, the experience of our bodies in motion. Footwear affords us the ability to walk, just as a chair affords us the chance to sit. This research seeks to address the shoe as a material and bodily object, as a garment that mediates the boundaries between the self and the world. It explores the relationship between the wearer and the worn, between the shoe and the foot – footwear as a vessel for the body, and also as a vessel for the self, carrying the wearer through the world.
The Heidegger/Schapiro argument concerned Heidegger’s interpretation in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1936) of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of boots. Of these boots Heidegger states: ‘Truth happens in Van Gogh’s painting. This does not mean that something is rightly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes... attains to un-concealment... The more simply and essentially the shoes appear in their essence ... the more directly and fascinatingly does all that is attain to a greater degree of being.’ (1936, p.680) Schapiro counters this argument in his 1968 essay ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object: A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh’ by stating that: ‘They are not less objectively rendered for being seen as if endowed with his feelings and reverie about himself. In isolating his own old, worn shoes on a canvas, he turns them to the spectator; he makes of them a piece from a self-portrait, that part of the costume with which we tread the earth and in which we locate strains of movement, fatigue, pressure, heaviness – the burden of the erect body in its contact with the ground. They mark our inescapable position on the earth. To “be in someone’s shoes” is to be in his predicament or his station in life. . . Not only the shoes as an instrument of use ... but the shoes as “a portion of the self ” (in Hamsun’s words) are van Gogh’s revealing theme.’ (Shapiro, 1968, p140) It is worth nothing that this is really a discussion of the nature of art, representations and being (dasein) rather than a of shoes themselves. Representations of footwear and shoes themselves should not be confused.

Bataille (1929) in ‘The Big Toe’ suggests that feet are considered ‘base’ in direct opposition to the ‘elevated’ upper body and head. That is to say that Bataille believed that a central aspect of the human condition is the struggle to elevate oneself out of the dirt. The foot, unable to do this, is therefore considered abject and unclean.
The worn and the used shoe is absent from most fashion research. The shoe, so often understood as a symbol of status and change, can become unacceptable when it is transformed through use and wear. The aged, creased and scuffed shoe is uncomfortable, an intimate object to be kept out of sight. Used shoes are frequently linked with feelings of shame, whether as signifiers of poverty or as bearers of bodily trace. Representations of worn shoes feature in discussion of race, class and status (Barthelemy in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001; Nahshon, 2008; Jones, 2012), and notably in the case of Van Gogh’s boot paintings (see fig. 1), they have formed a strand of twentieth-century philosophical discussion. Though it is never truly possible to separate signifier and signified, when an object becomes symbolically loaded (and thus stands in for another absent object, experience or person), its own materiality is negated or diminished. Used footwear is often polarising, viewed by some as the most abject of garments, dirtied both by the detritus of the street and by the excretions of the body. The purification of the extremities of the body, through the removal of shoes and washing of feet, is a common ritual in many cultures, emphasising the tendency for the peripheries of the self to be most vulnerable to pollution. In her article on purity and pollution in Japanese footwear Chaiklin (in Riello and McNeil, 2006) examines the literal and metaphorical pollution of shoes. She states that ‘footwear was unclean both from contact with the ground and the feet. Feet symbolic of the genitals added a definite erotic focus.’ (Ibid., p.175) The shoe serves as a filter for these potential pollutions, sacrificed so that the self may remain clean. While external pollution may dirty the shoe, it is our bodily pollution that, for many, renders the shoe ambiguous or uncomfortable. The abject nature of the shoe is emphasised by its orifice-like quality; the shoe, a container for bodily materials, is an intimate space not usually viewable to those other than its wearer. The used and empty shoe represents an absence, much in the way that a fingerprint or still-smoking cigarette in an ashtray might represent an absent finger or mouth. What makes the empty and used shoe so poignant is the absence of a presence. The empty shoe always alludes to its missing binary: the foot.

This poignancy, the empty shoe as a shoe empty of life, is often utilised to accentuate the horrors of loss. Writing on the shoe as a symbol of the absent body, Benstock states:

At a 1994 protest in Washington, D.C., for example, 38000 pairs of shoes stood in for victims of gun violence. The same statement has been borrowed in Paris and other French cities to symbolize the 600,000 civilians killed by land mines. Shoes have also served as reminders of holocaust victims in staged recreations of the aftermath of genocide. The pile of 4000 shoes from death camps in Poland displayed in the United States Holocaust Memorial
A timely and impactful example of the use of shoes to stand in for absent bodies is the placing of 10,000 empty shoes at the Place de la République, Paris. These shoes stood in for the bodies of protesters who had intended to attend a march at the UN climate conference COP21, which was cancelled after the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks. The image of the shoe-filled square was proliferated across social media and ‘famous shoes’, those of Pope Francis in particular, drew a great deal of attention.

Of the Shoah shoes, Moses Schulstein (quoted in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001, p.196) writes in his poem ‘I saw a Mountain’:
“We are the shoes, we are the last witnesses.
We are shoes from grandchildren and grandfathers.
From Prague, Paris and Amsterdam.
And because we are only made of stuff and leather
And not of blood and flesh, each one of us avoided the hellfire.
We shoes — that used to go strolling in the market
Or with the bride and groom to the chuppah,
We shoes from simple Jews, from butchers and carpenters,
From crocheted booties of babies just beginning to walk and go…”

There are a number of notable exceptions to this tendency: books and papers that actively engage with the materiality of wear and its affective impact. These include Stallybrass’s ‘Worn Worlds’ (1993); Evan’s essay on Isabella Blow’s archive, ‘Materiality, Memory And History: Adventures In the Archive’ (2014); De la Haye, Taylor and Thompson’s’ A Family of Fashion: The Messel Dress Collection (2005); Gill (1998) on deconstruction; and Crooke’s ‘The material culture of conflict: Artefacts in the Museum of Free Derry, Northern Ireland’ (2012). Similarly, Davidson (2013) and Mathews David (2015) address dysfunctional or decaying garments, garments outside the usual circulation of consumption.

Fig 2. Atrabillarios (1992-1997)
Museum recalls the piles of corpses in the streets of ghettos, in death carts in the camps, in mass graves. (Benstock in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001, p.8)

Similarly, artists Doris Salcedo’s Atrabiliarios (1992-1997) (see fig. 2) and Elina Chauvet’s Red Shoes (2009-2013) have used empty shoes to represent absence, disappearance and death. In their installations shoes become a substitution or synecdoche, a part used to represent a missing whole: the shoe serving as metaphor, standing in for a body, which cannot itself be present.¹¹ No place is this more evident than in holocaust memorials such as those at Auschwitz, where multiple empty shoes stand in for multiple absent lives. Kristeva writes, of viewing these piles of shoes:

In the dark halls of the museum that is now what remains of Auschwitz, I see a heap of children’s shoes, or something like that, something I have already seen elsewhere, under a Christmas tree, for instance, dolls I believe. The abjection of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death, which, in any case, kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things. (Kristeva, 1982, p.4)

For Carol-Jones (in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001) the image of the empty shoe has become synonymous with the Shoah. In her exploration of artworks which address both the crimes and the legacy of the holocaust she typifies the holocaust shoes as the ‘abject survivors of the abjection suffered by men, women and children in the Shoah’ (Carol-Jones in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001, p.197) – the shoe as witness to the horrors to which its wearer was subjected.¹²

The affective quality of worn and used shoes is not always linked to horror. Signs of wear may have a comforting or beguiling quality, a familiarity. Favourite shoes are often those that have moulded to the body, those which have become most accommodating to the self. Frequently, children’s shoes are collected by parents to record the passage of time. However, this wornness, and the alteration of artefacts through wear, is rarely discussed within fashion literature,¹³ which often focuses upon either the points of consumption or historically significant but well-preserved artefacts. Fashion, so linked to industry, to modernity and the production of images, does not in general deal with the imperfect, damaged and dirtied. Wearing and use are intrinsically interlinked, and through use the gradual destruction of the artefact is accelerated. In use the commodity is subverted, personalised, and made active. It is no longer an object of exchange but something ‘inalienable which becomes ‘entangled’ with the self.

In many ways it is this entanglement, the transition from material to immaterial
and back again which is at the centre of this research. This research addresses the
dual themes of transmissions and of transformation, of the way that persons and
artefacts may entwine over time. It is these transmissions and transformations,
the shifts from ‘me to not me’, from new to used, from commodity to inalienable
possession, which concern this research; this work is concerned with object relations
in a literal and a psychoanalytic sense. In viewing our relationships with clothing as
a form of object relations this research positions the work of psychoanalyst Donald
Winnicott as central.

Throughout this thesis a Winnicotian approach to object relations is used.
Winnicott’s concept the transitional or ‘me and not-me object’, an object capable
of mediating and maintaining the boundaries of the psychic (and physical) self is
applied both to the relationship between wearer and shoe and between artist and
artwork. For Winnicott the ‘transitional object is not an internal object (which is a
mental concept) – it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object
either’ (Winnicott, 1953, p3), similarly transitional phenomena become intermediary
spaces, spaces which allow insides and outsides to meet. It is this capacity for a
possession (or in the case of the artist an artwork or performance) to become
an intermediary between psychic and external realities, which this research both
explores and embodies. The objects of this research are both ‘me and nor me’.

More broadly, Winnicott is present in this research in relation to ideas of touching,
holding and of the importance of the capacity to hold. It suggests that the garment
and in particular the shoe, in wrapping and holding the body, perform a particular
psychic function. The shoe in this research is both container and symbolic
container, it holds the body, and mediates it’s relations with the material world, but
simultaneously also it holds records of our experience, the traces of use and wear. As
a container for experience the shoe is an additional psychic vessel, an object which
is capable of holding things we may not otherwise retain. Our bodies are held by our
shoes and so are our experiences; psychic containment embodied in touch.

Fashion theory often assumes the position of voyeur, the user rendered impassive
in its gaze. In fashion’s gaze both the garment and the wearer are objectified. By
focusing upon image-based media, new objects, or bodiless objects in museums or
shops, the artefact is rendered static and unchanging. This research seeks to put
use and the user at its centre, addressing shoes not only as imaginary objects of
desire or as commodities for consumption, but as objects of wear. This slight shift in
attention, which entails a change from the subjectivity of desire to the subjectivity of
experience, is one which, I suggest, makes a considerable difference in the reframing
of shoes as objects of knowledge. It is a shift in focus away from the points of
acquisition and towards the tactile, habitual, and bodily. This research seeks to examine our intimate, and at times uncomfortable, relationship with the material and worn shoe; to uncover the interactions between the shoe, the body, and the mind. In doing this, it aims to uncover the attachments that we have with the garments we wear, the ways that, through tactile engagement, they become incorporated into our bodily and psychic selves. As research by practice, it is about making things which may integrate more readily with the body and the self but, more than that, it is about making things which are designed to be worn and that, through the act of wearing, become finished or resolved. These are artefacts that are not destroyed through use but made by it. It is about bringing use and wearing to the centre of our discussions of clothing, of freeing garments from fashion’s objectifying gaze.

These shoes as objects ‘made’ through wear, were designed to amplify and increase the wearer’s interaction with the world, both through their choice of materials and the design of their form. Many of the shoes produced and worn throughout this research have pronounced pointed or extended toes. The choice of these shapes was, to some extent, aesthetic, recalling the shape and function of pattens, such as those in the ‘Arnolfini Wedding’ (Van Eyck, 1434), mediaeval and renaissance outer-shoes used to bear the brunt of day to day wear so that softer leather indoor shoes remained unscathed. Equally these pointed forms recall the battered (and at times bloodied) pointed shoe of the ballerina and in particular the macabre fairy-tale film The Red Shoes (Powell and Pressburger, 1948) in which dancing shoes exert an uncanny power over their wearer. The film, and the fairy-tale upon which it is based, are referenced in my own film Dance (2014), which explores the ambiguous relationship between a dancer and her shoes and in metal shoes of Worn (2015), shoes which literally harm their wearer, cutting into their flesh.

However these decisions on the form and shape of the shoes were also conceptual; pertaining both to a desired visual outcome of the works and the manner in which the shoes might behave during their wearing. By extending and lengthening the foot, and thus the bodily schema, and the boundaries of the body, I, as wearer and performer was more, ‘in the world’. The toes of the shoes scuffed more easily and soles had greater surface area to press into the dirt of the ground. My dressed body moved forward before me, my shoes jutting out beyond my feet. The shoes became degraded or abject more quickly; they hastened and amplified my interactions with the world. This extension of the bodily schema, the pushing of myself into space became a means of research, a way of pushing up against boundaries and at times of pushing through them. By extending the toe of the shoe they became not only ‘pointy’ but ‘pointed’ objects capable of directing the viewer and reader towards issues discussed within the work; the shoes became a sign always pointing back
It is perhaps worth noting here, that shoes, like gloves, socks and earrings (possibly also contact lenses) are paired and this presents a far greater risk of loss than other garments. The possibility that one part of the pair could be mislaid or damaged, rendering the pair incomplete, results in a particular poignancy, an awareness of their potential loss. Shawcross (2013) has written of the particular power of the single shoe, both in relation to abandoned or discarded shoes and in the practice of concealing shoes in walls and buildings (concealed shoes are always single, never paired). Like gloves, another dual garment, shoes are worn at the peripheries of the body, as outdoor wear and are often (though not always) removed when returning inside.
towards themselves. The curled toes and scuffs that are the outcomes of wear are the indexical imprints of my research, they are the traces of the research performed.

This research is, like the shoe and the foot, paired: research through both making and writing. The resultant thesis is similarly structured, mirroring the duality of the work in the layout of the chapters. It is presented as separate chapters of text and of images, each new chapter building upon the ideas explored in the last. The images are not illustrations but outputs of research in themselves, equivalent but not analogous to the written work. Interspersed between the chapters are extracts from the wearing diary that I kept as I wore and walked in the shoes I made, a reminder that this research was performed and lived, as well thought, written and made. The thesis starts with Polaroids from the performance series ‘Worn’, (from which the thesis and exhibition draw their name), followed by this introduction. After the introduction are images from the photographic series ‘Fold’, which explores the intimate tactile relationship between the wearer and the interior of the shoe. The methodology is followed by photographic chapter ‘Interior/Minpaku’, a series of images from the Minpaku ethnographic archive in Osaka which explore the interior of the shoe as a hidden and intimate space. The next chapter ‘Attachment: Shoes, Touch, and the Bodily Schema’ addresses this intimacy and the attachment produced through wearing shoes and the capacity of shoes to integrate with the wearer’s bodily schema. Attachment is followed by the first of two chapters of Polaroids from ‘Worn’: images which explore the indexical traces of performance, which remain on the shoe after use. The following chapter, ‘The Cleaved Garment’, explores the capacity of an external object to mingle with the wearer, user or maker’s self and to become ‘cleaved’. We then return to ‘Worn’ and to Polaroids of the empty, used and now bodily shoes. The final chapter ‘The Empty Shoe’ addresses the shoe as both a symbolic and indexical memory object, capable of inducing affect in the viewer. The final image chapter ‘Cloth’ is followed by the conclusion ‘Worn: Imprint, attachment and the affective encounter’ which focuses upon the encounter with the worn shoe and the traces of experience it contains.

Situating the shoe

What follows is a brief overview of current approaches to footwear: looking at the shoe as represented in literature, film and fairy tale and as addressed in academic writing. This research is about clothing and though clothing may be part of the fashion system it is also experienced as a bodily and habitual artefact. Though it addresses shoes as worn objects it is not concerned with the shoe as a fashion object and thus sits at the edges of fashion theory. It is more closely aligned with material culture studies: research into the objects we make and use. Current writing
Though the ‘material turn’ sought to address big issues (such as society, culture and the nature of ‘being’) in relation to materiality, there has been a simultaneous move towards the study of the material minutiae of our lives. Authors such as Gerritsen and Riello (2015), Miodownik (2014), Sudjic (2009), Connor (2011), and De Waal (2010) have used a focus upon the small and ephemeral items we surround ourselves with to explore our relationships in and with the world.

Notable works on everyday garments include The Global Denim Project (Miller and Woodward, 2007, 2010) and The Sari (Banerjee and Miller, 2003).
on footwear may be roughly divided into three categories, which often intersect and overlap: the shoe addressed as a fashion and design object, as a literary or folkloric symbol and as an object of fetish and sex. Though each of these areas presents fascinating and fruitful research, this research is specifically focused on the embodied experience of wearing shoes.

Despite the growing body of literature on the material minutiae of our lives, and despite their prevalence as artefacts, shoes are under-addressed in academic literature. Fashion research has tended to focus on the performative glamour of fashion – fashion is, after all, rooted in ideas of transformation and change. Fashion exists for an audience, be that the wearer or another. It is a process of image making performed on the body and through its representations. Whilst clothing may be manipulated into fashion, garments in themselves are simply worn; wearing is a mundane practice. Increasingly, fashion research does address some aspects of everyday clothing, but footwear has yet to be explored fully in this context.

Frequently there is a confusion between representations of shoes and shoes as material artefacts; literary or pictorial images of shoes are often discussed interchangeably with real shoes. Footwear has multiple representations within literature and visual arts, from fairy tales and folklore to painting, sculpture and film. However, it is important to make a distinction between these representations of shoes and the shoe as a material artefact. The shoe described within a fairy tale or painting has no material form; it is an image of a thing rather than a ‘thing’ itself. This image may allude or refer to the real or material shoe, but equally it may not. Though our interactions with the material may be mediated by the symbolic, and the symbolic may create a framework through which we read or interpret artefacts, the material shoe and its representations should not be confused.

Within academic writing on footwear, shoes tend to be addressed as symbols or signifiers: as standing for something else. Stemming from the semiotic analyses of fashion, developed by writers such as Barthes (e.g. The Fashion System, 1967) and Bourdieu (e.g. Distinction, 1977b and Sociology in Question, 1994), these interpretations understand the shoe as a referent, as signifying another thing. Certain types of footwear (or any other garment) might demarcate certain types of person: their taste, class, behaviour, employment and education. Footwear, so often task-specific (work boots, chef’s clogs, stripper’s platforms), affords excellent potential for this type of categorisation. Though the layers of meaning and signification may be complex (e.g. work boots on a fashion model, the multiple meanings afforded to training shoes, re-appropriations and subversions of a signifier of time), this semiotic interpretation is still the predominant means by which
The materiality of shoes is of huge importance in folklore and fairy tale, shoes frequently being made of unusual or impossible materials. Though the glass slipper in *Cinderella* (1812) is the most famous example of this, there are many other strange, materials, such as red hot iron shoes in *Snow White* (1812), timber in a Dutch folktale and copper in a Finnish one. In Cinderella-type tales, ‘slippers are always splendid. Some are red: Madame d’Aulnoy adorned her Finette Cendron’s feet with red velvet embroidered with pearls. Others are of silk, satin, spangled with jewels, matchless, or like the sun. Overall, though, the cinder-girl’s shoes are golden.’ (Davidson in Persson, 2015, p.26) Frequently the materials which shoes are made of are valuable and outlandish, in direct contrast to the shoes’ role as protectors of the feet. This contrast makes the shoe ‘strange’, indicating its role as a magical or transformative object. Within my own practice I often use gold and copper leaf to gild the interiors of the shoe, to make ‘strange’ and obvious the markings of the foot, to highlight them.
footwear is addressed. As with all garments, the shoe functions simultaneously as a form of cultural capital, a marker of taste, and an expression of identity; it is part of the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977a). These semiotic readings of fashion suggest that one can quite literally read someone’s shoes, from the ‘limo’ shoes of a footballer’s wife to the wellington boots of a farmer. The shoe is interpreted as a metonym; a part that becomes representative of the whole. This process of signification renders the material form inert: it functions as a sign rather than a material thing.

It could be suggested that the artefact, over-determined and symbolic, is understood as incapable of emanating meaning of its own, that through the preoccupation with the symbolic qualities of garments they are divested of their power as agents within a material world. Though certain material qualities may be understood to have a symbolic function the materiality of the shoe is overlooked in favour of what the shoe may represent. For many authors it is the shoe’s capacity to become symbolically overloaded which is of interest – the idea that this single item of clothing might become representative of the wearer as a whole. Within the edited volumes which focus exclusively on footwear (Benstock and Ferriss, 2001; Steele and Hill, 2013; Persson, 2015; Riello and McNeil, 2006), the shoe is interpreted predominantly for its symbolic function. For example, a chapter on ‘Queer Shoes’ in Riello and McNeil (2006) explores how shoes were used to demarcate shifting identities within subcultural and mainstream gay groups throughout the twentieth century. Similarly, in discussing eighteenth-century men’s footwear and the foot, McNeil equates the structured form of the shoe, its precision and neatness, with the disciplining of the post-enlightenment body through the scientific and analytical gaze (in Riello and McNeil, 2006). Breward (2006), looking at nineteenth-century men’s footwear, addresses the way that ‘good’ shoe design, design which was both simple and functional, became analogous with the desirable masculine traits of rationality, control and healthfulness: the shoe as a symbol of the body, mind and ethics of its wearer. Barthelemy’s chapter ‘Brogans’ (in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001) examines the capacity of a garment to become analogous, not with individual identity or morality, but with that of a whole culture or group. For Barthelemy the brogan, a roughly made and often uncomfortable boot, is a metaphor for the subjugation inflicted upon African-American slaves’ bodies by both their owners and the state. The ‘awesome and infallible signifying power of the shoes’ (Ibid., p.195) was internalised by their wearers, an inescapable symbol (and bodily reminder) of their perceived inferiority. For Hovey (in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001) the shoe as a metonymic object, representative of the whole, is taken to its most extreme conclusion in Rebecca (Du Maurier, 1938 and Hitchcock, 1940). Here the eponymous and deceased woman’s shoes become her substitute. The shoe in Rebecca is interpreted as both metaphor for the body of the first Mrs De Winter, and as a
18 So embedded is the shoe as a symbol of desire and success in popular women’s fiction (‘Chick Lit’) that a guide to becoming a successful author in the genre is called *Will Write for Shoes: How to Write a Chick Lit Novel* (Yardley, 2007). Shoe symbolism has become a particular trope in women’s fiction and a plethora of books use the shoe in their titles: *The Other Woman’s Shoes* (Parks, 2012), *Her Sister’s Shoes* (Farley, 2015), *If the Shoes Fit* (Lawless, 2010), to name but a few.


20 The idea of the pristine unworn shoe is seemingly linked to our desire for transformation through consumption. Just as in the world of fairy tales a glass slipper may transform us from pauper to princess, so we afford each new pair of shoes the potential for reinvention and change. Sampson (in Hill, 2016, p.239) states: ‘Within a culture of commodity fetishism, shoes come to represent far more than a means of protecting the foot. Footwear has long been a site of conspicuous consumption, from red-heeled seventeenth-century court shoes to red-soled twenty-first-century Christian Louboutins. Footwear acts in a dual manner, both as a status symbol and an artefact that can literally raise you above the street and the heads of others. Perhaps more than any other garment, shoes may demarcate where one stands within the social system: whether one should be looked up to or down upon. In fairy tales, shoes frequently represent a shift in status, from Cinderella’s upward trajectory, to Puss in Boots’ anthropomorphic shift. The acquisition of finer and more delicate shoes indicates the ability to eschew “sensible” shoes designed for manual labour or traversing long distances. In this context, “impossible shoes” such as Cinderella’s glass slippers – shoes that one could never walk in– are particularly telling. Her shift from sabots to slippers, even without the attendant transformation of clothing, pumpkin, and mice, would be enough to indicate her upward social shift.’
symbol of feminine desire: morality and consumption are irretrievably linked.

The shoe is frequently presented as an object of desire. In women’s magazines, ‘chick lit’ and television, the shoe is positioned as an artefact to be lusted over, fantasised about and ultimately acquired. Desire is the predominant theme in contemporary representations of footwear: shoes not as functional objects, but as fetish commodities. The shoe, in many ways one of the most functional of garments, has become synonymous with the type of conspicuous consumption and leisure described by Veblen at the end of the nineteenth century. For Veblen (1899), clothing was one of the sites on which wealth, and thus the capacity for leisure and non-essential consumption, was displayed. Much of the current discussion on footwear reiterates this idea: women’s footwear as the epitome of conspicuous consumption, shoes as artefacts acquired solely for their capacity to convey status and wealth. In media representations of women’s shoes (and of women more generally), the shoe is a site of uncontrollable and pernicious female desire. Shoes, and particularly their purchase, have become metaphors for qualities that patriarchal hegemony assigns to women: compulsivity, hysteria, greed and superficiality. Nowhere is this more evident than in descriptions of Imelda Marcos’s shoe collection (see fig. 3). Here the purchasing of numerous unnecessary shoes is interpreted as representative of extreme moral corruption, even akin to the crimes committed by her husband. Similarly, Carrie, the lead character in HBO’s Sex and the City (HBO, 1998), is presented as having accidentally spent $40,000 on shoes rather than saving to buy her flat (Sex and the City, 1998, episode 64). Footwear is also frequently presented as a site where repressed female qualities re-emerge. Gamman (in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001) writes that women’s shoe-shopping may be seen as a form of narcissistic pleasure and embracing of commodity fetishism, presenting this experience as both a site of narcissistic self-involvement, and as rebellion against and freedom from the domestic and the corporate spheres to which women are tied.

The perceived transformative nature of footwear is most apparent in the fairy tale. In Cinderella, The Red Shoes and The Twelve Dancing Princesses, the shoe is an agent of change. In putting on shoes the heroine in each of these tales is transformed. For Davidson ‘Shoes punish and reward, elevate and entrap, speed and hinder through their own powers or their transformative possibilities’ (in Persson, 2015, p.1). The shoe, with its capacity to transform rich to poor, ugly to beautiful, and girl to woman, is a recurrent symbol in fairy tales, frequently being presented as a trigger for uncontrollable and covetous longing. Within fairy tales the shoe is also often used as a metaphor for the moral or social transformation of the wearer, and is simultaneously the site on which change takes place; to put on shoes is to be transformed. As Davidson summarises, ‘In tales from Ireland to Canada,
See Serres (2008) *The Five Senses* for a more detailed discussion of the possible mistranslation from fur to glass. On this subject Hill (2016) states: “While many elements of fairy tales require a strong suspension of disbelief, the glass slipper has sparked a special debate among fairy tale historians and enthusiasts. One frequently repeated theory is that Perrault erred in his transcription of the oral tale, writing *verre* (glass) rather than *vair* (variegated fur). Others believe that the word was simply mistranslated from French into English. A 1926 article in the *New York Times* was devoted to this supposed mistranslation, stating “When [Perrault] painted for us Cinderella’s gorgeous fineries, he clothed her in bright silks and dainty lace, in rich brocades with gold and silver trimming, in tight bodices and voluminous pannier skirts. Now it was the very height of novelty for fashionable ladies in those seventeenth-century days of Perrault to wear shoes lined or edged and trimmed with soft fur of a kind which had until then been reserved for the robes of the highest in the land. This fur was known as Vair.” (p.46)

The word Cinderella has become so synonymous with the ignored and dismissed, that Sherlock (2011) has described footwear as ‘the Cinderella of fashion theory’. Sherlock sees shoes as artefacts through which changes or transitions are negotiated in the real as well as literary world. In ‘If The Shoe Fits’ (Hockey et al., 2013) the purchasing and owning of shoes is explored as a way users may try out and explore different identities. Different shoes are kept as mementoes and come to represent particular narrative aspects of their user’s lives.

Perhaps the most marked intersection between status and footwear is discussed by Ko (2008) in her book *Cinderella’s Sisters*. Ko explores the history of Chinese foot-binding and lotus shoes in relation to status and embodied experience. Stating that there was not one but multiple foot binding cultures in China which evolved and changed over centuries, Ko examines foot binding as an embodied practice, which made manifest both male and female desire. Ko examines foot binding as a form of skilled women’s work that was highly valued and technically complex. The intersections between this skill and the status afforded to small and neatly bound feet created a complex hierarchy of desire, hegemony, class, empowerment and bodily experience, one which requires a nuanced interpretation.
Iceland to India, wondrous shoes render their owners invisible, carry them on the sea, let them climb a stone pillar, sing their way through the snow, produce love, point out the right road, and even approve judicial decision.’ (Davidson in Persson, 2015, p.26). From Cinderella’s transformation from scullery maid to princess to the anthropomorphically transformed one afforded by the boots in Puss in Boots, shoes in fairy tales are magical or transformative artefacts, the object through which change or transformation is facilitated. The image of the glass slipper in Cinderella (whether or not the material is a mistranslation21), and of an impenetrable shoe, has captured our collective imagination: the term ‘Cinderella’ having become analogous with many forms of positive transformation.22 Cinderella, in particular, has inspired a volume of responses, both analyses of the original tale and literary re-interpretations such as Angela Carter’s Ashenputtle (1987) or The Wronged Daughter: Aspects of Cinderella by Marina Warner (1988).

In both Cinderella (Perrault, 1697; Grimm Brothers, 1812) and The Red Shoes (Andersen, 1845) the quest for shoes pushes women to the edge. In both stories female characters are compelled to sacrifice their feet, their mobility, freedom and independence for the status that shoes represent.23 The Red Shoes (1845), recorded and rewritten by Hans Christian Andersen, presents shoes as addictive, compulsive, and sexualised. Sampson suggests:

Shoes represent both a shift in bodily experience and a giving in to their allure – a loss of self-control. These shoes, with their magical or malevolent qualities, compel the characters to act. There is an obvious ambiguity about who is in control: do the wearers or the shoes perform the dance? For Karen, leaping in agony, the shoes are steadfastly in control. She is overtaken by them. (Sampson, in Hill, 2016, pp.245-6)

Like the glass slipper, the red shoe has become a ‘meta-symbol’ in the language of fashion. Davidson (in Riello and McNeil, 2006) analyses the history of red shoes in film and fairy tale. Red shoes have become a trope within feminist theory, folklore studies and, perhaps most significantly, film. The red shoe (as a metaphor for sexuality, power and desire) has a particular valency, most notably in Powell and Pressburger’s post-war film The Red Shoes (1945), a morality tale demanding that women forego their careers and stay at home. In this film it is the character Vicky Price’s ambition which leads to her demise, the uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire both triggered and symbolised by the red shoes. Similarly, Dorothy’s ‘ruby slippers’ in The Wizard of Oz (Fleming and Langley, 1939) become literally an agent of life and death. In more recent films, red shoes remain a trope; in The Red Shoes (2005), a horror interpretation of the Andersen fairy tale, the covetousness brought
on by shoes is the trigger for a series of terrible events. Davidson presents this film as a conflation of all the previous red shoe tales:

In the Korean film *The Red Shoes* (*Bunhongsin* (Yong-gyun Kim, 2005)) gruesome answers to this question reveal the fatality of possessiveness in a ghost-tale concerning female identity and the psychological power of shoes. Motifs from the Japanese – and Korean – horror genre intertwine with ideas from two Western sources to which the title pays homage: Hans Christian Andersen’s fairytale ‘The Red Shoes’ (1845) and the Powell and Pressburger ballet film of 1948. Three works wrapped within one title form the first of many triads recurrent through the film, repetitions of two women pivoting their opposition on a contested object of desire, whether man or pair of shoes. *Bunhongsin* prioritises the violence implicit in the earlier texts to enhance the potency of the red shoes symbol as a vehicle for impassioned, destructive ‘self-fashioning’. (Davidson in Uhlírova 2008, p.143)

Mackie (in Benstock & Ferriss, 2001) presents a feminist reading of red shoes and, through them, the bloodied pointe shoes of the ballerina. The pointe shoe leads us to another interpretation of footwear – its role in expressions of sexuality and fetish. Extreme footwear, so removed from the mundane daily shoe, has long held academic interest: both in relation to the high heel’s incapacitating nature and to its capacity to raise the wearer up to a pedestal like height. In *Shoe Obsession* (2013) Steele and Hill explore fetish shoes in the broadest sense, examining both very high heels and the compulsive desire to collect shoes. Heel height is interpreted here as analogous with power and freedom to move – very high shoes lifting their wearers high above the ground. For Steele and Hill (2013) as for Rossi (1993), the allure of a high-heeled shoe is its capacity to change the gait of the wearer.

For Freud the shoe could be interpreted as a vaginal symbol: ‘the shoe or slipper is a corresponding symbol of the female genitals’ (Freud, 1905, p.299), just as the foot was a corresponding symbol for the male genitals. This interpretation of the shoe is reductive; any and all container-like vessels could symbolise, and stand in for, female genitalia. Though the shoe may be a gendered object, this gendering is a consequence of performance, design and use rather than genital resemblance. For Abraham (1910), the shoe was a site of great conflict and desire. In his 1910 paper on shoe and corset fetishism Abraham describes how, through the process of binding the shoe to the foot, its slimness, delicacy and restraint become qualities of desire for the patient. Here, rather than the shoe being simply a sexual symbol, the act of putting the shoe on the foot becomes sexualised. In his interpretation of fairy tales, Bruno Bettelheim (1976) sees Cinderella’s glass slipper as:
A tiny receptacle into which some part of the body can slip and fit tightly [...] as a symbol of the vagina. Something that is brittle and must not be stretched because it would break reminds us of the hymen; and something that is easily lost at the end of a ball when one’s lover tries to keep hold of his beloved seems an appropriate image for virginity, particularly when the male sets a trap – the pitch on the stairs – to catch her. Cinderella’s running away from this situation could be seen as her effort to protect her virginity. (Bettelheim, 1976, p.265)

Bettelheim suggests that, in offering the prince her shoe, Cinderella is offering her virginity. Bettelheim’s focus on the shoe as a vaginal symbol obscures what the glass slipper actually is: a shoe too fragile to walk or move in, a shoe that renders the wearer immobile – an impossible shoe. Similarly Thomas (1999), in her psychoanalytic interpretation of ‘The Worn-Out Dancing Shoes’, views the trips to the underground world each night as a metaphor for masturbation and thus the awakening of the princesses’ desire. Though both Thomas and Bettleheim focus upon fairy tale, the act of interpreting the shoe as a locus of fetish or a metaphor for genitals traps the shoe in the realm of the symbolic, distancing it from the real material shoe. Stallybrass (in Turner, 2014) writing of Freud, dematerialisation and the fetish states:

For what is it that Freud discovers in the fetish? Not a shoe, but a system of displacement. Freud, in this at least, is the true heir of Protestantism. The fetish cannot be a real presence; rather, it symbolizes an absence. The culture of capital feels the greatest embarrassment before materiality itself, for it reduces the subject to silence. One enters speech, in this new regime, through the disavowal of the materiality of the object. In front of a shoe, Freud finds meaning; in front of a painting of tulips, an art critic finds a memento mori. (Stallybrass in Turner, 2014, p.278)

What emerges from this brief overview of the literature on footwear is that the shoe tends to be interpreted as a symbolic, metaphorical, or imaginary artefact; that the real shoe and its particular materiality are seldom explored. When the material rather than the literary or filmic shoe is discussed, it is often in terms of its symbolic function rather than its material qualities or the embodied experience of wearing it. Although recent research, such as ‘If the Shoe Fits’ at Sheffield University (Hockey et al., 2013), has focused more directly on the everyday shoe, there is an emphasis on the purchase of footwear and the narratives that its owners attach to shoes. This research seeks instead to explore both the attachment created through wear and the affective qualities of the worn shoe.
How then, to explore the real shoe, the everyday shoe – the shoe that is worn and used? What methodologies can be employed to examine a commonplace but over-determined artefact – a thing which is simultaneously fetishised and mundane? How might one bring into focus artefacts which are obfuscated by their everyday nature, and what might that focus reveal?

The material artefact is often typified as mute or inert, active only when imbued with human agency. If we shift our focus from the artefact’s symbolic qualities and engage with its materiality, might then these artefacts be heard? This research seeks to place the artefact, the shoe, at its centre. Through an iterative process of making, wear, and observation, it aims to make apparent the intimacies of our relationship with shoes. Rather than record the narratives which we apply to footwear, it seeks to highlight the material traces of these relationships: to present the ways they are embodied within the artefacts themselves.

In exploring this, it asks four questions:

- What is the relationship between the shoe, the body and the mind?
- How can the act of wearing create attachment between the wearer and the worn?
- How might the shoe become integrated into our psychic selves through making, use and wear?
- What is our relationship with the used and empty shoe – the shoe without the body, the shoe no longer worn?

These questions are not discrete entities but are part of a whole, asking what our relationship is with the things we wear. Through focus on the intimacies of our relationship to a particular garment, the shoe, it asks, more broadly, what is our
Phelan writes: ‘performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented ... Performance’s being ... becomes itself through disappearance.’ (1993, p.146) Schneider (2001) critiques this position for acknowledging neither bodily memory of performance (the very thing which allows a dancer to perform the same phrase many times) nor the material traces of the performance.
relationship with clothes and how do they act upon us? How and why do we become entangled with garments over time?

This research is research through practice, into the nature of our relationships with shoes, through making artefacts and images (installation, film and photographs). This is material culture research enacted through the production of art objects. It situates itself as art practice; the shoes produced are not footwear in a conventional sense but instead are objects designed to amplify and make explicit their role as records of gesture and experience. The empty shoes are records of an absent performance, of gestures which are lost to the viewer, so that only their traces, the marks upon the shoe, remain. This research is concerned with the amplification of wear, making these traces more apparent or explicit for the viewer. It attempts to amplify the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the shoe and the foot, the minutiae of the processes of wearing. By taking these artefacts into the gallery space my practice aims to intensify the affect usually experienced when viewing a worn shoe. The new knowledge which stems from this research is in this apprehension, this uncovering. I aim to create an encounter between the viewer and the artefact, one which highlights the ways garments and the body intermingle – how, when the garment and the body are cleaved, we read and experience the traces left behind.

This research, like the object of its study, is paired, resulting in two distinct but interdependent manifestations of knowledge – the verbal, and the bodily-material. Though the text and the artefacts are designed to sit alongside one another, they are not analogous. These different forms of knowing informed each other, each building upon the knowledge developed by the other. The two bodies of knowledge may complement and contextualise each other but do not attempt to describe one another. Goett, writing of the relationship between text and artefact in her research practice articulates a similar position: ‘Its task is neither to describe ... nor to explain the artwork and thereby reduce its meaning, taking away from the receiver a multitude of potential links to be made beyond the stated and verbalised intentions of the artist’ (Goett, 2009, p.82). The artefacts are auto-ethnographic objects, objects which directly embody experience. This writing does not describe their making through wear, because it is manifest within them, visible in the marks imprinted upon their form. These non-verbal records, embedded in the artworks, do not require translation into words, because they themselves embody a form of knowledge, which is apparent and available for those who view them. Macleod, on the artwork as a form of knowledge, suggests: ‘this is theory which is not written; it is made or realised through artwork. This theory is the result of ideas worked through matter. It might be appropriate to see this as a matrixial theory, a complex
of ideas/matter/form and theory which is external to practice.’ (Macleod, 2000, p.5) The text here is not a theoretical framework designed to shore up ambiguous artefacts, but is an alternative manifestation of the same ideas and processes. Neither are the artefacts and images designed as illustrations to the text. Word and object complement one another, each saying something the other may not. As the practices were conducted simultaneously, both the writing and making work were changed through the enacting of practice. To return to Macleod, ‘the written text was instrumental to the conception of the art projects but the art projects themselves exacted a radical rethinking of what had been constructed in written form because the process of realising or making artwork altered what had been defined in written form’ (Ibid., p.3).

For Scrivener (2002) the role of the artist as researcher is in uncovering (making present or apparent); creating and uncovering knowledge through its manifestation as a material form. Candy and Edmunds suggest that for Scrivener: ‘art is not concerned with communicating knowledge based on a justification of that knowledge’ (in Candy and Edmunds in Biggs and Karlsson, 2010, p.124). That is to say, the artwork’s role is not to present explanations but to produce or enable the encounter – to create an affective experience. For Scrivener, art as research is concerned with producing apprehensions, and the experience of viewing the artwork must create a new way of knowing for the viewer: that through the experience of viewing the work, new knowledge should come into being.

This research is research by practice. It is research into an artefact via that artefact’s production; I the researcher both observe and produce the object of study. It is, to borrow Frayling’s (1993) categorisation, ‘research through the arts’ (Frayling’s, 1993, p. 5). The subject of this research is not the act of making, but rather making is the means through which the research is conducted; making as a form of uncovering knowledge. The nature of making as research practice is iterative; an artefact is made, used, and observed, these processes repeated many times. This research is about wearing and looking; about the experience of the artefacts for the wearer and the viewer. It is research through making rather than into making, making facilitating the interaction between wearer, the viewer and the shoe.

Entanglement as methodology

This research adopts a methodology based around theories of entanglement; of the enmeshed and indivisible relationship between artefact and user. Hodder (2012) writes of people and things being ‘entangled’, inseparable from their environments. The user, artefact and environment are in a continuous reiterative dialogue, every
Ingold (2007) comments on the critical difference between the two disciplines of anthropology and ethnography: ‘the objective of anthropology, I believe is to seek a generous, comparative but nevertheless human, being and knowing in the one world we all inhabit. The objective of ethnography is to describe the lives of people other than ourselves, with an accuracy and sensitivity honed by detailed observation and prolonged first-hand experience. My thesis is that anthropology and ethnography are endeavors of quite different kinds.’ (Ingold, 2007, p.1)

See Chapter One for further discussion of Winnicott’s (1971) formulation of transitional phenomena and the ‘me and not me’ object.
change impacting the next. Hodder explores the complex and dynamic co-dependence of humans and things, seeing the world as one of affordances and links. Drawing upon Gibson’s (1979) theory of affordances, he interprets the world as one in which artefacts afford or allow human behaviours. A shoe, for example, may permit a user to walk longer, while a chair may allow them to sit, or a path to cross space. Material things facilitate and produce our relationships with the external world.

Within this thesis the terms entanglement, intermingling and incorporation are afforded dual meaning, referring both to the physical cleaving of garments and body through touch and wear and to the psychic mingling as the garment becomes a repository for bodily experience and is simultaneously incorporated into the wearer’s psyche or body ego. Instead of attempting to lessen this entanglement, in hope of an elusive objectivity, this research embraces the entangled position of maker and wearer as researcher. It places this enmeshed nature of our relationship with the material world at its centre, as both the subject of this research and its methodology. Borrowing from the terminology of Merleau-Ponty (1962), this research uses a methodology of ‘being in the world’. Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘being in the world’ particularly in relation to motility, moving and walking, ones ‘projective capacity’ as integral to the formulation of the self. Ingold, in writing on ethnography and anthropology,25 writes of the idea of ‘observing from the inside’ (2014) as central to fieldwork practice. That one must ‘attend to what others are doing or saying and to what is going on around and about; to follow along where others go and to do their bidding, whatever this might entail and wherever it might take you’ (Ibid., p.389); that the anthropologist must be ‘along with’ their subject. This ‘being with’, this participation, is the act of acknowledging and embracing one’s enmeshed relationship with the research subject. In this research I was ‘along with’ my subject; I made, I walked, I wore.

This ‘being in’ blurs the line between subject and object, between ‘me and not me’.26 Makers are, through the tactile experience of making, entangled with the artefacts they make, and inseparable from them. Through this entanglement, the subject/object divide is not only blurred but may become completely obscured; the maker and the object of their study becoming one and the same. However, it is exactly this ambiguity between subject and object, between me and not me, which is central to both the methodological and theoretical framework of this research. The ambiguity between subject and object, which Schilder (1935) formulates as the ‘bodily Schema’ and Winnicott (1971) as the ‘me and not me’ of transitional phenomena, is mirrored in my research practice. It is this very thing, the intermingling of subject and object, which my research seeks to explore, and that I, the researcher, aim to embody. The products of my research are undoubtedly entangled with me; I have made them,
worn them, photographed and observed them; they are my objects in multiple ways. By acknowledging my position at the centre of this research, I use techniques borrowed from auto-ethnographers such as Taussig (1983); I acknowledge and embrace my subjective position within this work. My own subjectivity and sensory experience are inseparable from the research; seeing, sensing and knowing have become entwined. In locating myself as subject I utilise Pink’s (2015) formulation that

(auto)ethnography is a process of creating and representing knowledge (about society, culture and individuals) that is based on ethnographers’ own experiences. It does not claim to produce an objective or truthful account of reality, but should aim to offer versions of ethnographers’ experiences of reality that are as loyal as possible to the context, negotiations and inter-subjectivities through which the knowledge was produced. (Pink, 2015, p.22)

Making gives the researcher the ability to alter or enhance the experience of the artefact in a manner that would not be possible through observation alone. They come to know their subject through touch and also through the material manipulation of its form. The capacity to observe closely is central to all forms of research. For the maker, the capacity to look, and the self-reflexive ability to spot an error and correct it, is an intrinsic tool in the production of the artefact. Making is about understanding through looking and touching, but also about referencing plans, drawings and the fantasy of the completed artefact. The practice of making is one of charting the dissonances between intention and actuality. The auto-ethnographic process is self-reflexive; I am the producer and simultaneously the product of this research. The shifts in my research have been mirrored by shifts in my own capacity to contain and articulate knowledge. For Ellis and Bochner (2000) auto-ethnography is successful when it provides affective experience for the reader. Similarly, Richardson (2000) states that successful auto-ethnography must be substantive, aesthetic, reflexive, impactful and expressive. This research therefore aims to produce artefacts which are substantive, aesthetic, reflexive, impactful and expressive: to create auto-ethnographic artefacts and ‘thing-like’ texts.

Artefacts and images

The works which constitute the output of this research (and make up the exhibition which this thesis accompanies) span a range of relationships with and experiences of wearing shoes. ‘Fold’ presents a series of simplified cloth shoes, worn and photographed as they imprinted and collapsed through wear. Their simple folded structure allows them to be opened and laid flat after wearing, making the marks
Fig 4. Dance Shoes (2014)
of use apparent. ‘Minpaku/Interior’ examines the intimate experience of looking closely at the things we wear. These photographs present the interior of the shoe as a hidden and intimate space. The film ‘Dance’ (see fig. 4) and accompanying shoes explore the shoe as a record of a particular time and place. Each shoe, worn for a single performance, becomes a record of those particular gestures, temporary and unrepeatable. ‘Worn’ brings together these threads, presenting twenty-four pairs of shoes that I made, wore and photographed over the course of a year. The Appendices which follow the thesis are a visual archive of the practice, performances and exhibitions which constituted the research.

This research employs shoe and image making as its primary practices, constructing objects and making images of them as they are used and worn. However, central to the research is the practice of wearing, of using these handmade shoes, and through use altering their material form. As such, it positions wearing as another form of ‘making’; the shoes are transformed through use. This wear ‘activates’ the objects, they become resonant with experience. They are made affective not only through design or production but through the process of bodily imprint. These are objects which are ‘made’ through wear. The aim in making these objects was to amplify the marks of wear, to make them apparent, and unavoidable. In doing this it draws into focus the experience of viewing the worn shoe, to create an encounter for the viewer. Display, the act of lifting the shoe from the ground and placing it in the gallery, in the vitrine, or on the plinth, clearly alters our experience of the shoe. Decontextualized, the viewer’s experience of the worn shoe is amplified; it is not simply an abject, discarded, object, but a record or trace. I aim to induce an affective encounter for the viewer at this point of display.

The research practice is concerned with making shoes that break down or alter as they are worn; increasing the speed and intensity of decay and wear. These shoes break down more readily than ‘normal’ shoes and are open, so that the imprints of the body are revealed. The shoes make this relationship visible for the viewer and in doing so shift the focus from the shoe as a commodity to the shoe as a record. In doing this, I have abstracted the shoe’s form, taken it apart and simplified its construction; stripping it back to the bare bones of what a shoe must be. I have emphasised certain qualities: the capacity of the insole to bear an imprint of the wearer’s foot, the soft enfolding nature of a slipper, the solidity and echoing resonance of wooden soles. I have made objects whose insides are explicit and open; which demand that the viewer engages with the intimate materiality of wear. Thus this research draws upon a methodology of ‘making strange’, of defamiliarisation of the shoe and of wearing as an everyday practice. The shoe is made strange both in the abstraction of its form – so that it is not ‘read’ as an
An exception was making the film Dance with dancer and choreographer Nicole Gaurino. Nicole and I collaborated both on the choreography of the performance and on the functionality of the shoes. The process of developing shoes became one of looking, mirroring and adaptation, our desires for potentially different outcomes fused in a single material artefact. (see Fig. 5) Firstly we used the shoes as an inspiration, borrowing movements from them in order to create motifs. Through a process of observation, recording and mimicry, Nicole was able to copy the movements I produced in my shoes. She was literally stepping into my shoes, inhabiting my day-to-day movements. This quotation from the auto-ethnographic writing that I was doing at the time highlights this tension: ‘I cannot dance. I am not a dancer. My body is nothing like hers. She is small and I am tall. She has danced almost every day since she was five years old, I dance only at nightclubs and weddings. And yet I am lending her my gestures, the staccato uncomfortableness of my bodily self. I lend her my movements and ask her to amplify them. To make apparent those gestures I wish to ignore. To step into my shoes …’ Simultaneously I worked to develop footwear that would in itself inform the dance. The heeled wooden and metal clogs which were simultaneously rigid and bouncy were designed to be unstable and to challenge Nicole. We consciously chose to use a new pair of shoes for each rehearsal and later performance so that each time she would meet the shoes anew, and through the course of the dance learn to handle them. Because the shoes were awkward to move in, our dance motifs became strategies for dealing with the shoes; movements that would allow Nicole to test them. The dance was informed by the limitations and peculiarities of the shoes. The performance developed a narrative arch in which slowly Nicole would master the shoes and push them towards breaking point.

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everyday shoe – and by placing it, an everyday and potentially abject artefact, in the gallery. In abstracting the shoe I drew upon two traditions of shoe making, the soft and the hard shoe. These shoes are simple, a single piece of material, cut, folded and tied in order to envelop the foot. The shoes broke down quickly, moulding to the foot as they stretched and wore. Eventually the softest shoes, those made only of silks and leather, broke down completely, disintegrating under the weight of my body. Simultaneously I made clogs and pattens, hard wooden and metal over-shoes which chipped, scratched and bent, rather than stretching or fraying. Hard shoes pushed back against my body, jarring my knees and stubbing my toes.

Wearing

The ambiguity of this relationship is increased by the fact that I, the shoes’ maker, am often also their wearer. This research through making is also research through wearing; my body as the locus of practice.\(^{27}\) Wearing, as the extended sensory interaction of the garment and the skin, is at the centre of this research methodology. As I read and wrote, carved and sewed, I also walked in the shoes that I had made. This wearing was a performance enacted over many months, a performance recorded in the objects themselves. They travelled with me and became records of my movements and experiences. The tactile experience of wearing is often pushed aside in fashion research in favour of the experience of looking. Touch is central to our capacity both to self-identify and to relate to others; it is through touching that we come to know ourselves and the world. For Pink (2015) ‘sensory knowing is produced through participation with the world’ and it was through these participations (walking to the shops, meeting friends, going to college) that my knowing was made. Though I kept a diary of the emotional and sensory experiences of wear (excerpts of which are interwoven into this text), I did not seek to record in writing the distances I had walked or the journeys I undertook; instead the shoes themselves became the record. Here wearing is understood as central, as a simultaneously creative and destructive act. The shoes I produced are ‘made’ through the act of wearing, the process of imprint and wear making my attachment to them implicit and explicit; materially manifest and verbally unspoken. As I wore the shoes they broke down, the weight of my body causing them to split, crack and fray. They leaked and gave me blisters – my relationship with them was fractious and ambiguous. I did not always like the shoes I had made.

Making marks, making material meanings

This research is, at its most basic level, concerned with mark-making practices, with the ways that gesture may be preserved in material form. It seeks to look at
these marks on our clothing and confront them as traces of the body. Gesture is the confluence of the body in space and time; a meeting of intentionality, or unconscious and involuntary drives, bodily capacity and environmental agencies, creating a single and temporal line. Each gesture is unique; though a movement may be repeated, it is never the same. Rather than viewing these marks as symbols or as hieroglyphs which refer to something else, this research seeks to address them as what they are: records of lost movements. This research is a documentation of trace, a focus upon the encounter with the material outside or beyond language.

This research utilises both walking and writing as mark-making practices, as gestures whose output is inscription. Writing is a mark-making practice, gesture recorded in material (or digital) form. Much of this research was written by hand before being transcribed, the tactile experience of pen and paper as a manifestation of the ideas this research produced. Inscription, and the materialisation of gesture are often linked to memory; the internalisation of experience and the materialisation of gesture is analogous and may be compared. Since Plato the idea of memory as akin to an imprint has been prevalent in writing on remembrance, recollection and forgetting. The incising of material has particular mnemonic function, it allows us to preserve or retain gesture which would otherwise be lost. Similarly footprints are records of gesture, the body progressing through space and time. Footprints are frequently presented as indices, as referent of a now absent body. Forster, in discussing the work of Peirce on the index states, ‘My footprint represents my foot – as opposed to some other object of the same shape and size, because it is my foot that caused it. This causal connection is what qualifies the footprint as an index.’ (Forster, 2011, p. 90) However the footprint is not only a signifier of an absent body, it is also the trace of a gesture, of a body ‘being’ and moving in the world; a footprint is a gesture materialized.

Walking

Walking was the primary means of mark making for much of this research; a process of imprint through movement. Walking holds a particular place in culture; not only are our movements learnt, but they are socially and culturally specific. The way we walk is indicative of who we are and who we would like to be. In ‘Techniques of the Body’ Mauss (1935) writes of his ability to identify people by their walks, not only in situations where walking is fundamentally performative such as a regiment marching, but in non-performative settings like walking down the street: ‘for example I think I can recognize a girl who has been raised in a convent. In general, she will walk with her fists closed. And I can still remember my third form teacher shouting at me: “Idiot! Why do you walk around the whole time with your hands
28 De Certeau (1984) famously commences his discussion of practice with a passage describing walking from the heights of the World Trade Center down into the streets of New York. The marks mapped out by our footsteps are, for De Certeau, cartographies of social structures; they are material or temporal manifestations of our networks: ‘They are myriad, but do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation. Their swarming mass is an innumerable collection of singularities. Their intertwined paths give their shape to spaces. They weave places together. In that respect, pedestrian movements form one of these “real systems whose existence in fact makes up the city.” They are not localized; it is rather they that spatialize.’ (De Certeau, 1984, p.97)

29 Paleoanthropologist Leroi-Gourhan (1993) suggested that bipedalism – the capacity to walk on two feet – was at the root of the development of human tool use. That freeing the hands by walking on two feet allowed for the development of making and through that of material culture.

30 In no place is the public nature of walking as evident as it is in the contrast between the mannequin and the flâneur. The cat-walker, the mannequin, walks only to be observed, their walk is designed to court the eye. Evans (2013) writes of the ways that the walks of models (the intersections of their bodily and social selves) were developed and reproduced in accordance with the fashions of the time, the posing of the body as a mediated social construction. In contrast the flâneur, wandering the streets, highlights walking as an act of looking, of observing the multiple modes of city life. The flâneur may preen or pose, but his motive is to remain unobserved, a voyeur in the midst of a crowd. It may be worth highlighting the gendered natured of these forms of walking, women on display to the ‘male gaze’ and available, men hidden and looking.
flapping wide open?” Thus there is an education to walking too.” (Mauss, 1935, p.458) Walking, more than almost any other activity, renders us social beings. Walking is an intersection of the social, the biological and the personal; it is learned, enacted and performed. Walking exclusively on two feet is a uniquely human trait: that we are upright mammals defines us. Bataille in ‘The Big Toe’ writes of the big toe (non-opposable) as ‘the most human part of the human body’ (Bataille, 1929, p.1), the most differentiated from other apes. He suggests that uprightness or verticality is the defining feature of being human; presenting the foot as an object of shame, the part of us closest to the ground from which we have been elevated. Walking is the act of being present in the world. It is a means of presencing the self, the conflation of intention and existence in the public sphere. In walking, the body, the self and the personal accoutrements that make up our material culture are placed on display. One is not simply being, but being in relation to the material world. Acts of self-display are often described in terms of walking, of strutting and striding, of sashays and streaks. To walk is to make oneself into a social being, to take oneself outside.

Looking and making images

Though much of this research practice is concerned with making and wearing shoes, the paired practices of looking and image making are equally important. This research is a call to attend more closely to the materiality of the things we wear and to the ways they age and alter. My methodology uses looking closely, engaging with the intricacies of wear, gesture, and trace. Looking closely has a particular quality to it; it is quite different from looking at a distance. The object viewed at a distance is knowable and bounded, and as such may be contained. In the voyeuristic act of looking from a distance we render the artefact static; it is objectified. Proximity presents an alternative viewing experience; the artefact up close envelops us, we are subsumed. Without a horizon to steady us, the viewing experience is akin to vertigo; up and down, inside and outside, me and not me become confused. This loss of perspective can become pleasurable; one is enveloped in the object as edges and boundaries disappear. In looking closely one attends to the very materiality of the object, not as an artefact in a system or network of things, but as an encounter which encompasses and envelops us. This experience is akin to what James calls ‘a pure experience’: ‘in optical vertigo, caused by unconscious movements of our eyes, both we and the external universe appear to be in a whirl. When clouds float by the moon, it is as if both clouds and moon and we ourselves shared in the motion.’ (James, 1905, p.284) Thus the photographs become a method of estrangement. In this process the images reference the work of Karl Blossfeldt (1865-1932) whose photographs presence the tactility of the material word above all else (see fig. 6).
Fig 7. Mother’s # 35 (2001)
Benjamin wrote of Blossfeldt’s images:

At the same time photography uncovers in this material physiognomic aspects of pictorial words which live in the smallest things, perceptible yet covert enough to find shelter in daydreams, but which, once enlarged and capable of formulation, show the difference between technology and magic to be entirely a matter of historical variables. Thus Blossfeldt, in his astonishing plant photography, revealed the most ancient column forms in pewter-glass, totem-poles in ten times magnified sprigs of chestnut and acorn, gothic tracery in teasel. (Benjamin, 1931, pp.7-8)

In this instance the aim was to externalise the intense and scopophilic experience of looking closely, an attempt to replicate the vertiginous experience of attending to an object; to materialise the practice of looking closely and the pleasure that this brings.

The Photograph

To transform looking closely from a performative act to a material one requires tools, a means through which to preserve the drive of attention. In photographing the object, one is attempting to retain it, not internally but externally as a material form. Barthes, in *Camera Lucida*, suggests that:

in Photography I can never deny that the thing has been there. There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the past. And since this constraint exists only for photography, we must consider it, by reduction, as the very essence, the noeme of Photography ... The name of Photography’s noeme will therefore be: ‘That-has-been’, or again: ‘the Intractable’. (1980, pp. 76-77)

The idea of ‘That-has-been’ or ‘the Intractable’ is brought to the fore in the works of Ishiuchi Miyako, whose photographs of the material traces of lives make present the role of the artefact as witness. In both her series *Hiroshima* (2008), which captures artefacts left behind by those who died there, and *Mother’s* (2002), (see fig. 7), which captured her dead mother’s personal effects, she explores how absence is present in the most mundane artefacts. Her photographs, including many of shoes, refer to bodies no longer present, artefacts which are imprinted with and resonant of irretrievable pasts.

Over the course of this research, image making emerged as an integral aspect of my practice. Initially the images were documentary (see Appendix B – Images from Archives), their aim being to record or highlight aspects of wear. However,
31 Both the quantity of images that could be produced and their capacity to be reproduced infinitely made digital photography seem at times incompatible with a practice based around indexical trace and wear.

32 Though the material object is certainly also ‘here-now’.

33 Also see Didi-Huberman (1997) on contact images and pinhole cameras.
over time it became apparent that this process of image making was itself a part of my practice. These intimate and enlarged images served to highlight the marks of wear in a manner that was affective (see fig. 8) - taking photographs as a means of looking closely. The image making became a process of uncovering the intimate and hidden parts of the shoe, making these spaces unavoidably present. In the series Minpaku/Interior, the act of photographing the interior of Japanese straw snowshoes uncovered spaces and details which were difficult for the eye to perceive. The blown-up images are disorientating – it is difficult to understand their scaleless nature or to locate oneself within them.

The index and Polaroid

At times this research required that the images themselves had (rather than represented) a materiality; that they were themselves indexical. Of the index, Iversen writes: ‘The index as trace, however, is produced or caused by actual contact with an object (a footprint in the sand, for example) but the object itself is absent. In this instance, attention is directed to something that was present in the past. As Doane observes: “The trace does not evaporate in the moment of its production, but remains as the witness to an anteriority.”’ (Iversen, 2012, tate.org.uk). Though there is much debate about the indexical nature of the photograph, here the digital photograph is interpreted as representational rather than indexical. To paraphrase (and distort) Barthes’ terminology (1977), the worn garment, as a bearer of indexical trace, is a ‘having-been-there’ object and the photographic print is an ‘almost-been-there’ object. The print itself (rather than the negative, the ‘lightcast’) was not present at the creation of the image. Prints taken from negatives have never touched the original or been present at the moment of recording; the reproduction is rarely indexical. For Benjamin,

Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence. This includes the changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the various changes in its ownership. The traces of the first can be revealed only by chemical or physical analyses which it is impossible to perform on a reproduction; changes of ownership are subject to a tradition which must be traced from the situation of the original. The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity. (Benjamin, 1936 in Arendt, 1968, p. 218)

When Peirce, in 1902, wrote of the photograph as an index, photography was in its infancy, exposures were long and multiple prints rare. The negative is a true index
Mulvey (1975) writes of cinema as creating, or perpetuating a sense of separation between viewers and viewed. They are excluded from the world of the moving image, in this exclusion their position as lone voyeur is amplified: ‘But the mass of mainstream film, and the conventions within which it has consciously evolved, portray a hermetically sealed world which unwinds magically, indifferent to the presence of the audience, producing for them a sense of separation and playing on their voyeuristic phantasy. Moreover, the extreme contrast between the darkness in the auditorium (which also isolates the spectators from one another) and the brilliance of the shifting patterns of light and shade on the screen helps to promote the illusion of voyeuristic separation’. (Laura Mulvey 1975, p.3). This separation, the meeting of the present-absence of the viewer and the absent-presence of the actor/performer, is amplified within my own work by the simultaneous presence of the used shoes. This artefact, the ‘having-been there’ object acts as an intermediary between the viewer and the film. It is both ‘here-now’ with the viewer and at the same time it is ‘there-then’ within the film. Thus the artefact serves to emphasize the distance between the filmic record and the viewer. Within the film ‘Dance’, this distance, the unreality of the viewing experience is again emphasised by the use of three cameras positioned around the room. Thus the viewer, sees the same performance from three angles simultaneously. The camera allows them to view the film while emphasising the temporal impossibility of the viewer being in it. Similarly for Benjamin the camera distances viewer and viewed, so that ‘the public need not respect the performance as an integral whole. Guided by the cameraman, the camera continually changes its position with respect to the performance. The sequence of positional views which the editor composes from the material supplied him constitutes the completed film. It comprises certain factors of movement which are in reality those of the camera, not to mention special camera angles, close-ups, etc.’. (Benjamin 1936 in 1968 p. 79)
in Peirce’s sense, an object touched by light, which has touched the original form: a lightcast. It is akin to a footprint in gelatine and silver. Responding to the need for a material image (one which might fade or crease or fall apart), this research utilises Polaroid. Polaroid is a positive image, the image and the negative are one and the same. A Polaroid image removes the possibility of normal photographic reproduction; in developing, the negative becomes the photograph itself and is destroyed. Using a 1970s’ medical-forensic Polaroid lens enabled the creation of close-up images with a pronounced materiality (see fig. 9).

This research is concerned with the relationship between the image and the artefact; the differing manifestations of trace and gesture contained within an object and represented in an image. Gesture recorded in film is set against the same gestures recorded in material form. The dissonances between these records reveal a spatio-temporal uncertainty, an ambiguity between the ‘here-now’ and ‘the-having-been-there’. Viewing the artefacts and film together is quite other than viewing them separately. Barthes suggests of this meeting of the here-now and the there-then:

The type of consciousness the photograph involves is indeed truly unprecedented, since it establishes not a consciousness of the being there of the thing (which any copy could provoke) but an awareness of its having-been-there. What we have is a new space-time category: spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the photograph being an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the there-then. (Barthes, 1977, p.44)

Though Barthes’ formulation of ‘having-been-there’ may be at odds with interpretation of the used garment as indexical and the photographic image as reproduction, the dissonance between ‘the here-now’ and ‘the there-then’ is precisely what I wish to induce in the viewer. Together the film, artefacts and viewer triangulate: the ‘having been there’ of the garment, the ‘almost-been-there’ of the image and the ‘not-there’ of the viewer.34 This interplay between the record and the viewer is where I hope the affective experience, the ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 1977) which is the output of this research, will emerge.

My research is about the spaces and situations where material artefacts (not us) and ourselves (us) meet and intertwine – in what happens when artefact and psyche meet. The artist is in a unique position to examine this. Research has, for a long time, been dominated by text and the textual, by written interpretations of the material world. While these interpretations may be insightful or poetic, it is important to recognise that a ‘word’ is not a material form and a ‘form’ is not a word. The signifier and signified, however closely related, are not equivalent. In the shift
between one form and another, something will always be lost. While the writing and material output relate to each other as closely as they can, they are not the same thing. They are instead like two parallel lines, close but never meeting. They are akin to the childhood mirror game, a game in which both players try to mimic each other precisely, each new gesture demanding the other reconfigure themselves to match. In the mirror game there is always a dissonance, a delay between seeing and responding. And it is in these dissonances, the spaces between writing and making, between what can be seen and what can be said, that I hope the new knowledge will unfurl.
Today the noise of my shoes, the slap of flip-flops against my soles, is mirrored by the sounds of the street outside. Outside my window thousands of feet hit the floor in rhythmic time as they run the 13 miles of a half-marathon. The paced rhythm of marathon running is so at odds with the usual patter of the street. Their feet hit the ground: one foot, two foot in time with one another; the sound of the impact amplified as though their bodies are singing as one.

The sound of my shoes reminds me that I am walking, that they are there with me companion, and aid. They mirror my movements, each step followed by the fleshy slap. Slip slap, slip slap I sound across the kitchen floor. A woman accompanied by her echo.
The shoes are biting me. The central strap pushing into the soft white flesh of my sole. Each step jars, a constant nagging reminder of what my feet are doing, of where I have to go. I move onwards slowly, conscious of my steps . . .

Bored and in pain I pause on the street and break a conker under my shoe, the first of the year. I can feel the green needles of the shell through the sole of the shoe, a strange masochistic pleasure in rolling the fruit under my foot; as it cracks the conker emerges, white and under-cooked as dough on the pavement. It is not what I want. I move on.

Later on an escalator, I push the arch of my foot against the lip of the step; I want to feel the prickle of green needles again.
Attachment: Shoes, touch and the bodily schema
The ESRC-funded project by Hockey et al. (2013) ‘If The Shoe Fits: Footwear, Identity and Transition’ at Sheffield University looked at the symbolic meanings afforded to shoe shopping. In particular they examined how buying shoes and keeping them when they are not worn might be linked to the maintenance of past or fantasy identities. A summary of the research can be read at http://www.socresonline.org.uk/18/1/20.html.

If we are to understand rites of passage as the point at which the mechanisms through which the body is disciplined shift, then clothing is one of the ways through which these changing disciplines are manifested.

In Europe there is a long history of using children’s shoes to ‘correct’ the form of the foot and aid the development of a good and docile body. From the fifteenth century shoes were used to ‘swaddle’ children’s feet (see Grew and de Neergaard, 1988). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a strong discourse surrounding children’s foot health developed. Rousseau famously said in *Emile*: ‘Let Émile run about barefoot all the year round, upstairs, downstairs, and in the garden. Far from scolding him, I shall follow his example; only I shall be careful to remove any broken glass.’ (1763)

Latour (2009) in ‘Where are the Missing Masses?’ explores how artefacts may be afforded moral responsibilities and in doing so play an active role in the disciplining of the body. He states: ‘The object does not reflect the social. It does more. It transcribes and displaces the contradictory interests of people and things.’ (Latour, 2009, p.152)
New shoes

We must start with a new pair of shoes.

When one circumvents the discourse around consumption and fantasy that dominates discussions of footwear, new shoes become a useful starting point for further study. The acquisition of new shoes is significant because it is the beginning of the much longer embodied relationship of wearing. As footwear is frequently task- or time-specific, the acquisition of new shoes often represents a juncture or shift in the wearer’s embodied experience. Whether they are school shoes, work boots, or wedding shoes, new shoes often mark a point at which a new regime of bodily disciplines commences. While the new shoe itself may discipline the foot (with stiff leather, laces and straps), putting on new shoes may also mark the commencement of larger institutional, bodily, and social regimes of disciplining. The image of oneself in new shoes becomes indelibly linked with shifts in how the body and thus the self is produced. The body, its postures and gestures are produced not only by the performance of tasks and the organisation of spaces, but by the artefacts with which the body interacts. For Foucault, writing on the state, the prisons and the panopticon, ‘These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called disciplines’ (Foucault, 1975, p.137). Footwear regulates the bodily behaviours, both through its material form and through its acquisition, marking the commencement of a new disciplinary regime.

There is something about our capacity to see ourselves wearing shoes, to be able to look down and see the shod foot as a whole, that creates a particular experience for
This is also true of our hands and their adornments such as nail polish, gloves or jewellery.

Fashion is predominately a gaze-based medium; it is a practice of looking and of being seen. It is a process of looking (at other wearers or at fashion media), then mirroring and adapting what one has seen and then finally presenting oneself for the gaze. It is akin to Berger’s (1972) formulation of the female form within the male gaze: ‘according to usage and conventions which are at last being questioned but have by no means been overcome – men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at.’ (Berger, 1972, pp.45-46) However, unlike Berger’s description, fashion’s viewer and viewed are interchangeable, locked in a perpetual cycle of mirroring and modification.

For Freud (1917) narcissistic identification is an attempt to regain the lost object; this ‘served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object’ (Freud, 1917, p.249).

Lyon (in Benstock and Ferriss, 2001) addresses the ways that the bare foot was conceptualised as healthier by footwear reformers, nudists and dancers. She links the fetishisation of the bare foot to modernism’s fixation with ideas of progress and of the primitive.
the wearer – a dual experience of seeing one’s feet in shoes and of simultaneously feeling the shoe encasing the foot: the shoe and the foot are presented as unified in our gaze. This process of looking at oneself, of simultaneously being the objectifying viewer and the subject of the gaze, can become both unsettling and scopophilic. The subsequent dissonance and self-objectification might perhaps explain the compulsivity frequently said to accompany the purchase of footwear; shoes present an excellent site for narcissistic experience. In his work on scopophilia, Fenichel (1953, p.71) writes that ‘A child who is looking for libidinous purposes … wants to look at an object in order to feel along with … (it).’ Similarly, the shod foot becomes an object of identification for the wearer; the shod foot is both of the self and other to it.

**Good shoes**

If new shoes provide a locus for a narcissistic experience then they also provide a site for a moralising one. There has long been a discourse of ‘good’ shoes, of shoes as potential loci for bodily, moral, and ethical reform – from the Victorian Dress Reform Movement, as exemplified by Dr Gustav Jaeger (see fig. 10), whose adherents believed they could liberate and improve health via their clothes and shoes, to ways that masculinity and modernity are thought to intersect in men’s footwear choices (see Breward in Riello and McNeil, 2006). There is a pervasive idea that a ‘well-chosen’ shoe – frugal, of good quality and durable – is indicative of the wearer’s morality. Conversely ‘poorly’ chosen or ill-considered footwear, those shoes that are frivolous, poorly suited to the terrain, or difficult to walk in, are interpreted as representing the frivolity or impracticality of the wearer. There appears to be an implicit link between physical balance and moral constitution; someone can be described as ‘sure-footed’, as ‘off kilter’ or as ‘flighty’. Though the object of this research is the material shoe, these metaphors and the representation of the body through language give insight into how the body in motion is interpreted. Different shoes are seen as representing different moralities and behaviours. Heel height, for example, is frequently linked both to power – the raising of oneself above others – and to pride. Venetian courtesans, in wearing high wooden chopines, were both raising themselves off the street and making themselves more visible; this visibility was often interpreted as a lack of humility, or shamelessness. For Vianello, chopines produced a ‘confusion about the moral and social identity’ of the women who wore them (Vianello in Riello and McNeil, 2006, p.77); stature equated with high status and low morality.

The dressed body is often understood as unnatural, a space of artifice, where gesture and movement, learnt over time, may conceal true experience or feelings.
McNeil (in McNeil and Karaminas, 2009) explores how the extravagant dress of macaronis was interpreted by the British press as indicative of moral and sexual ambiguity. He examines how the macaroni’s artifice in dress and mannerisms was perceived as indicative of, social climbing, profligacy and being of ambiguous origins; that in this case the flamboyant dressed body in fact revealed the true nature of the wearer rather than concealing it.

Munson, E.L. (1912) The soldier’s foot and the military shoe; a handbook for officers and noncommissioned officers of the line, an American guide to shoe care for soldiers, states: ‘It is highly important, in preventing foot injuries, that a good, well-fitting shoe, once secured, shall be kept in good condition. This can be accomplished with a little attention. The leather of shoes which are put away without use in dry weather tends to become hard and wrinkled. Shoes which are being kept for marching should therefore be worn now and then; and if not sufficiently supple, lightly rubbed over with the neatsfoot oil supplied by the Quartermaster’s Department. This oil is the natural oil of the animal and is free from the acids and other substances deleterious to leather found in waxes and greases of other kinds. When nearly dry, the shoe should be thoroughly brushed or rubbed to remove all dirt and supple the leather. If there is any tendency to stiffness of the leather when completely dry, it should be rubbed again and, if necessary, wiped off with a slightly oiled cloth.’ [Online] Available from: https://archive.org/details/soldiersfootmili00munsrich. [Accessed: 20 September 2015]
However, for Mauss, all movements, not only those understood as fashionable, are learnt, mediated, and constructed:

The habitus of the body being upright while walking, breathing, rhythm of the walk, swinging the fists, the elbows, progression with the trunk in advance of the body or by advancing either side of the body alternately (we have got accustomed to moving all the body forward at once). Feet turned in or out. Extension of the leg. We laugh at the ‘goose-step’. It is the way the German army can obtain the maximum extension of the leg, given in particular that all Northerners, high on their legs, like to take as long steps as possible. In the absence of these exercises, we Frenchmen remain more or less knock-kneed. (Mauss, 1935, p.114)

The mistrust of the dressed body and its capacity to conceal the true nature of the wearer is a recurrent theme in post-enlightenment writing. The idea of the ‘natural human’, so dominant in enlightenment discourse, presents the naked body and the bare foot as simpler, healthier and more moral. The bare foot is often perceived as more liberated than the shod foot. The naked foot, like the shod one, is often fetishised.

Similarly, acts of shoe care, of cleaning and mending one’s shoes, are often perceived as indicative of a disciplined and rigorous morality. Just as the body is disciplined through ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss, 1935), the objects with which we adorn it are also disciplined. The metaphor ‘down at heel’ connotes both the moral failure to maintain self-preservation and impoverishment. In no place is this more evident than in the ways that soldiers care for their shoes, bodily discipline through marching, drills and uniforms being extended to footwear. Boots are polished to a mirror-like sheen and their surfaces made impenetrable with dubbin and wax. The strengthening of the shoe’s surface through care mirrors the fortifying of the body (and the army itself); boundaries sealed and leaks prevented, the impenetrability of the body and of the regiment is maintained. Maintenance of shoes is in itself interesting; aside from its function as a display of moral rigour it is also an act of care. To care for one’s clothes is, after all, to care for the self; it is the grooming of the ‘bodily schema’. Repairing shoes may be due to necessity or economy but it is simultaneously an act of reparation; an attempt to negate the damage wearing does to one’s clothes. Re-soling or re-heeling shoes is a form of erasure; the exterior records of steps one has taken, and the dirt one has stepped in, are erased through the replacement of a sole or heel tip. Kelley (2015) writes of the ways that valued garments were repaired in order that they might be passed on. She examines the maintenance of clothing, not just as a domestic task necessary to ‘keep up
appearances’, but as a way of negotiating personal and familial relations. To repair a garment is to acknowledge its intrinsic value in one’s life. This importance of self-representation (see Entwistle and Wilson, 2001) and self-care was of particular significance to the working classes – the need to maintain and present a particular image to others was key to upholding their social status. Conversely for the British upper classes, the need to keep up appearances was either delegated to others (butlers and valets wearing in shoes is an excellent example) or shunned entirely; the capacity to self-represent as shabby or a little down at heel both belying and reaffirming social status. In embracing the patina of wear (see Charpy, in Adamson and Kelley, 2013), the British upper classes were able to denote both their history (old families, old things) and place themselves in opposition to the conspicuously consuming merchant class (see Veblen, 1899).

Shoelessness

The absence of shoes is read simultaneously as liberation and subjugation. How the body is positioned in relation to the ground frequently demarcates social status. Throughout history the absence of shoes frequently indicated poverty, imprisonment and slavery. If the shod body is the social body, the body without shoes is excluded from the social contract. The shoeless body is not afforded the rights and liberties that come with putting on shoes. In choosing not to go barefoot, we are subscribing to a multiplicity of social demands and conventions. Often to go without shoes is perceived as a strong marker of difference. We talk not just of slaves and prisoners, but also of the poor and disenfranchised in terms of their non-existent or shoddy footwear. The phrase ‘barefoot and pregnant’ alludes to a shamed woman not afforded the social status of a wife. However, far from always being an impediment, deliberate shoelessness may be an act of power, a refusal. By going shoeless, one is refusing the social contract, marking oneself out as part of a counter culture. For the hippies of the 1960s and 1970s shoelessness was a form of liberation. DeMello (2009) suggests that this voluntary barefootedness alludes to the perceived innocence and freedom of the bare foot, a foot without responsibility. The shoeless foot is vulnerable and this vulnerability has been used to emphasise the difference between peaceful protesters and those who confront them. There is also a perceived relationship between barefootedness and humility. This is evident in the religious practice of barefoot pilgrimage and barefoot mourning, as well as discalced religious communities such as Franciscan monks and nuns. Eschewing the status afforded by footwear allows the pilgrim or mourner to materially manifest their modesty and submission to divine authority.
This abjection was particularly present for me during the final year of the research. Making and wearing 24 pairs of shoes meant that my studio and house were full of dirty and used shoes. Often, despite the fact that they were an aspect of my practice, I found the worn shoes shameful and rushed to tidy them away when visitors arrived.
Shoes are tools that allow us to perform certain tasks; they allow us to walk further and for longer. Our relationship to the shoe may be sartorial or fetishistic, but it is also practical and bodily. It is our engagement with the materiality of the shoe that highlights our dependence on it. We require shoes to negotiate the terrains and social spaces through which we move. Shoes may hinder us, either through intent or by accident. Though these disabling qualities may be interpreted as the work of an oppressive hegemony, they are also the physical work of the material shoe. The shoe is an active agent and new shoes offer the potential for change; in being shod we are being transformed. The idea of the shoe as an agent of change is seductive, but all too often new shoes are read as simply an illusory shift in the wearer’s self-image. However, the shoe causes us to alter our movements and our experience of our bodily selves. The material shape of our bodies is altered with each new pair of shoes.

The shoe is a protective garment, armour for the foot. The sole of the shoe touches the ground in place of our feet, protecting us from the potential dangers of the street. The shoe allows us to walk; it is sacrificed to protect the foot. Is there a discomfort with this exchange – that we must destroy our shoe in order to preserve our feet? As with all garments, the skewed transactional relationship that we have with the shoe can be unsettling. Our clothes, simultaneously companions in our embodied experience, extensions of our bodily selves and visual communicative tools, do not remain the same in perpetuity. With each wear, gesture, and step they are worn down and destroyed; though our shoes carry us, we are eventually too much to bear.

The worn shoe is frequently described as abject; sweaty interiors and dirty soles cause us to wrinkle our noses and turn our faces away. Shoes tread in the dirt of our streets, and cannot easily be washed or purified. The fact that in many cultures one must take off one’s shoes before entering intimate and vulnerable spaces (the home, the temple) illustrates the potentially polluting nature of shoes. Our footwear becomes polluted so that we are not. Just as shoes absorb the external pollutants of the street, they become receptacles for our own bodily excretions. As we wear our shoes, sweat and layers of discarded skin come to line their interiors, parts of our bodies absorbed into their material form. Although we may attempt to clean the dirt of the street from our shoes, it is near impossible to remove these traces of our bodily selves. Kristeva, writing of the abjectness of bodily excretions, states: ‘these body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living
Connor (2011) in an essay on spectacles writes of the ways that ‘Glasses are never simply used or worn; they are to use Jean-Paul Sartre’s expression existed – both lived out and brought into active and magical existence’ (Connor, 2011, p.89).
being.’ (1982, p.65) The worn shoe is simultaneously a barrier between potential pollutants and ourselves, and a receptacle for those same substances. Rather than offering us the potential for transformation as a new shoe might, worn shoes become a vessel for our former selves; we become incorporated into their material form. The worn shoe becomes synonymous with decay of the self; it is a material link with our past selves, a vessel for the skins we have already shed. Instead of offering the release of transformation it becomes a reminder of our pasts. Shoes may also be read as boundaries of the body, objects which negotiate what may and may not be admitted. Shoes, like many garments, are simultaneously penetrable (one puts one’s feet into them) and container-like (active spaces, capable of holding). As artefacts that mediate our experience of walking, movement, and the ground, shoes form a boundary between the self and the world. Douglas wrote that: ‘The body is a model that can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious.’ (Douglas, 1966, p.115). Is it possible that the shoe might function both as a literal and symbolic boundary, one that protects more than just our feet? If we understand the shoe as an additional boundary for the body, then its interior can be interpreted as akin to our own interior space. As such, the pollution it filters is not just the dirt and detritus of the external world, but pollutants that may be potentially damaging to our own sense of self; ‘dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement but a positive effort to organise the environment.’ (Douglas, 1966, p.2)

Interaction between the shoe and the foot

Shoes are intimate objects, worn close to the body for long periods. We often wear the same pair of shoes daily, for months or even years. This relationship differs from our relationships with most other garments; through use we become more intimately attached to our shoes. Continued wear serves to increase our attachment to footwear; extended contact gives rise to a more enduring connection. In our conceptualisation of the dressed self the shoe has a particular role: it is both a literal and a metaphorical container. Shoes serve as vessels, holding, supporting, and elevating the body; we are carried by our shoes.

Worn shoes have a close and continued relationship with, and correspondence to, the form of our bodies. If we were to categorise the significance of our relationships to garments by the duration of wear and physical closeness, shoes along with spectacles46 and jewellery would rank highly. It is through proximity and duration that an enmeshed relationship develops. The shoe is not a static object; it alters through wear. The shoe that we take off at the end of each day is different from the one we put on that morning. We are familiar with the idea of ‘breaking in’
Even in the case of bespoke shoemaking, where lasts are made to the measurements of the client’s foot, the last, and thus the shoe, cannot correspond precisely to the shape of the foot. The last is always a compromise between the desired style of the shoe and the form of the foot.
shoes and of the comfort and reassurance of a ‘well-worn’ pair. Feet and shoes correspond to one another increasingly over time. Through wear the fabric of the shoe is individualised, the shoe becoming a mirror of the foot. As leather stretches and heels wear away, the shoe becomes a reflected image of the wearer, an indexical imprint: ‘In this instance, the notion of being in someone else’s shoes becomes doubly powerful. You are placing your foot into a shoe shaped by a foot, which will in turn attempt to exert its shape onto you. In other words, in wearing another person’s shoes, one’s feet are, minute change by minute change, being turned into theirs.’ (Sampson, 2003, p.56)

**Touch and counter-touch**

Through habitual wear a transactional relationship develops between shoe and the foot. As the shoe moulds to the body it becomes a mirror, a cast of its form. The interior of the shoe becomes a reflection of the bodily self, and this reflection is projected back onto the feet with each wear. The shoe is a continuously updated reflection of the wearer’s body over time. The shoe is, thus, an ever-changing mirror of the self; it is a map of the spaces we have occupied and the gestures we have made.

If the foot shapes the shoe, then it is equally true that shoes shape the feet. The sole of the shoe suffers wear in place of the wearer’s foot. However, in exchange, the shoe demands a distortion of the wearer’s foot; the shoe asks the foot to perform. In placing their foot into the shoe, wearers are compelled to draw in their toes and heighten their arches. Frequently this process is intensified, the shoe not simply asking the foot to contort itself, but permanently altering its shape. Shoes worn over a period of time change the shape and structure of the foot, altering the way that it can be used. Toes get pushed under each other, tendons become shortened, bones distort and arches collapse. The bones of the feet may tell a forensic archaeologist much about the activities they performed. The shoe changes the body – its shape, movements and behaviours – and though individually these alterations may be minor, they are cumulative and become impactful.

This process of reciprocal imprint is central to the experience of wearing shoes. Feet and shoes rarely correspond to each other precisely and must alter each other’s form to produce a closer fit. The material outcome of wear is the dual process of imprint and wearing away. In wear, the shoe’s form is altered through the simultaneous processes of addition and diminishment. The exterior of the shoe is eroded through its contact with our environment; the pressure of our bodies wears down soles, rain dissolves dyes and discolours leathers, laces age and break, dirt
Kula exchange, by the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea, involves the exchange of jewelry, shells and other items between different families on the islands. Rather than exchange between two individuals the debt is ‘paid forward’ so that the material artefacts and thus the obligations cross the sea. Of this process Malinowski asked: ‘why would men risk life and limb to travel across huge expanses of dangerous ocean to give away what appear to be worthless trinkets?’ (attributed to Malinowski, 1922).
builds up. The interaction between the foot and the interior of the shoe is equally complex. The body pushes the shoe away but simultaneously, minutely, adds to it in layers of sweat and discarded skin. If the shoe is sacrificed for the sake of the foot, then we, in turn, are indebted to it; it gives us something and asks that we reciprocate. In a manner akin to the reciprocity of gifting, we become entangled with our garments. Mauss (1928) observed that the gift is never neutral and always comes with obligation; when something is sacrificed a need for recompense remains. For Mauss, exchange created a gift economy, one where social ties were sealed not through written contracts and financial exchanges, but through the obligation to repay a gift. Whether through direct exchanges, such as potlatch, or circular exchange such as Kula, each gift received requires reciprocation in an on-going cycle; gifting begets gifting. Thus obligation creates or seals social ties; indebtedness produces attachment. For Mauss (1928), the circular nature of Kula exchange, where debt moved not between two participants but in a forward-facing circle, was particularly significant. The Kula carries the agency of its owners and through this exchange is a symbolic container for status and relatedness. ‘What imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged is the fact that the thing received is not inactive. Even when it has been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of him.’ (Ibid., pp.11-12)

Through our relationships to artefacts, personhoods and agencies can be distributed further than the bounded surface of the body. Is our attachment to garments linked to the debt we owe them? Does this reciprocity underscore attachment? While the anthropologist’s interest may be in how attachment between people may be negotiated through objects, here it is in the attachment between a person and a garment; attachments created through making and through wear, in the interactions where the body and garment meet. The attachments between person and artefact are cyclical and forward-facing like the Kula, the agencies and attachments of previous users remaining present for each new user. Attachment and processes of identification and incorporation are central to understanding our relationships with artefacts. Through the process of perpetual exchange, of touch and counter-touch, the shoe and the self become entangled. In his discussion of the ‘transitional object’ Winnicott (1971) gives value to the concept of indebtedness in the formation of attachments.

I have introduced the terms ‘transitional objects’ and ‘transitional phenomena’ for designation of the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral eroticism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what has already been introjected, between primary unawareness of indebtedness and the acknowledgement of indebtedness (‘Say: “tà”’). (Winnicott, 1971, p.1)
For Winnicott the acknowledgement of debt was crucial to the development of our sense of self. The dialogue between the shoe and the foot is a process of giving and taking, the body and the shoe tied together in a process of perpetual mutual exchange.

The dialogue between the shoe and the foot

The process of giving and taking, which typifies our relationships with clothing, echoes the reciprocal, touch-based, relationship between mother and infant. Our reciprocal attachment is, from the outset, located in touch. Although touch mediates internal desires, its manifestations occur not within the interior but at the peripheries of the body – the skin, the hands, the feet, the eyes. The surface of the shoe is in tactile interaction with the skin; walking is not merely the projection of the body forward but a process of touching and of being touched. Visual and tactile mirroring is central to the development of mother/infant reciprocity (see Brazelton et al., 1974). The mirroring of touch becomes one of our first experiences and negotiations of the other. Touch is the foundation of our attachment to others and our sense of self; touch positions us within the world. Benthien (2002) suggests: ‘It is through the skin that a newborn learns where she begins and ends, where the boundaries of the self are. Here she learns her first feelings of pleasure and displeasure.’ (2002, p.7) Touch is our initial and primary sensory experience, both in utero, enveloped by the mother’s body, and postnatally with the contact of the parent’s skin. Pioneer of infant observation, psychoanalyst Esther Bick, observed that this idea of being held or enveloped in skin was central to the development of a sense of self. She suggests that ‘in its most primitive form the parts of the personality are felt to have no binding force amongst themselves and must therefore be held together in a way that is experienced by them passively, by the skin functioning as a boundary’ (Bick, 1968, p.56). In examining the psychic function of skin and touch, Anzieu (1989) proposed the ‘skin ego’, the ‘psychic envelope’ on which our sense of well-being and containment is founded. Anzieu’s skin ego acts ‘as a containing, unifying envelope for the self; as a protective barrier for the psyche; and as a filter of exchanges and a surface of inscription for first traces’ (1989, p.98).

Skin, Surfaces and Boundaries

Skin is a semi-permeable but bounding surface of the body, a site where attachment and incorporation are negotiated. Like the skin, the surfaces of the shoe (often leather, itself a skin) are permeable and ambiguous. The ‘boundary’ of a space is simultaneously the route of its coherence and its separation; edges both define and separate. Insides of shoes are complicated; highly individuated and hidden from view, they are a space that is felt rather than seen. The experience of the interior
of the shoe is bodily; it is a space of touch, where different surfaces fold in to meet one another. The skin is a boundary of both bodily and psychic experience. Thus, where the shoe touches the skin, it touches the mind as well. Reflecting on skin and containment, Benthien (2002) states: ‘Notions about the psychic protection and integrity of the self, find enduring symbolic representation through the skin. It would appear that contemporary concepts of the self are necessarily linked to images of envelopment, of coherence, and at times, of something skin like.’ (Ibid., p.9) Our interior selves and the external world meet at the boundary of the skin surface.

Attachment and Incorporation

‘Outside and inside are both intimate – they are always ready to be reversed, to exchange their hostility. If there exists a borderline surface between such an inside and outside, this surface is painful on both sides ... the centre of “being there” wavers and trembles.’ (Bachelard, 1964, p.217)

There is a blurring of the boundaries between the self and the shoe; the shoe becomes incorporated into our selves. Phenomenologist Schilder (1935) used this blurring to formulate a conceptualisation of the body that was not bounded by the skin. The ‘bodily schema’ incorporates multiple proximate artefacts and technologies into the self: any object that was held or used had the potential to become part of the self. ‘The bodily schema does not end with the human skin as a limiting boundary. It extends far beyond it and, from the point of view of motility, perception and emotions, includes all the objects we use and to which we are geared.’ (Schilder, 1935, p.56) Though not all objects are incorporated into our bodily schemas, habitual bodily objects like the shoe are likely to become incorporated. Merleau-Ponty (1962), in his development of the idea of the ‘bodily schema’, expresses this particularly well: ‘To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them or conversely to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.166) Does the reciprocal imprint cycle, the continuous process of touch that is wearing, allow the shoe to become incorporated into the schema more readily?

Attachment

The materiality of the shoe allows it to become incorporated into the bodily schema more readily than some other garments. Shoes are stiffer and more structured than many of the clothes we wear; they hold their shape away from the body. This structure makes them resistant objects; rather than wrapping and caressing the skin, they push back. Shoes do not entirely submit to our bodily force. It is the shoe’s
capacity to push against our body which allows a cycle of imprint and alteration to occur; a softer garment would not have the potential to permanently change the form of the foot. Clearly the duration of wear and proximity to the body of the shoe over time enhance this process. As the shoe and the foot come to correspond more closely to each other, increasing attachment occurs. The shoe may become so bodily over time that there is a distinct discomfort in wearing the shoes of others. Often we view the shoes of the deceased as analogous with their bodily selves, and hesitate to dispose of them.

The incorporated shoe

Thus, the duration of wear and proximity of a structured garment to the body increase attachment and incorporation into the bodily schema. Proximity and structure create imprint, and imprinting as a process of touch and counter-touch aids incorporation into the bodily self. Each imprint is a record of our selves at a particular time and place. This image of the self (the imprint) is then reflected back onto the body as the shoe exerts its force on the foot. The material shoe becomes a constantly updated record of our current and former selves: an external vessel for experience. The shoe, as part of the bodily schema, holds a curious position: both incorporated into the self and materially separate from it. The shoe, to borrow Winnicott’s (1971) term, is an object which is both ‘me and not me’. Winnicott formulated the concept of the transitional object to explain the process through which a child may separate itself from its mother. The function of a transitional object, a scrap of blanket or soft toy, is to allow the child to differentiate between what is ‘me’ and ‘not me’; it is an intermediary object between internal and external worlds. For Winnicott the transitional object is one that mediates psychic and external reality. It is the transitional object’s capacity to remain me (of the self) and not me (external to the self) that give it this function: a bridging object between internal and external worlds, keeping inside and outside apart and yet interrelated.

There is the third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area which is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet inter-related. (Winnicott, 1971, p.230)
Might the idea of transitional objects, objects that mediate inside and outside worlds, be useful in understanding our attachment to garments and particularly shoes? Garments are a boundary between bodily and external worlds, between us and not us. They allow us to mediate space, to ‘be’ in the world. Clothing with its literal and metaphorical capacity to mediate inside and outside is a form of transitional phenomenon, a bridge between the imaginary and the material. Clothes are a surface through which we are able to mediate our relations with the external world; as a boundary, a point of transition, and an agent of change, what is the particular resonance of the shoe?
I have flattened the back of my shoe, unthinkingly pressing my heel into it as I walk around the flat. My gentle morning routine, the shuffling from kettle to fridge to table has altered my shoe. Conscious of the damage and unsure of whether to repair it, I am suddenly aware that this unconscious behaviour is not new but a regression. That throughout my childhood I did exactly this; flattened the heel of my left shoe while the right remained intact. At some point I grew out of it, I left this bodily tick behind. I had forgotten the familiar feeling of the compressed leather beneath my heel but now it is there for me. I am flooded with familiarity and loss. My past selves have re-emerged.
The dew has crazed tiny lines across the surface of my shoes. They have become a network of creases, the skin of my shoe aged from wear.

I am pleased my shoes have remembered my steps, that they have taken this task from me. They remember what I do not.

When the shoes dry the tiny lines disappear.
In ‘Fashion and Anxiety’ Clarke and Miller (2002) present an interesting discussion of the way clothes are understood and articulated as correct or appropriate.

Lemma (2010) suggests that one function of marking the skin’s surface (through tattooing, scarification and self harm) might be to strengthen it, while also to allow one to break through to the unconscious below. The skin integrates inks and makes signs to society about our emotional self. The skin, a receptive surface, is altered as it protects our interior space. Similarly the garment, as a protective surface, both mediates our bodily experience and protects our bodies from harm.

Though this research is about and through making and wearing shoes, this chapter addresses our relationships with clothing more broadly, both in order to explore the generalities of our relationships with the things we wear and the embodied experience of making for the maker. I have chosen the word garment, specifically to include not only fabric clothing but footwear, accessories, and other worn objects such as jewellery, watches and spectacles. The word garment is interesting, linked etymologically to the old French words ‘garnir’ and ‘garnement’: to decorate or garnish but also to protect (oneself) or armour up. The garment is one of the ways one equips oneself to be in the world.
'Clearly things make people, and people, who are made by those things, make other things. The central question, however, is not whether this does or doesn’t happen, but in what kind of way it happens. What is the modality of this relationship?'

(Pinney in Miller, 2005, p.256)

As makers and wearers of clothes, we implicitly understand that people and the garments they wear are entangled. The intimate nature of this relationship is highlighted in the way it is expressed through language: ‘It’s just not me,’ somebody will say, or ‘it fits like a second skin’.49 We think ourselves into the garments we wear and through this projection they become integral parts of our selves. Our garments are simultaneously signifiers of identity, participants in and witnesses to our embodied experience. Though our skin bounds our physical bodies, it does not bound our psychic and emotional selves – our capacity to integrate with the objects that surround us.50 This chapter explores the ways that the self and the garment51 may become entwined – how through making and wearing clothes, the garment and self become cleaved, to and from one another. It presents the processes of making and of using garments as both a negotiation with the garment’s materiality and the projection of the user’s fantasy onto their material form – a process through which the maker or user’s agency may become entangled with the material agency of the garment.

The relationship between the self and the garment, simultaneously bodily and not of the body, may be encapsulated in the verb ‘to cleave’. To cleave, one of Freud’s (1910) antithetical words, means both to join together and to split apart. We may refer to things cleaving together and also cleaving apart. Freud considered antithetical words, or anti-autonyms, to be one of the multiple trickeries played out by the unconscious mind, particularly in dreams; in the unconscious, a thing may be represented as both itself and its opposite. In their ambiguity these words represent,

In this research I am both the maker and the wearer of my shoes; doubly cleaved with them. Though making one’s own clothing used to be very common (and is still the norm in some cultures), shoes, as garments were required to be highly durable and require particular and non-transferable making skills, are less frequently homemade. Though there have been certain instances of home shoe-making (a trend in 18th Britain for middle-class women to make their own slippers (cf. McGuire, N. in Moran and O’Brien 2014 ) or home shoe repair as a necessity in times of poverty or war, shoes are usually acquired new or second hand.

It could be said that The Gift (Mauss, 1928) is the basis of most of modern material culture studies and as such has informed a great deal of research on clothing and fashion.
for Freud, a way into our unconscious desires and fears, a crack through which to peer. In ‘The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words’ (1910), Freud observed that:

The way in which dreams treat the category of contraries and contradictories is highly remarkable. It is simply disregarded. ‘No’ seems not to exist so far as dreams are concerned. They show a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing them as one and the same thing. (Freud, 1910, p.353)

This chapter examines the intermingling of selves that constitutes the practices of making and of wearing clothes. Though the relationship between the wearer and the garment, and to a lesser extent the garment and the maker, have been addressed, these two sets of relationships are often viewed as bounded or mutually exclusive. The distance between maker and user in contemporary commodity cultures often renders the maker inert in the experience of the wearer; the maker’s agency is viewed as bounded within the transaction of making. This chapter suggests a rethinking of this dynamic, examining the ways that the maker is present for the wearer in their experience of the garment.

The ‘me and not me’ garment

Our relationships with clothing are often viewed in relation to labour, commerce and exchange – clothing as a commodity within a network of transactions, rather than a vessel of lived experience. Theories of commodity, gifting, and exchange underlie much of our thinking about clothes; the points of acquisition and of disposal are the locus of much research into fashion and dress. My research seeks to examine the tactile and psychic transactions that take place between artefact, maker and user, looking at the triangular nature of these relationships and exploring the capacity of garments to function as both mediator and transmitter of internal relations and relatedness. Dilnot in his essay on the gift writes of this relationship, of the gift or artefact as a relational device:

But this means that to make and to design something is to create something whose end is not in itself but is rather ‘in’ the subject for whom the object is made (whether that subject is individualized, or is ourselves, collectively, as a whole). On this argument, then, the object is never autonomous, never just ‘for itself.’ It is, in fact – as Elaine Scarry puts it ... always ‘only a fulcrum or lever across which the force of creation moves back onto the human site and remakes its makers (Scarry, 1985, 307).’ (Dilnot, 1993, p.57)
To return to the ideas of the previous chapter, Schilder suggests that 'the bodily schema does not end with the human skin as a limiting boundary. It extends far beyond it ...' (1935, p.56). The bodily self extends beyond the skin surface of the body and into the artefacts that surround it, into the things that are habitually and intimately used. Artefacts that mediate our sensory experience, as garments do – keeping us warm, dry, helping us to run further or to see more clearly – are integrated into the bodily self. For Schilder, clothing is integrated into the wearer, not simply as a form of expression, a mark of allegiance, or a signifier of wealth, but as a central aspect of the self. If for Schilder (1935) the bodily self may extend beyond the boundary of the skin, for Winnicott (1971) it is the psyche that is not limited by our bodily form. For Winnicott, infants use artefacts in order to negotiate and separate internal and external realities: to separate the self from the other. Similarly the garment, tactile and encompassing, mediates the relationship between the wearer’s internal imagined self and the projected bodily reality presented to the world. The garment is transitional in the sense that it is the site on which a shift from internal desire to external performance is achieved and maintained.

If the garment functions as an extended and externalised aspect of the self, then this relationship presents a paradox; for artefacts that are incorporated into the self may disintegrate, be discarded or lost. How is it that, despite their incorporation, the disintegration or loss of the incorporated garment occurs without compromising the integrity of the wearer’s bodily or psychic self? – that the wearer’s internal self is not destroyed or damaged with each laddered stocking or fraying hem? How is it that garments might act as internal objects for their user, without risking damage to the unity of that internal self, as the garment breaks down over time? Though we may keenly feel the loss of a beloved garment or comfortable shoe, that loss does not cause us permanent harm. These lost garments may present a sadness or melancholia for the wearer, who may never retrieve the sensory experience of wearing them again. This tension – the incorporation of the garment into the bodily schema versus the garment’s material frailty – suggests that incorporation is not total or permanent, and that the garment is capable of straddling bodily and non-bodily divides. It is simultaneously part of the self and materially not of the self; it holds a place of partial incorporation, never wholly of us or not us. The material frailty of the garment presents a continuous risk; garments, made of yielding fabric and leathers, do not last as long as we might psychically require. They are temporary repositories, parts of us for a short time only. Though with careful use and care a garment may last many years, it presents a risk, for the more it is worn the faster it will degrade. Just as we must care for the body in order that it might thrive, garments must be subject to grooming and ablutions. We tend to our clothes as an extension of our bodily selves.
In fact often clothes are no longer wanted, a rejection, which is at the heart of the fashion cycle. The reasons why they are no longer wanted, despite their material durability, are interesting. Like Winnicott’s transitional object, the unwanted garment appears to ‘lose its meaning’ and become dispersed.
In The Art of Forgetting (1999) Forty presents monuments, edifices of stone, bronze and concrete, as sites of communal forgetting, the permanence of the material artefact freeing the viewers from the necessity of holding the event in their mind; monuments permit us to forget. Forty contrasts this idea with Riegler's conception of an 'Aristotelian tradition [in which] if objects are made to stand in for memory, their decay, or destruction (as in iconoclasm) is taken to stand in for forgetting' (Forty and Küchler, 1999, p.3). For Forty it is the very transience of a material thing – the fading of a Polaroid, the fraying of a hem, the crumbling of a wall – which forces us to remember. For the artist Boltanski, this material impermanence could be utilised to maintain memory:

If you make a monument in stone, everyone will soon forget what you have commemorated. The city will pay for the monument in order to forget it. What I wanted to do was to make a monument that would have to be remade each month, using very fragile materials, like the little prayer houses that observant Jews construct for Sukkoth. Of course, the monument would fall down and have to be continually reconstructed. If at any time it disappeared, it would mean that times had changed, and the reasons for its existence were forgotten. The only possible monuments are those that must be continually re-made, that require a continuous engagement, so that people will remember. (Boltanski, quoted in Solomon-Godeau, 1998, p.1.)

In turn, it is the psychic ‘work’ of keeping a frail or decaying thing whole and complete within the mind that maintains it there; we cannot let the artefact go for fear it may disintegrate and crumble. The wearer or user must attend to, and be vigilant of, the fragile object for fear it may disappear. Though one does not wear a garment in perpetuity – outfits are changed, styles come and go – a bond between user and garment frequently remains.

The capacity of the self to remain whole in spite of the loss of a garment suggests that the nature of the relationship between the self and the garment is one in a constant state of cleaving: intermingling, both physically and through their incorporation into and separation from the psychic self. The ambiguity of the antithetical verb ‘to cleave’ is central to our relationship with garments; they are both incorporated and yet other to us. As an artefact pulls away from the self through decay, it is grasped by the mind and vice versa, a continuous backwards and forwards between selfhood and otherness. Central to this process is incorporation through touch. Our relationship with the things we wear is produced as much through touching as through looking. As Ratcliffe suggests, ‘the ubiquity and
indispensability of touch becomes even more apparent once it is acknowledged that what we perceive through one sense includes an appreciation of what could be perceived by means of other senses. A visually perceived cup looks graspable; a surface looks smooth to the touch. Tactual possibilities permeate all experience.’ (2014 p.19) If the garment’s capacity to integrate and separate from the self allows it to become both ‘me’ and ‘not me’ of the wearer, then might the process of cleaving also extend to the relationship between the garment and its maker, through the touch and counter-touch of cutting, sewing, and pressing?

An artefact that can simultaneously be part of the self and separate from it presents the potential for the self to be distributed outside the confines of the body. If the garment becomes an aspect of the self, then may we also become an aspect of the garment? Do we inhabit the clothes we wear even when they are not on the body – even when we are gone from them? The idea of a self distributed into clothing recalls Stallybrass’s ‘Worn Worlds’ (1993) in which he relates how his dead friend Allon is suddenly present for him when he wears his jacket. Allon is intermingled with his clothes and remains in them even after his death:

... I was inhabited by his presence taken over. If I wore the Jacket then Allon wore me. He was there in the wrinkles of the elbows, the wrinkles which in the technical jargon of sewing are called ‘memory’: He was there in the stains at the very bottom of the Jacket, he was there in the smell of the armpits. (Stallybrass, 1993, p.2)

Stepping back from the hypothesis that garments and the body are cleaved, continuously integrating and separating from one another, what ways do garments act upon their wearers? Clothes, like all artefacts, are an amalgamation of multiple processes, experiences, materials, and agencies. They carry both symbolic (representational) and indexical (bearing trace of) meaning. A garment is a point, in space, in time, in culture, where a range of meanings converge and from which they will, in time, diverge again. Garments are an accumulation of agencies. Weiner, in Inalienable Possessions (1992), explores the ways in which, through the exchanges of artefacts, agencies and personhoods are distributed. She argues that the artefact and the self are not separated when the artefact is given away or gifted; that an artefact may retain the agency of its owner (‘mana’ or ‘spirit’ in Weiner’s discussion) even when passed on to another. Weiner writes of artefacts which may not be exchanged or gifted but which remain within families or groups and in turn become inseparable from them, of how through years of ownership, the garment develops a cumulative identity. It is not simply representative of its current owner but of those who have owned and worn it before. Of the wearer of a Maori ceremonial cloak, she
comments that, in wearing the precious garment, ‘she is more than herself – that she is her ancestors’. (Ibid., p.6) The artefact thus becomes synecdochal for the people who have owned it; it stands in for them and is invested with their agency: ‘These possessions then are the most potent force in the effort to subvert change, while at the same time they stand as the corpus of change.’ (Weiner, 1992, p.11)

Such artefacts accrue agencies just as they accrue the patina of use or wear. Similarly, Strathern (1988) writes of the initial owner retaining an aspect of the gift after it has been distributed: ‘when we give something maybe we don’t keep it, but we don’t lose it either’ (1988, p.198). Expanding upon Mauss’s supposition that the gift is central to forming cohesive social relations in Melanesia, Strathern argues: ‘objects are created not in contradistinction to persons but out of persons’ (Ibid., p.171). Objects and selves are merged in their creation and in the exchange of artefacts aspects of the self are distributed into the other:

As an exchange, an unmediated relation works through the directness of the effect which partners have on one another and, in the case of the metaphoric gift, creates a mutual dependency between them each for their own definition. They ‘exchange’ identities as it were ... Here, however, it is the replication not of individuals as singular, same-sex persons, which is at issue, but the replication of substance. Thus we might imagine its effect as bodily growth or as the transmission of bodily tissue from one person to another. (Ibid., p.207)

The gift is not merely a representation of the person but a non-divisible part of them. The act of distribution separates neither the artefact from the person nor the person from the artefact; instead they are ‘extracted from one and absorbed by another’ (Ibid., p.178).

These accrued agencies or incorporations do not have to sit comfortably with one another. An artefact may be the site of several conflicting discourses or experiences. In any contested artefact or space one will see multiple agencies at play. Even a non-contested artefact may be the site of multiple agencies. As Hoskins suggests, ‘Even those objects which seem to be without a directly identifiable function – that is, objects which have previously been theorized as simple objects of aesthetic contemplation – are in fact made in order to act upon the world and to act upon other persons.’ (Hoskins, 2006 in Tilley et al, p.76) Material objects thus embody complex intentionalities and mediate social agency. When you sit on a chair, the maker or designer, the person who placed it by the desk, and the other bodies who caused its seat to sag through use are all present and acting upon you through its
Layton (2003) defines the patient thus: ‘People and things are only agents if there is a recipient (a “patient”) for them to act upon. Patients enter into a social relationship with the index, the art object.’ (Layton, 2003, p.10)

The art nexus for Gell was a means of mapping the ways that artworks act upon us (their affect or aura), and the agencies which those art works embodied. He examines the magical orauratic qualities that allow artworks to function. Taking the viewer as the ‘patient’ upon which the artwork’s agency is enacted, Gell maps the relationships between the different agents and agencies that went into the artefact’s production.

Layton writes of the term abduction: ‘In order to avoid treating art as a medium of communication, Gell introduces the term abduction. “Art-like situations” can be discriminated as those in which the material “index” (the visible, physical, “thing”) permits a particular cognitive operation which I identify as the abduction of agency (Gell, 1998, p.13). Abductions are inferential schemes, and we infer the same type of agency in a real and a depicted person’s smile.’ (Layton, 2003, p.15)
material form. No artefact contains just one agency; they are always an accumulation and, in the layering of these agencies, new ones may be produced.

In his call for an anthropology of art, Gell (1998) examines the agent-patient relationships embodied within the art object. Gell understands viewing an artwork as a ‘transmission of power’ in which recipients abduct information and experience from the artwork. According to Gell, art comprises ‘social relations in the vicinity of objects mediating social agency’ (Gell, 1998, p.7); that is to say, anything may be an art object if it is mediating agency. For Gell, these social relations are not only human-to-human but may also be between the person and the ‘thing’:

The immediate ‘other’ in a social relationship does not have to be another ‘human being’, my whole argument depends on this not being the case. Social agency can be exercised relative to ‘things’ and social agency can be exercised by ‘things’ (and also animals). The concept of social agency has to be formulated in this very permissive manner for empirical as well as theoretical reasons. It just happens to be patently the case that persons form what are evidently social relations with ‘things’. (Gell, 1998, p.17)

Gell mapped the multiple agencies which come together in the production of the work of art and looked at how these may act upon the viewer as ‘patient’. Through the drawing up of an ‘Art Nexus’, Gell presents numerous agents whose intentionality or agencies are at work within the art object (the index). The artist, the patron, the material, the viewers, and objects which inspired it, may all be agents in the production of the art object – their agency is bounded within its material form. These agents may be human, as in the case of a patron or gallerist, or non-human, as in the landscape which inspired Constable or the urinal co-opted by Duchamp. The art object is both the outcome and the ‘index’ of these agencies; it bears indexical trace of their agency. Thus the viewing of a work of art becomes a transmission of power or agency. The interaction with any artefact is in fact similarly transactional; agency is exchanged, through looking, touch and use. The abduction of this agency – in Gell’s case, the art object’s ‘affect’ – is not predetermined and will vary depending on the recipient and the physical, geographical and social relationship they have to the artefact. The intentionality of different agents may be at odds with one another, whilst simultaneously being bounded within the artefact’s material form.

Artefacts are active agents within both human-to-human and human-to-artefact interactions. Ingold (2013) writes of the convergences within or between artefacts and forces; the points at which materials and people meet. Ingold terms the objects...
that facilitate such convergences ‘transducers’ – artefacts that act as links between materials, forces and intentions. It is interesting here to think about intention, for both the making and wearing of clothes are often typified as unconscious or unthinking acts. The conceptualization of wearing and making as not only tacit but also separate from thinking tends to negate the role of fantasy and imagination in the production of both the garment and the outfit. Craft has often been presented as a process outside of the imaginative, the maker as custodian of tradition and continuity rather than experimentation. However, the imaginative leap is vital to the process through which we ‘think’ garments in both making and dressing. If we apply the idea of the transducer to fashion, does the garment act as a facilitator or link between fashion ‘thinking’ or intention and fashion action or performance? The idea of the garment as a facilitator or point of transition is useful, the garment allowing internal experience to emerge in material form. These confluences between intention, agency and materiality are not fixed or permanent but are always in a state of flux or cleavage. Once fashion thinking has been transformed into fashion performance via the making or wearing of a garment, it will continue to alter, both through entropy and use. Artefacts are amalgamations of agencies brought together in material form, inseparable from their environments and users. Artefacts, environment and users are in a constant state of flux.

The maker and the garment

Taking the idea of a distributed personhood in a chain of affordances, and of the artefact as both mediator and facilitator of intentionality, we are presented with personhoods which may spread out from the body via artefacts and artefacts that can facilitate or hinder a user’s intentions. How is this intention or ‘thinking’ incorporated into the garment and how is it distributed through use and wear? This question might be explored by looking at the points when a garment and person cleave, where they both join or pull apart. The first instance of cleaving is between the garment and the maker. As referred to above, for Schilder (1935) and Merleau-Ponty (1962), an artefact that was in habitual tactile contact with its user was incorporated into their bodily self. Thus makers as well as users mingle with the artefacts they produce. Handmakers, such as craftpersons, seamstresses or shoemakers, who have repetitive tactile engagement with the object’s materiality through its production, incorporate some aspect of that artefact into themselves. Simultaneously, the maker is incorporated into the garment, the two becoming entangled or enmeshed.

Though the means through which a garment is produced may be complex, multifaceted, and frequently include many agents and processes, in this instance I wish
Sometimes making is not an actualisation of idea or fantasy but a giving into the agency of the materials one works with: letting the material agency, the body, the rhythm of process take over. Making like this may become a surprise; unexpected outcomes may lead the maker to somewhere quite other than their initial idea. Rosenberg writing about action painting and the ‘chance’ mark upon the canvas writes: ‘With regard to the tensions it is capable of setting up in our bodies the medium of any art is an extension of the physical world; a stroke of pigment, for example, works within us in the same way as a bridge across the Hudson. For the unseen universe that inhabits us an accidental blot or splash of paint may thus assume an equivalence to the profoundest happening...’ (Rosenberg, 1952, p. 22)
to focus on the relationship between a handmaker and a garment. Without straying too far into the politics of garment production, it is worth acknowledging that even in the simplest acts of making there are multiple agents at play. Each material and its producers, as well as designers, inspirations and clients, are present for the maker in the making of an artefact. One could easily apply Gell’s ‘art nexus’ (1998), in which he outlines the multiple agencies at play within the art object, to the agents/patient relations embodied in a garment.

Before the garment exists as a material form, it exists as an idea, image, intention, or impulse. It is a fantasy or desire held in the mind of the maker. It is through the projection of this intention onto the material form, and through negotiation with agency of materials themselves, that the realisation of the garment takes place. It is important to acknowledge the role of fantasy and the imaginary in the creative process, the ways that in order for intention to cross into action, a fantasy must be developed, tested, and approved. Fantasy is the trying-out ground for experience, a space where an idea may be examined and amended before it becomes fixed. The object as fantasy is malleable, and at times ambiguous; it is made solid only through its examination and testing out within the mind. Just as one might grasp a new artefact and turn it in one’s hand in order to comprehend its weight and form, so the maker must turn the imaginary artefact over in their mind until it becomes clear to them. However, unlike a material artefact, the imaginary artefact is never truly graspable and thus never truly complete. It is ephemeral and transitory; its essence eludes capture.

Frequently, it is the maker’s or user’s capacity to accurately translate this fantasy object into material form which is interpreted as the essence of makerly skill. This capacity to successfully transition inside to outside, internal desire to external product is viewed as the goal of the creative process. Though the notion of the craftsperson’s skill as solely located in the accuracy of this transmission may be outdated, the ability to manipulate and tame the agency of the materials one uses is central to the maker’s work. The material of the garment may facilitate this realisation or it may not, fighting back and resisting transformation. Thus, the process of materialisation is always one of negotiation: a to-ing and fro-ing between the fantasy of the object and the means through which it can be produced. The garment becomes an actualisation not just of the maker’s desires but also of the processes of materialisation, and of the accidents and affordances that occur during its making.

The process of materialisation is conflicted. Just as our outfits rarely look quite the way we imagined them, the garment is not a direct transposition of the maker’s ideal
60 It is often considered important that marks of making are not visible to the user, that the means of production is occluded through skill. Though contemporary craft may embrace and even fetishise the marks of making, smoothness and seamlessness are still highly valued. It is as though Gell’s (1998) ‘mind traps’ are perceived as most effective, when the means of production is not just complex but completely hidden from the viewer.
but a culmination of a series of divergent and at times conflicting agencies. The fabric may pucker, stitching come undone, pattern pieces not fit together. Though the maker’s skill and experience may mediate and lessen the material’s agency and resistance to change, the process is rarely simple or without problems. All this time the maker is, through repeated tactile engagement, incorporating the garment into their self; the garment becomes an extension of the self. Other incorporated or cleaved objects may mediate these incorporations, such as the familiar tools a maker uses, the chair they sit in, the garments they themselves wear. Returning to Gibson’s (1979) affordances, it is not merely the skill of the maker which affords the transition of the object from fantasy to material form. The objects which surround the maker – their tools, their landscape, and the materials available to them – are all active agents in the actualisation. The maker must negotiate with these agencies as well as with the agency of the materials used to make the object.

The negotiated material garment is not an ideal but an ambiguous object, embodying both the maker’s fantasy and the maker’s failure. The ideal or fantasy object may never be fully achieved. This is both because the ideal object is rarely unified and static (it is malleable and transitory in the mind) and because the process of materialisation must be negotiated with the agencies of the materials with which the maker interacts. The garment cannot be fully and permanently incorporated into the self because it represents a chink in the armour of the ego. It is ‘of the maker’ but never fully part of them. Through extended tactile engagement, the maker and the garment become entangled, the maker internalising the garment’s failures or flaws, the garment existing as a material projection/extension of an internalised ideal. Despite the intimacy of the making relationship and the intermingling that occurs, garments rarely remain with their maker but are distributed onwards to wearers. The distributed garment retains elements of this ambiguity; it retains the ‘me and not me’ of the maker. To return to Dilnot, ‘The basis of this re-description is a transformation of how things are thought: not as “dead” possessions or signs or markers but as “live gifts” working, at base, “for” us, and working in their “circulation” between and among us to establish a circle of making and self-making’ (Dilnot, 1993, p.59).

The wearer and the garment

Just as a process of projection, negotiation and incorporation typifies the relationship between the maker and the garment, the relationship between garment and wearer is one in which material agency and the body are in constant dialogue. The process of dressing like the experience of making starts with a fantasy of confluence, the outfit and the body uniting to form an ideal. Unlike the maker’s
ideal, the garments that will constitute the wearer’s fantasy already exist. Fashion is dependent upon the wearer’s agency as a maker of meaning: mass-produced garments are made original and idiomatic through appropriation and use. Both the ideal and its material manifestation require the utilisation of pre-constructed objects and imagery. The ideal or imaginary dressed body is constructed in reference to both external artefacts and imagery and the wearer’s conceptualisation of their own bodily self. Many different agencies collaborate to produce the fantasy of the dressed self: fashion, culture, and politics. We are perpetually surrounded by imagery of the dressed body and cannot help but incorporate elements of this imagery into our ideal and imagined selves. Conversely, the manifestation of the ideal, in material form, requires negotiation not with imagery and symbolism but with the materials or garments available to the wearer. In order to create a ‘look’, the wearer must work with what is available to them. Location, trends, financial means, social rules and prohibitions and, in particular, the wearer’s own pre-existing wardrobe impact on the wearer’s ability to successfully manifest their ideal. Simultaneously, once a garment or garments have been selected, the wearer must negotiate with the agencies already embodied within the garment and those of the other garments worn with them. The maker and attendant agencies are present for the wearer in the act of dressing. The wearer must negotiate the actualisation of their fantasy with pre-constructed material forms rather than with raw material, and their ability to realise their ideal is limited by this.

Fashion thinking is turned into fashion performance via the collation and modification of garments: their styling. This confluence retains the fractious and conversational nature of all our relationships with material things; the agency of the wearer is in a constant negotiation with the agency of the garment itself. The realisation of a fashion fantasy cannot help but be, to some extent, a failure, for fantasy cannot comfortably accommodate agency outside the ego. The garment is never truly separated from the previous bodies with which it has been entangled. It is not simply a confluence of agencies, but also a confluence of selves, and those selves compete with the material agency of the garment. The maker is present for the wearer in the garment. This presence, however, is not always consciously or unconsciously acknowledged: few of us think on a regular basis of the hands and bodies which made our clothes.

Just as the body modifies the worn garment, stretching, straining and creasing its surface, the garment imprints itself on the body, rubbing, marking and, in the case of structured and resistant garments (see Chapter One), permanently altering the form of the body. Through this tactile engagement, the garment becomes part of the bodily self and can function as an additional psychic receptacle, carrying
a history of our embodied relationships within it. Though wearing creates an attachment with the garment, it also hastens its disintegration. To return to the question posed earlier in the chapter, if this disintegration presents a risk, how may it be accommodated? Not only is the manifested artefact already a lost object, a poor rendition of the original ideal, but with each use and wear it moves farther from that ideal state. As the garment is worn, it becomes both more integrated and less ideal. Thus the paradox is present for us again: the more we use, the greater the incorporation and the greater the decay. In the negotiation between the body and the garment, it is the agency of the body that often wins. As attachment deepens, through reciprocal touch, garments start to fray, sag and tear. As the fashion is performed, the garment is sacrificed.

It is here that the transitional nature of garments (see Chapter One) becomes apparent: their capacity to be both of the self and other to it. It may also be useful to address the garment as a transformational object, as discussed by Bollas (1979). For Bollas the infant’s first experiences of the mother are as processes rather than as an object. If not transitional, could the garment then be viewed as a ‘transformational’ object – one onto which transformational desire is projected and contained? Transformational objects are ‘identified with the metamorphosis of the self’ (p.27); much like Ingold’s (2013) transducers, they are perceived as allowing change to occur. They are understood as facilitators of potential transformations, objects through which a new self may emerge. For Bollas this identification is pathological, the transformation needing to occur within the patient’s psyche rather than via a material object or external experience. The garment is transformational in two senses: firstly, it allows for the transformation of the wearer/maker’s fantasy into an enacted material reality, a shift from internal to external, which gives the maker/user the omnipotence the ego craves; and secondly, like all material artefacts, it is in a constant state of flux. The garment is not stable in its material form and it is this absence of fixity which prevents permanent and total incorporation. The garment pulls away from the wearer in this transformation, never fully allowing its agency to be subsumed by that of the wearer. For the maker this tactile entanglement results in the production of the garment, the drive forward resulting in a shift of form. Conversely, for the wearer the pressure of the body upon the garment leads to its destruction, its wearing away. The shift in form leads eventually to the degradation of the garment. The two processes of incorporation mirror one another, one a process of conscious construction and the other of unconscious destruction.
Though this research does not deal directly with second hand clothing (particularly because shoes for a range of reasons such as size specificity, difficulty in cleaning and modifying, etc. are less likely to be traded and reused than other garments), it is worth noting that second hand clothing is particularly interesting as a site of intermingling or cleaving. Second hand garments often contain physical traces of their previous users, whether that is bodily trace, such as sweat stains or stretched elbows, or modifications of the garments form, such as shortening a hem or letting out a seam. In these modifications, the new wearer is brought into direct bodily relationship with the traces of the previous wearer’s agencies. One must either seek to overcome these interminglings (washing the garment or letting down the hem) or feel the previous user’s agencies upon one’s body in the form of slightly too short sleeves, or a perfume you would not yourself have chosen. In this vein DeLong et al. write that vintage clothes shopping, ‘… is about fitting the body from clothing that fitted a person of another era … reconfiguring the current body proportions with different foundational structures’. (DeLong, Heinemann & Reiley, 2005, p.13)
Cleaving and the failed garment

For both the maker and the wearer the garment is always, to some extent, a failure. It cannot appease the desire for an ideal object, and is condemned to fall short. Despite this inability to live up to the maker’s and wearer’s ideal, the garment is still incorporated through making and use into the maker’s or user’s self. However, on failing to live up to their fantasy or ideal, and simultaneously presenting the risk that it will disintegrate and be lost to them, the garment may be rejected. Despite this initial rejection, through continued use and tactile engagement re-incorporation of the garment occurs – only for it to risk rejection once more as it again fails to live up to the ideal. Thus the relationship with the incorporated garment (the garment located within the wearer’s bodily schema) is not continuous, but one of repeated rejection and incorporation, a constant to-ing and fro-ing between fantasy, desire and loss. This cycle of re-incorporation and rejection is resonant of Freud’s ‘compulsion to repeat’ (1909): the attempt, through an act of unconscious compulsive repetition, to master an earlier troubling experience. Freud wrote of this process of returning to the site of trauma or loss over and over again in the hope of overcoming the source of anxiety as ‘like an un-laid ghost, it cannot rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell broken’ (Freud, 1909, p.123). The repetitive incorporation and rejection of the garment into the psyche, the continuous cleaving, echoes the process that Freud describes.

There is always a dissonance between ‘thinking’, as the creation of an ideal object within the psyche, and ‘being’, as the materialisation of that fantasy object through negotiation with the material world. The performance of fashion thinking can never be entirely successful because it requires the convergence of multiple external agencies. This inherent failure is at the heart of fashion: the compulsion to try and try again. In part, this imperfect realisation of the fantasy occurs because the garment retains traces of the maker and previous users. The garment is imbued with the agencies of others which threaten to override the agency of the new user. Despite physical separation, others are still entangled with and acting through the garment. Just as Gell writes of the index as ‘a detached part of the prototype’ (1998, p.103) or Weiner (1992) describes spirits transmitted via the Kula, the garment is a detached part of the maker and wearer. The word ‘cleave’, called upon earlier to encompass the me and not me qualities of the garment, its capacity to be both the self and other to it, can be called upon again to describe the garment as an object in flux, split between and incorporated into two or more bodies and selves.
Although I walk for several miles the shoes do not loosen at all, they still grip my feet tightly, pressing my toes together and biting at my heels. They are cool and faintly sticky inside, I can feel the copper adhering to my soles.

When I reach home, I peel off the shoes, letting them fall to the kitchen floor. I look down at my feet to see perfect imprints of their stitching; the shoe mirrored on my foot. The dye has bled, leaving black stitch marks where the sole and upper meet. These marks are uncanny and unsettling, like something from a horror film. Stigmata of the path I walked.
Film rehearsals: I cannot dance. I am not a dancer. My body is nothing like hers. She is small and I am tall. She has danced almost every day since she was five years old, I dance only at nightclubs and weddings. And yet I am lending her my gestures, the staccato uncomfortableness of my bodily self. I lend her my movements and ask her to amplify them. To make apparent those gestures I wish to ignore. To step into my shoes...
The Empty Shoe: Imprint, memory and the marks of experience
Often we understand the passage of time by our distance from an event, object or location; time as a measuring process. The incremental changes that mark its passage are too numerous and varied for our minds to comprehend or retain. Material things, however, do retain these incremental changes. The use of the material to record and mark the passage of time, to bear witness to what we cannot retain, is deeply rooted in our culture. We watch the tides, the sun and the seasons; we count rings on trees, measure shadows, watch clocks.
I have written of touch and counter-touch, of the attachment that ensues from use – of how, in holding an object, one comes to know it differently than through looking at it, and how, in the acts of making and of wearing, one knows it differently again. I have explored the intimacies of wearing and of making and the entanglements and incorporations that occur when the mind and material meet: how wear increases attachment but also imprint and decay; how through wearing, the incorporated garment is slowly lost to the wearer. Next to be considered are the manifestations of wear: the scuffs, wrinkles and creases which make apparent the relationships of wearing. Over time garments become records of lived experience, covered with the marks of use. How do these traces of use become manifestations of the passage of time, and how they might be viewed and read? The layering of imprints is not a linear process, one set of imprints masking the next; instead, the process of inscription is complex, imprints jostling together non-contemporaneously. These marks pile one on top of the other, becoming less intelligible and distinct with each movement and each step. Wear is materialised in objects in many ways, in stretching, tearing, abrading and creasing – marks made in a repetitive cycle, one mark begetting the next. These marks are not singular, linear or orderly; instead they overlap, each one impacting and producing another. As the shoe is worn, its surface becomes a map of the actions performed within it.

Time is present in all material things; they are both of ‘a’ time (when they were made, altered or used) and material manifestations of the passage of time itself. A Victorian shoe, for example, is not only a manifestation of when it was produced but also of the progression of time since that point. The passage of time is apparent and visible in the material world. This confluence of ‘having-been-there’ and ‘here-now’ is what Barthes (in reference to the photograph) refers to as ‘spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority’ (Barthes, 1977, p.44), material culture always existing between two times. The marks of use and wear are the presencing of this dissonance, the material records of the shift between there-then and here-now.
As my shoes creased their surfaces became more appealing to me; they became bodily – more intermingled, more mine. Each crease felt poignant, an unintentional record; the surface of the shoe sacrificed unthinkingly in the process of my daily life. Creases are ‘poignant’ in a way that folds are not. There is, I think, a particular resonance to worn things, a particular sense of awe of their survival, of artefacts and of experiences. We do not feel for that same awe for immaculate surfaces, the smooth surface has retained nothing; it has not experienced, learnt, or survived.

(Wearing Diary # 35)
Creases and folds

Garments show the traces of use and wear in many ways; these are intersections between bodily imprint and material decay. Often the first signs of wear are a creased or crumpled surface (see fig. 11), wrinkling and folding to accommodate gesture. Ingold writes of the crease:

The third major class of line [is] created not by adding material to surfaces, or by scratching it away, but by ruptures in the surfaces themselves. These are cuts, cracks and creases ... If the surface is pliant, then it may be folded without breaking, creating creases rather than cracks. The lines on a letter that has been unfolded after having been removed from the envelope are creases, as are the lines of pleated fabric on curtains, upholstery or clothing. So, too, are the lines on the face and hands, caused by folds of the skin. (Ingold, 2007, p.45)

Creases are not the wearing away of matter or a building up of residue, but an inversion, a contortion of the material’s form. Creasing is the transformation of a surface through action; creases are gestures embodied in a material form. Creases occur where the joints of the body bend a solid but malleable piece of material, bringing together non-adjacent sections to create pockets, ridges, and furrows. Creasing is a manifestation of the fabric’s resistance to compliance: silicon cannot crease because it is infinitely pliant; rice paper cracks because it is incapable of pliancy; fabrics which crease must both accommodate folding and resist it. Creases are lines drawn through movement, gestures retained in a physical form. Creasing differs from folding, not in the end result – though a fold may imply something more precise than a crease – but in the intentionality of the action, the thinking behind the mark-making. Folding implies intentionality and purposive agency; creases, on the other hand, are often unintentional, the resultant trace of an action rather than the aim of it. The crease is a trace of experience, suffered or accepted, whereas folds are inflicted onto matter. Creases produce a network of lines, a map of our movements; each crease connects to another just as each gesture flows into the next. These networks, alongside the other records of use, create material cartographies of experience. The crease materialises this as the two surfaces on either side of the fold are brought into contact. The wearing and repeated unconscious habits of the movement of the body bring surfaces into contact and create reflexivity. The crease is both a record of a gesture and of the gesture continued: a line of flight away from the body. Gesture freed from the bounds of the body continues as a line across the material’s surface.
There is, I think, a horror in scuffing one's shoe, an inevitability, a loss. The shoe starts off perfect, a crisp clean surface, free from multiple layers of marks, the marks it does bear are intentional, they are meant to be. As soon as you put on a shoe or the first time you know that you will scuff it. Often to initially preserve the shoes, to acclimatise myself to their damage, I would wear them indoors for a few days, walking mindfully and gently around the house. However at some point I would need to wear them outside. The tips of the toes, the point at which the body moves forwards, are the first place to mark. With each stride, as the foot leads the body forward, there is a new risk. The scratched hide is no longer smooth, its protective sheen abraded. Abrasions reveal the suede-like softness of the leather's interior, raw and vulnerable, insides laid bare.

The weight of my body and form of my feet is imbedded in the shoes that I have worn. Interestingly on the thin soled flat shoes these imprints are most visible, not on the inside, but on the outside, the soles of my shoes. The sole has curved to correspond the undulating flesh of my feet, to the height of my arch and width of my toes. Thus each time I remove my shoes and turn them over, I see myself reflected back. I am present in these shoes. Sometimes, if worn in the rain, or dried too quickly, the shoes lose their cast like quality, their capacity to mirror my form. When I turn them over the curves of my feet are gone from them - I have been erased.

There are a few major exceptions to contemporary culture's discomfort with the used and the worn. Within the realm of clothing the most apparent exceptions are certain types of jeans and leather jackets. The symbolic value of both jeans and leather jackets is dependent upon a web of meanings surrounding white working-class American masculinity. They draw on signifiers from both early twentieth-century working-class culture and cinematic expression of rebellious or counter-culture masculinity. Wear or ageing of these items has come to signify a particular type of 'authenticity' linked to traditional male working-class manual labour and motorcycle use. The wear here is seen to allude to strength, rebellion, risk taking and 'authentic' experience. Hence, for many, worn or ripped jeans or a battered leather jacket connote authenticity of their wearer. Both Miller and Woodward’s (2010) study of Global Denim cultures and Clements’ (2011) study of the signification of the leather biker jacket explore these themes in more detail. Similarly Mathews David (2015) writes interestingly of sandblasting and other 'faked' forms of wear.
Scuffs and abrasions

Just as creases alter the surface of a garment by transforming it from smooth to wrinkled, scuffing also disrupts the surface of the object (see fig. 12). Scuffing is the displacement of matter from one space to another; as the surface is rubbed away, the garment’s material form is dispersed. Scuffs are records of the garment and body’s relationship to their habitat, their interactions with spaces and objects around them. If, as Latour writes, ‘an “actor” in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it’ (Latour, 2005, p.46), then these marks, the scuffs and abrasions, are the traces of these entities, the technologies with which the garment and the wearer interact. Thus the scuff is a map of affordances, the actions the garment allows us to perform. The scuff is created through the meeting of the environment and gesture; it is a record both of the body and of the networks of artefacts and technologies that it is part of. In scuffing, the skin of another species may be used by us as prosthesis for our own fragile skins. The animal hide absorbs the impacts that would have wounded us.

Stretching and imprints

Stretching and the imprints of the body record the pressure exerted by the wearer on the garment (see fig.12). Stretching is not just a record of gesture but of continued force of the body against an object’s material form. The garment’s elasticity, which allows it to retain its original shape, decreases over time. Stretching, like abrasion, is a dispersal of the object’s matter; however, unlike abrasions, the dispersed matter remains part of the object. These are processes of gradual rearrangement, of matter shifting in response to the body, its gestures, and the environment in which it resides. Eventually the impacts of the body and environment overcome the shoe and lead to its disintegration; wear hastens entropy. Although, in contemporary consumer culture, it is not common to wear a garment until it falls apart, using a garment will eventually destroy it. The time a garment takes to transform from pristine to rags is contingent on the wearer’s body, movements, and environment. The gradual process of material change is the manifestation of time in a material form.
The late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a particular engagement with and fixation upon the smooth and the sleek. This is apparent in relation both to product and industrial design, and also in the representation of female bodies. Smoothness has become increasingly linked to ideas around youth, cleanliness, progress, desire and the modern. Both the female body and the artefact (it may be said that the female body is in fact an artefact in a high capitalist commodity culture) have been corralled into a position where their attractiveness is dependent upon a sleek smoothness. Nooks, crannies, cracks, wrinkles, hair and patina have all been deemed old-fashioned, dirty, uncontrolled and undesirable.

In _Thinking Through the Skin_ (Ahmed and Stacey, 2001) Ahmed and Stacey write that ‘In consumer culture we are encouraged to read skin, especially feminine skin, as something that needs to be worked upon in order to be protected from the passage of time or the severity of the external world, or in order to retain its marker of gender difference in the softness of its feel’ (Ahmed and Stacey, 2001, p.1). This signifying quality of skin is emphasised by Connor in his _The Book of Skin_: ‘The skin figures. It is what we know of others and our selves. We show ourselves in and on our skins, and our skins figure out the things we are and mean: our health, youth, beauty, power, enjoyment, fear, fatigue, embarrassments or suffering.’ (Connor, 2003, p.50)

For discussion of the fetishisation of newness see Jonathan Chapman’s _Emotionally Durable Design_ (2005). He writes of our fixation on the new: ‘Through a wide-eyed affection for all things new, mainstream industrial design has become technocentric, incorporating contemporary technologies within archaic product typologies – a skin deep discipline devoid of rich content that packages culture into slick consumable bytes, streamlined with synthetic polymers and metals.’ (Chapman, 2005, p.10)

The insides of my sandals have become smooth through wear, the pressure of my body impacting and burnishing the leather day after day. The shoes I wore after bathing are the smoothest, my warm damp flesh, made them pliable and slippery. The balms I rub into my feet have seeped into them, adding a sheen to their surface. They are luminously dirty, glossed not with polish but with oil and sweat. These shoes do not wrinkle and crease like the others do; their form is added to rather than depleted. These minute additions, of sweat and oil, swell the surface of the leather and fill in the abrasions of use. It is as though they have been embalmed. (Wearing Diary # 40)

Smoothness

The smoothing of a garment’s surface through wear is interesting because smoothness is frequently symbolically linked to ideas of newness. The near-fetishisation of smoothness in contemporary culture is grounded in modernism; smoothness is interpreted as signifying newness, freshness, youth and, through these, progress. In his paper on the aesthetics of glamour Thrift (2008) examines the ways that glamour is produced through the artful manipulation of surfaces, linking the glamour of smoothness to both technological advancements and capitalism. The allure of the smooth is pronounced – think for a moment about skin, and how we value the unlined surface of a young face. Smooth surfaces are often perceived as impenetrable, and thus immune to pollution or decay. A smooth surface is perceived as a protective layer, which cannot be easily unravelled or infiltrated. Smoothness, whether of a face or a garment uncreased by wear, may belie the wearer’s internal experience: unreadable faces may be described as ‘mask’-like (smooth, immobile and opaque). There is something seductive about this symbolic fusion of newness and impenetrability, and this seductiveness is writ large across twentieth-century design. The newness implied by smoothness further implies the potential for reinvention, whilst its impenetrability suggests a protection from pollution or harm. However, though surfaces may be smooth because an object is new, they may also have been worn away over time, smoothing through erosion. The soles of shoes, in particular, are often smoothed in this way. Smoothing is a form of erasure, of material forgetting; smoothing wipes the slate clean. On an everyday level, the act of ironing a garment renders a garment amnesiac, it forgets the previous day’s creases and gestures. The erosion of a surface to smoothness creates a paradox: the deletion of records through the process of their materialisation. Smoothed objects may be appealing because they carry no record of the past on them; they are a blank slate, an absolution. Conversely, creases, whether on our clothing, skin or sheets, cannot conceal the actions that produced them.

The creases on a shoe contain the records of the major events through which one might narrate a life (rites of passage, journeys or achievements), but also the habitual minutiae, the multiple repeated acts, of our everyday lives. A crease may start with a single gesture but is deepened by its repetition over time. Creases frequently relate to our habitual gestures; at times one may even recognise a wearer through the creasing of their clothing. This repetition does not require that each gesture be exactly like the one that preceded it. The exact repetition of a gesture is impossible, for it is performed in a different time. Repetition of gesture is one of the ways that tacit knowledge is produced and retained. Just as tacit knowledge is inscribed on the body through repetition, deep creases are incised into material,
learning and responding to the practices of the body. A crease is a material memory, an archive of an act repeated over time.

As the material creases, its surface turns in upon itself, becoming a hinge that cleaves the surface, allowing discontinuous parts to meet. This cleavage, through which non-adjacent parts of an object meet, brings to mind Serres’ (1995) description of time as akin to a crumpled handkerchief:

If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it certain fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far-off distances. Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close can become very distant. This science of nearness and rifts is called topology, while the science of stable and well-defined distances is called metrical geometry. (Serres with Latour, 1995, p.60)

For Serres, the handkerchief serves as a metaphor for understanding time not as a metric system but as a topology. The surface of the cloth may be rearranged through crumpling or tearing, or be cast out and drawn back in like a net. While Serres uses the materiality of this habitual object as a metaphor for temporality, material things themselves function not as topologies but as topographies of time. The metaphor of maps is useful here: in stretching, scuffing and creasing, the surface of a garment becomes a complex map of experience rather than a linear chronological record.

Our attachment to our clothes (and, in particular, to our shoes) is produced in the transmission of experience across surfaces; the cycle of imprint between body and the garment leaves a trace. These are transmissions of experience from immaterial into material and back again. They are the ways things and thoughts collide; the way that the solid and the ephemeral may relate to one another. As a surface creases, the geography of the object is disrupted, close becomes near, and near becomes far. As a garment wears down through use, the body is enveloped more closely in its folds, and simultaneously the creasing of the surface creates pockets or containers. The ridges and valleys of a worn surface capture both matter shed from the body and matter distributed from the outside world; the surface of a used garment becomes a container in this way. These pocked surfaces become imbued with a particular kind of resonance. The garment is both a mediating surface through which perception is filtered and a vessel for minute traces of the journeys and gestures the body undertakes. The creased surface becomes an archive. In this
process of gathering and of retention, objects may become appealing or abject. Dirt that creases gather is uncomfortable because it emphasises our inability to move through the environment unsullied. Dirt threatens us because it disrupts the binaries we use to order our lives – inside/outside, me/not-me, safe/dangerous. The creased surface is risky because it sits at the edges of these boundaries, its insides and outsides touching and undefined.

The mystic writing pad

The marks upon the shoe are traces of the gestures performed within them, records of being in the world. The relationship between body, footwear and memory is one in which three agents are in constant dialogue. The body imprints its form on the shoe, leather stretching and soles wearing away; in turn, the shoe alters the body, distorting bones and hardening skin: movement inscribes memory. Through wear and the process of bodily imprint, footwear becomes a container for experience. The garment, in touching the skin, mediates our perceptive consciousness and becomes a site where internal and external experience may meet.

How might the shoe’s capacity to record and bear witness to our experiences impact upon the particular resonance of the worn or discarded shoe? In ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”’ (1925), Freud takes the metaphor of a mystic writing pad to illustrate the way that perception, memory and the unconscious function in relation to one another. In searching for an adequate metaphor for the ways which experiences are processed and retained, Freud examined different forms of writing and inscription. First, he rejects the metaphor of writing on a sheet of paper; though a sheet of paper can be permanently marked by ink, it is quickly filled up with information. Similarly, he rejects the metaphor of a slate and chalk, upon which limitless information can be recorded, but only if the previous inscription is erased. For Freud, the most successful metaphor for the relationship between perception, memory and the unconscious is that of the ‘mystic writing pad’: a child’s toy made up of a tablet of wax covered with a sheet of waxed paper and one of cellophane, upon which words are inscribed with a stylus. This toy allows one to make unlimited notes but also to leave permanent traces. By writing on the cellophane sheet the waxed paper is pressed against the wax tablet and the written marks show. To clear the pad of writing all one is required to do is to lift away the sheets of paper from the wax slab and the words will disappear. However, traces and impressions of the writing are still present as indentations, unseen on the wax slab below. Freud saw this device as analogous to the processes of experience and recollection: the cellophane as the shield of the perceptual apparatus, the waxed paper as the conscious perception of the event and the wax slab as unconscious record. For
Freud this process of imprint and erasure was akin to the process through which experience enters the unconscious. The unconscious with its ‘unlimited receptive capacity’ (Freud, 1925, p.227) stores what the perceptive consciousness takes in but cannot tolerate or retain. The imprint of experience is produced on the surface but retained in the core. Within the mind, memories imprinted into the unconscious are also able to re-emerge. Freud considered ‘the appearance and disappearance of the writing’ as akin to ‘the flickering-up and passing away of consciousness in the process of perception’ (Freud, 1925, p.230). These junctures are sites where conscious experience and the unconscious intersect and transfer across and between surfaces. This analogy sheds light on the ways experience is manifested in objects, the points where conscious behaviour and material trace might meet. That there are layers of experience and of retention is clear, and also that experience may move between these layers.

Through the cleaving of the garment the experiences of the wearer move into layers which are not bodily. While much memory may be processed via the brain, the perceptive apparatus which allows us to recollect is located throughout the body, both on the surface and in its core. The skin, an organ of perceptive consciousness, is also a site of the unconscious, a juncture where memory emerges and recedes. The shoe is a site where material and skin meets. If mnemic trace could be transferred into objects, then those worn closest to the body might most readily receive this transfer. Garments pressed close to the skin become, at times, more bodily than object-like; as Stallybrass writes, they ‘materialize the power of people to be condensed and absorbed into things and of things to become persons’ (Stallybrass and Jones, 2001, p.116). A well-worn garment that has rested long upon the skin’s receptive surface comes to embody experience, rather than signify it. Just as the marking of our skin shows the passing of time, the ageing of a shoe becomes a material record of its wearer.

**Palimpsests**

The traces of experience which reside within and upon our own shoes may help to shed light on the ambiguous attachment we have to them. However, this personal attachment does not explain why the worn shoes of others are so poignant. In exploring the affective quality of worn shoes, one may draw upon another writing metaphor, the palimpsest. Palimpsests are vellum scrolls which are inscribed and then, when the text is no longer required, scraped clean and used again. The production of the palimpsest has three stages: the initial writing, the erasure, and the rewriting of text onto the cleared surface. The layering of texts in the production of the palimpsest is often used as a metaphor for inter-textuality. However, my interest
Similarly in my own practice shoes are made in order to be destroyed through wear. They are ‘made’ through the twin processes of construction and destruction; erasure as a form of making. In the practice of carefully constructing fragile shoes, I was linking these two modes of making. For Gell (1998) ‘cognitive stickiness’ is ‘the enchantment of technology’ operating through the maker’s virtuosity (the technology of enchantment) and intentionality. In contrast, the imprints left on worn shoes are unintentional, habitual, unavoidable traces. My role as the maker, wearer, and researcher allowed me to connect these two contrasting processes and to highlight the ways that use becomes a form of unconscious ‘making’; altering and making it bodily.
lies in the materiality of the palimpsest, in the ways in which the reading of one object might aid us in the reading of another. If the metaphor of the palimpsest is applied to a shoe, we may interpret ‘writing’ as bodily imprint, and the ‘erasure’ as the wearing away of the shoe’s surface through use. The acts of writing and erasure are both forms of inscription and of scraping the surface away; both leave behind a trace. This process is, in many ways, resonant of Rauschenberg’s ‘Erased de Kooning’ (1953). In this piece Rauschenberg slowly erased a de Kooning painting over the course of a month. In the erasure of the painting, Rauschenberg was retracing the gestures (the actions of an action-painter) which de Kooning had used to produce it. The scraped palimpsest is wiped clean but, like the wax tablet of the mystic writing pad, retains some traces of the previous inscription. The shoe carries traces of the wearer; bodily experience is written across the surface of the shoe. Each movement we make is minutely recorded in the shoe’s changing material form, only for those records to be partially erased through daily wear as new records are imprinted on top of them. The shoe is like a palimpsest, inscribing experience over experience until its form finally breaks down.

Erasure

Inscription of experience is not a single instance of a process but a repeated one. The worn shoe does not hold single records but the traces of many, and similarly our clothing contains multiple imprints of our lives. Do garments become more resonant, more affective, the more they are worn? In many ways my own practice is concerned with this duality, the simultaneous making resonant and erasure of the garment through wear. I make objects which are designed to be more receptive to the marks of wear than usual; they either break down more readily or show damage more clearly than a habitual shoe. There is something poignant for the artist about making artefacts that will inevitably be destroyed. Their material frailty and the inevitability of their loss cause you to attend to them more closely; each use both binds and separates you. This fragility is resonant of Boltanski’s comments (see Chapter Two) on impermanent monuments which ‘require a continuous engagement’ (Boltanski, quoted in Solomon-Godeau, 1998, p.1).

Unless an imprint is partially erased there is no space for the next; the process of erasure is not the wiping clean of a slate or even the scraping of the palimpsest. As a garment is worn, each mark is simultaneously partially erased and further embedded by the over-writing of the next. Erasure takes place in the enacting of the next experience. Thus the new experience partially obliterates the old but also pushes it deeper into the material of the shoe. As the shoe becomes a record there is always a partial forgetting. The empty shoe simultaneously represents an absence of presence and contains the presence of absence – the trace.
To sum up: the worn shoe is a site of multiple non-contemporaneous records. Each new bodily imprint partially obscures and destroys the previous imprint, creating a mesh of overlapping and incomplete traces. When we observe a shoe, we are not viewing the record of a single motion (as we do when we view a footprint), but the partial records of many different and disparate movements. Thus the shoe does not present a linear narrative but one in which multiple records sit side by side. The shoe is a site of non-contemporaneity. Multiple records are simultaneously visible and, through their partial erasure and overlapping, impossible to decode. This overlapping of multiple narratives gives worn shoes their particular resonance. They do not represent a single trace but a complex record of many gestures performed and lost. These multiple overlapping narratives produce an experience for the viewer that is akin to looking at a well-used palimpsest. Previous acts of inscription are visible, despite their partial erasure, and compete with the most recent inscription to hold the eye. Thus the shoe becomes more resonant but less intelligible the more it is worn. The worn shoe becomes difficult to read; the more worn it is, the less easily one may abduct an individual trace. Its effect stems from an inability to comprehend it; one cannot untangle the multiple imprints of events and experiences that the object contains. The worn shoe produces such effect because it is difficult to understand. Here affect may be interpreted as ‘the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion’ (Greg and Seigworth, 2010, p.1). In Art and Agency, Gell (1998) presents the idea that an artefact may be ‘cognitively sticky’. Tilley writes that this ‘cognitive “stickiness” of patterns is attributed by Gell to a blockage in the “cognitive process of reconstructing the intentionality embodied in artefacts”’ (Gell quoted in Tilley, 2006). That is to say, our inability to comprehend the process through which an art object is manufactured gives it power over us; incomprehension leads to enchantment. Is it the obfuscating nature of the imprints upon a worn shoe (or other garment) that creates the affective experience of viewing? It is our inability to decode the multiple experiences recorded within the shoe that makes it such a powerful object. The worn shoe’s resonances stem not simply from its function as a record of events but from the fact that we can never fully untangle the web of interrelated experiences that produce a life.
Memory, recollection, and resonance: Garments, material imprint and the memory nexus

‘Memory is the seamstress, and a capricious one at that. Memory runs her needle in and out, up and down, hither and thither. We know not what comes next, or what follows after. Thus, the most ordinary movement in the world, such as sitting down at a table and pulling the inkstand towards one, may agitate a thousand odd, disconnected fragments, now bright, now dim, hanging and bobbing and dipping and flaunting, like the under-linen of a family of fourteen on a line in a gale of wind.’

(Woolf, 1928, p.436)

A red wine stain on a wedding dress, a shiny pair of new school shoes, the buttons on your father’s favourite suit: even away from the body, clothing resonates with the aspirations and failures of its wearers, of the lives lived within it. More than almost any other artefact, clothing demands that we recollect. From our own clothes, treasured or discarded, through the wardrobes of loved ones and lost friends, to anonymous dresses hanging in shops and museums, garments permit us to access pasts otherwise lost to us.

There is something in the bodily nature of the garment, perhaps its skin-like quality or its ability to envelop our bodily selves, that allows it to serve as a gateway, vessel or locus for recollection. This resonance is often explored in writing on fashion, textile and dress: from Stallybrass’s (2001a) haunting encounter with his friend Allon White’s jacket, to De la Haye (2005) and Evans’ (2014) explorations of the creases, scuffs and abrasions left through use, storage and wear. Davidson (2013) and Ponsonby (2014) both write of the utilisation of these affects in curatorial practice, the ways that a tear or imprint of the body may be utilised to impact upon the viewer. Similarly practitioners such as Goett (in Jefferies et al., 2015) make use of the capacity of garments to embody experience to address the relationship between memory and material. Goett writes that ‘The laundry itself ... is a textile multiverse: every garment on the washing line of memories imbued with missed belongings; every textile process with its traditions, myths, histories and practices attached.’ (in Jefferies et al., 2015, p125) The relationship between clothing, memory, and recollection is central to fashion studies and to creative and curatorial practice.

It is a paradox that scholars of fashion and dress, a medium that is so fundamentally lived, enacted and performed, should so often focus on clothes no longer worn. What is the lure of the dress without the body, the shoe without the foot? Is it that we, in our museums and archives, away from the bustle of the high street,
In an introduction to ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire’, published in *Representations*, Nora (1989) writes of memory ‘places’ and the intersection between the material, symbolic and functional in these sites. He states that all memory places are a confluence of these categories: real, imagined and archival. It could be said that the term ‘memory object’ functions in a similar way; all memory objects mediate a space between the material and immaterial, the cultural and personal and the real and the imaginary.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Non-Narrative</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monuments</td>
<td>Perfumes and textures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intentional keepsakes</td>
<td>Deja-vu and sensations unmediated by words. The texture of a garment held at a pre-verbal phase. Touching something in the hope of being transported back.</td>
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<td>e.g. lockets, charm bracelets, friendship bracelets</td>
<td>The texture of a garment held at a pre-verbal phase. Touching something in the hope of being transported back.</td>
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<td>Indexical</td>
<td>Relics</td>
<td>Other people's artefacts, abject objects</td>
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<td>e.g. Princess Diana's Wedding dress, baby shoes, memento mori</td>
<td>e.g. Grave textiles (c.f. Davidosn, 2013), Auschwitz shoes, Hiroshima dresses</td>
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Fig 13. Memory nexus diagram

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73 In an introduction to ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire’, published in *Representations*, Nora (1989) writes of memory ‘places’ and the intersection between the material, symbolic and functional in these sites. He states that all memory places are a confluence of these categories: real, imagined and archival. It could be said that the term ‘memory object’ functions in a similar way; all memory objects mediate a space between the material and immaterial, the cultural and personal and the real and the imaginary.
are surrounded by these bodiless garments – these absences of lives? There is a preoccupation with how and why garments may act as vessels for memory or triggers for recollection. The mnemonic functions of clothing have become an increasingly important strand of research in fashion and dress. Many different mnemonic and recollective processes and experiences are grouped under the umbrella term of ‘clothing and memory’: from those that relate to our own clothing to those that involve the clothing of others. The different means through which clothing acts upon us, as viewer, have not yet been fully examined or defined.

It is evident that different kinds of ‘memory object’ act upon the viewer (or ‘patient’, to use Gell’s term) in a range of ways, and that in order to understand how a garment may embody a memory or trigger recollection we must explore the patient’s relationship to it. Clearly, the position of an artefact within the networks of social and object relations that constitute our culture, environment, history and discourses is fundamental to how it is ‘read’. The artefact exists only within this web of contexts and affordances and is inseparable from them. Gell’s (1998) ‘art nexus’ is useful in exploring the agency of the garment as memory object. Memory objects, like art objects, are a locus of ‘affect’, a site of abductive experience for the viewer: ‘They are difficult to make, difficult to think, difficult to transact. They fascinate, compel, and entrap as well as delight the spectator.’ (Gell, 1998, p.23)

Both art and memory objects may act as agents in a web of relations in which the viewer is the ‘patient’. For Gell the art object constitutes a confluence of multiple agencies, including the material the artefact is made from and those of the patrons and viewers who receive it. By making these relationships explicit, Gell sought to examine whose agency was transmitted through the art object. While I differ from Gell in that I attribute agency to a material object itself, rather than view it as a conduit through which another’s agency may be transmitted, the diagrammatic mapping of these relationships may clarify the manner in which an artefact acts upon us: that through creating a ‘memory nexus’ rather than an ‘art nexus’ we might understand some of the ways that clothing, experience and affect intersect.

In building this ‘memory nexus (see fig. 13) I have defined four modes of mnemonic object, and have constructed a framework through which to examine them and their intersections. These categories are: indexical, symbolic, narrative and non-narrative. These four categories may be divided into two binary pairs, though it is worth noting that, in many cases, an artefact may be read as both. As with the reading of any artwork, context and relationality are everything in the ‘reading’ of a memory object; an object which is read through narrative for one may be non-narrative for another.
Indexical and symbolic memory objects

The first classification concerns the nature of the artefact itself: between indexical and symbolic memory objects. The indexical memory object is one which was present at the recollected incident; an object that bears imprint or trace (the smoke from a fire, a footprint in the sand) – they were physically present at the inception of the memory. It is the dress you wore to your wedding or the shoes of holocaust victims stored at Auschwitz. The indexical memory object’s affective quality stems from its causal relation to the experience recalled: the fact that it was there. Stallybrass and Jones (2001a and 2001b) explore the evocative qualities of artefacts which have a direct indexical link to recollected experiences or persons. In Stallybrass’ description of wearing his friend’s jacket and in his larger study of memento mori and clothing, he examines how the material trace of wear (the indexical imprint) or physical remnants of a body and gestures can evoke memories or become resonant. Gloves (garments which, like shoes, are highly reminiscent of the part of the body they protect) and other worn artefacts ‘trouble the conceptual opposition between person and thing’ (Stallybrass and Jones 2001b, p.118). (in Boehm, 2012), writing of hair as a memento mori, similarly addresses the indexicality of memory objects:

The hair could produce an emotional or sensory point of contact between the viewer and the person it came from, thus was both subject and object, person and thing. Because hair meant memory and mourning, this meaning persisted even when the individual was historical or even unknown and therefore came to mean the collapsing of distance between now and any past, along with a sense of wanting to restore or access the past that can be captured by mourning objects. (Hill in Boehm, 2012, p.164)

While an indexical memory object may allude to a lost person, it may also allude more specifically to an absent behaviour or gesture. Pollock, writing about her mother’s rolling pin (in Turkle, 2007), addresses how the object as a record of gesture may compel us to recall, repeat and re-live movement. These indexical memory objects are akin to those Feldman (2006) calls ‘contact points.’ Contact points are, to use the terminology of this research, intermingled objects, objects which were once in contact with the body and through that contact have come to cleave to it or represent it and as such allow a viewer to engage with an embodied history. Feldman writes they are a ‘general category of object that results from physical contact with the body, and then subsequent removal or destruction of the body’ (Feldman, 2006, p.246), highlighting in particular the shoe’s capacity to act as a contact point for the viewer. Though Feldman’s categories are perhaps broader
The passage is as follows: ‘I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin.’ (Proust, 1913, p.48)
than my own (including diaries and other ephemera) and are used in particular
reference to the experience of artefacts in museums, the idea of an artifact as a
contact point is helpful.

Conversely, a ‘symbolic’ memory object stimulates recollection because it ‘is like’
another object; it stands in or is a substitute for an absent original. The symbolic
memory object represents the experience (verbally or non-verbally) but bears no
direct causal relation to it. It may function through having similarities to the original,
or through having been afforded the symbolic function of representing it. Thus the
symbolic memory object may either be a visual or sensory stand-in for an original
or it may be a mnemonic (a memorial sculpture, a pebble in a shoe). These objects
induce recollection through their ability to remind us of something else. Perhaps
the most famous of symbolic memory objects is the madeleine in Proust’s *A la
recherche du temps perdu* (Proust, 1913). For the narrator it is not that particular
madeleine or that particular cup of linden tea that causes his sudden and involuntary
recollected act, but the confluence of their properties at a particular place and time.
That is to say, there is not an indexical link between the ‘trigger’ (tea and cake) and
the recollected act, but a likeness or similarity between the two sensory experiences.
The madeleine and tea are like another madeleine and tea; one is a ‘material
metaphor’ for the other. Here, the object functions as proxy: a material thing
reminds you of another, stimulating recollection. The artefact operates as a simile.

**Narrative and non-narrative memory objects**

If the categories of symbolic and indexical define how the object relates causally
or materially to the original event, then the next two categories attempt to define
the way the viewer receives or interprets them. It asks whether the experience of
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Conversely, the non-narrative memory object is one whose affective qualities stem
from the artefact’s physical presence or materiality, be those traces of wear or use
or a particular material quality which reminds one of another. The non-narrative
The particular functions and mechanisms of memory and recollection are as complex and varied as the memories that may or may not be recollected. Increasingly, however, psychologists make a distinction between memories which are retained as narratives (those which may be recollected at will) and memories which have no narrative attached to them and are experienced as involuntary or intrusive memory. In his work on unwanted memory and trauma Van Der Kolk writes, ‘... research into the nature of traumatic memories indicates that trauma interferes with declarative memory, i.e. conscious recall of experience, but does not inhibit implicit, or non-declarative memory, the memory system that controls conditioned emotional responses, skills and habits, and sensorimotor sensations related to experience’. (Van der Kolk, 1994). Hence, though the recollection of a narrative may be inhibited, the experience is retained as sensorimotor sensations and emotion. These recollections, unbounded by narrative are less likely to be summoned by voluntary recall and more likely to reemerge in response to sensory stimuli similar to the original traumatic event.
memory object is experienced outside a verbal narrative; it is not mediated by a story but by the fact that the garment itself is resonant. Engagement with it is sensory, and not verbally mediated. Affect in this case is a bodily experience: ‘crucially then, the turn to affect expands the category of experience: an “affective event” is not consciously apprehended but is, rather, what happens to the body directly on the level of its endocrinology, skin conduction, and viscera’ (Callard and Papoulias in Radstone and Schwarz, 2010, p.47). The process of recollection may be verbal and narrative or sensory and affective. If we divide recollective experiences into those which have a verbal narrative attached to them (I wore this when, or this reminds me of) and those from which the abduction is non-verbal and sensorially affective, we have a complex web of different forms of recollection and evocation. This ‘memory nexus’ presents multiple potentials for how people respond to artefacts and could be useful in examining how and why certain artefacts become overloaded with meaning or become particularly affective.

Voluntary and involuntary

It is worth noting that there is a distinct difference between the voluntary and involuntary, in both remembering and recollecting: there are things we make in order to remember and things we cannot forget. A voluntary recollection is quite different from the sudden assault of an unwanted memory. Recollection appears to function in a number of ways. Often one recalls events without the intervening periods – recollection as a staccato series of events which stand out through the blur of the habitual. Alternatively, one may recall a whole period, each detail, event, or action preceding the next. The difficulty with continuous remembering is that there is too much to take in or to later relay. In Borges’ story ‘Funes the Memorious’ (Borges, 1962), Ireneo Funes is able, after an accident, to recall an entire day’s events precisely and accurately. However, the process of recollection takes an entire day, so that he can only recall one day if he sacrifices another. A similar paradox is discussed in Luria’s *The Mind of a Mnemonist* (1987) where Shereshevskii, haunted by his inability to forget, attempts unsuccessfully to write down and burn his memories. The mind cannot retain infinite detail and also function successfully. Objects, however, have an almost infinite capacity to retain the markings of time; they are in possession of a material ‘eidetic’ memory.

If we take these four categories, the ‘non-narrative’, the ‘narrative’, the ‘indexical’ and the ‘symbolic’, and juxtapose them, we may begin to examine the multiple ways one may engage with a ‘memory object’. In constructing this nexus, we are presented with four potential categories of mnemonic object and recollective experience: the symbolic/narrative, symbolic/non-narrative, narrative/indexical, and indexical/non-narrative.
Symbolic/Narrative

The ‘symbolic/narrative’ memory object is one that is, for the viewer, both representational and affixed to a particular narrative. It may be an image of something or an artefact which has no visual link to the original. What is significant is that it evokes a memory which is abducted as a narrative or verbal experience. The majority of objects that are referred to in relation to memory fall either into this category or the next. Monuments are an example, or intentional keepsakes such as lockets, charm bracelets and friendship bracelets. They trigger recollection of a narrative that is familiar to you. Although they were not present at the event, the event is known to you, the viewer. An artefact which is a representation, substitute or simulacrum of an aspect of an experience, event or person, and which induces the recollection of articulable narrative of that event, might be referred to as symbolic/narrative. Symbolic/narrative memory objects constitute a great number of public memory artefacts: memorials, objects in museums, portraits, etc. The impact of the narrative-symbolic object lies in its capacity to trigger recollection of something one has previously experienced or learnt. Frequently these artefacts act as the cultural equivalents of a knotted handkerchief; they are a constructed reminder of something else. Though Forty (in Forty and Küchler, 1999) would suggest that the memorial is a tool for forgetting, it is apparent that the overt intention, if not the result, of the memorial is remembrance. To expand upon Forty’s analysis of memorials, is it possible that the absence of an indexical link between artefact and event is what ‘allows’ us to forget? - that there is none of that nagging urgency of the indexical memory object, its commanding capacity to draw in and capture the viewer? The symbolic/narrative memory object, however, does not have to be purpose-built – it may simply be that it resembles some other earlier artefact; an artefact may simply have enough commonalities with an original.

Symbolic/Non-Narrative

Just as one may be compelled by the symbolic/narrative memory object to recall a particular and articulable event or experience, the symbolic/non-narrative memory object triggers affective experience because it resembles or stands in for an original. However, for the viewer, these objects do not have an articulable narrative attached to them, but exist in a realm of extra-lingual experience. The experience of these objects is not a verbal recollection but a sensory or bodily one. It is perhaps akin to the affective awe that Gell (1996) describes in his essay ‘Vogel’s Net’. The artefact produces, for the viewer, a recollective sensation, which is not accompanied by recollection of a narrative or descriptive memory. The experience of déjà vu is one
See methodology for further discussion of the relationship between photographs and the index.

The experience of the uncanny is undoubtedly an affective one; the dissonance between knowing what and knowing how. This ambiguous space between knowing and not knowing presents a sort of horror or dread – which is worse, knowing or not knowing? Freud wrote: ‘The subject of the “uncanny” is a province of this kind. It undoubtedly belongs to all that is terrible – to all that arouses dread and creeping horror; it is equally certain, too, that the word is not always used in a clearly definable sense, so that it tends to coincide with whatever excites dread. Yet we may expect that it implies some intrinsic quality which justifies the use of a special name. One is curious to know what this peculiar quality is which allows us to distinguish as “uncanny” certain things within the boundaries of what is “fearful.”’ (Freud, 1919, p.1)

Goett (2015, in Jefferies et al.) writes of the frequency of these preverbal textile experiences and their resonance in day-to-day life: ‘I can recall the sense of frustration at being unable to pull my left arm fully from the metal bar of the pushchair. The wool of my sleeve had got caught underneath’ reads a contribution to the nation’s memory survey conducted by the BBC in 2006. ‘I can remember both my hands were enclosed in a knitted mittens tucked into knitted sleeves and that I didn’t have the manual dexterity to free myself.’ Other participants tell first memories of the safe smell of the pram’s plastic lining, the soggy ear of a rabbit, the prickliness of the father’s khaki uniform, the soft silky texture of the mother’s petticoat, still vividly sensed in their minds.’ (Goett, 2015, in Jefferies et al, p.121)

There is much written on the relationship between memory and truth, and though I do not want to stray too far into the murky waters of what constitutes as true or real memory, it is worth acknowledging that artefacts and memory objects are one of the key places where the ambiguities of memory, history and truth come to intersect. Landsberg (2004) writing on ‘Prosthetic Memory’ suggests that broadcast media, and new media in particular, allows for the layering of and confusion between private and public memory. As artefacts often cross the boundaries between personal and cultural memory, multiple discourses come to reside or surround these particular artefacts. What we ‘should’ or ‘wish’ to remember may become as closely affixed to the artefact as what we ourselves have experienced or learnt.

Diana’s weddings dress in fact became so symbolically loaded that it functioned more like a relic at a site of mass worship than a memory object. During the years after her death the dress toured in an exhibition “Diana: A Celebration”. And it became a central part of what has since been referred to as the cult of Diana. Taking on an almost relic-like quality, the dress was housed in the old stable block of her family home of Althorp. The exhibition which remained at Althorp until 2013 was frequently referred to as a shrine. The wedding dress, already heavily loaded with the symbolism of a virgin bride, came to stand in for Diana’s perceived innocence and the wrongs which had befallen her. It became a metonymic garment, representative of the qualities the dead princess was said to embody: ‘What is also intriguing is what happens when a symbolic object dies. Diana, since entering the public stage in the early 1980s, had already been mythologized. The wedding with Charles was commonly referred to as a “fairytaile wedding” of a Prince and Princess. Her public activities since her divorce of a humanitarian nature as well as the fashion impact she had throughout public life, had already become part of the Diana mythos. Yet with her death she was venerated almost instantaneously as something even greater – an irreproachable exemplar of the good, the true, and the beautiful: Our symbol has died, and thus we feel a need to transform this symbol into something even greater.’ (Tite, 1998, p.27)
of affect, bypassing narrative recollection for a bodily one. Similarly, the intense affect of the abject is situated outside language; the ‘horror’ is felt, not thought. The symbolic/non-narrative memory object is both representational (an image, however abstracted, of something else) and not experienced through language. This is frequently the case in the representation of a horrifying event, which interrupts our cognitive process, inducing shock, stun and awe. Photographs and paintings are often of this category, non-indexical, and yet the representation is so similar to reality that they may trigger a near-indexical response. Other artefacts may be symbolic/non-narrative, items that are familiar yet un-placeable, stirring within us non-verbal longing, desire or fear. Perfumes and scents are particularly liable to induce the affect of the symbolic/non-narrative. Cut off from the grounding of vision they discombobulate. As Benjamin wrote: ‘If the recognition of a scent is more privileged to provide consolation than any other recognition, it may be because it deeply drugs the sense of time. A scent may drown the years in the odour it recalls. This gives a sense of measurelessness …’ (Benjamin, 1936, p.184) Textures, like smells, may stir within us experience which we cannot describe. Often the texture of a garment or other article held when we were at a pre-verbal or early childhood phase may trigger affective experience, sensations unmediated by words. Similarly, the act of putting on an old garment may, stir in us recollection without narrative, the memory of sensation rather than words. This capacity for one thing to stand in for another creates a world of affective links; one thing is resonant of another, again and again in a network of referring images that come to bound our world. In many ways the phrase ‘is like’ is the most profoundly informing aspect of abstract thought, that we come to know the world not just through me and not me, but through our capacity to differentiate and compare.

Indexical/Narrative

Worn clothing is often an indexical/narrative memory object: the garment that you or another have worn and about which you can tell a story. Items imbued with a particular significance (those associated with rites of passage or periods of change) may be particularly resonant, but most of our garments and those of our relatives would fall into this category. It is worth noting that the narrative need not be of one’s own memory (or true, for that matter), but it must be, for the viewer, firmly attached to that object. These narratives may be passed onto you directly (your mother’s garments, for example, may trigger recollection of what she or others have told you about her life) or part of a larger cultural narrative. We learn, for example, the story of Princess Diana’s wedding (and her life) so that we cannot help but recall it when we view the dress. The indexical/narrative memory object requires that we comprehend an artefact on viewing it; we see it, know it, and can place it within
our network of things. This ‘knowing’ can be deployed to great effect in museums and memorials. The indexical nature of a worn garment, its capacity to signify embodied experience, lends narratives an authenticity or truth. Crooke (2012) writes of the ways that this indexical/narrative memory can be used to highlight both indexical (and potentially forgotten narratives) and larger cultural histories.

As we dig deeper the simplest object becomes evidence for our life stories. Whether the cup you favour to drink from is handmade or factory produced, whether it is designer or high street or porcelain, plastic or tin, each one is consciously made. A faded cup may be favoured for its longevity, another for the memory of the day when it was bought or the connection between you and the person who gave it to you as a gift. On each occasion the value accorded to the practical nature of the object is surpassed by what the object might represent. (Crooke in Dudley, 2012, p.26)

Similarly, Stallybrass and Jones (2001b) examine how the memento mori functioned in nineteenth-century Britain. The memento mori is an indexical/narrative memory object but it is also a metonymic one: a part (the deceased’s hair) comes to stand in for the whole. These tiny mementos present a containment of trace within the artefact, a bounding of loss. Grief is contained within the object.

**Indexical/Non-Narrative**

The final category of objects contains those with which my own work is concerned. Indexical/non-narrative memory objects are those which bear indexical trace of the original event, person or experience and which the viewer apprehends in an affective rather than verbal or narrative manner. Davidson (2013), writing of the experience of unpacking and cataloguing a baby’s bonnet from a grave excavation, writes:

> These textiles flagged up the existence of secret things, an underground world of dark, buried objects which undermined the decorative, white cotton lightness of normal surviving historical garments of the same time. They are a gap in the garment narrative I didn’t know was there nor intuit the existence of, and startlingly close to our world. To see decayed what we are used to seeing whole is indeed uncanny, the familiar rendered strange. I felt the first influences of affect, ‘as potential: a body’s capacity to affect and be affected’, where an ‘outer skin envelope or other surface boundary’ is a ‘body’: mine, the textiles’, and those of the dead. (Davidson, 2013, p.8)

These are artefacts whose affective quality stems from their ability to bypass the verbal, the narrative, the symbolic and to function in a visceral bodily manner.
The indexical/non-narrative object’s affect stems from its unintelligibility; it is the palimpsest one cannot read, the tracks we are unable to decipher. These are artefacts to which we cannot attach a narrative, either because we do not ‘know’ it or because we are unable to recall it. The range of affective experiences spans the horror of which Kristeva (1982) wrote when viewing empty clothes at Auschwitz, to the nagging uncertainty of a memory on the tip of your tongue, elusive and inaccessible. This category of object often includes the used clothing and possessions of others: objects which are simultaneously familiar and alien to us. Unable to locate them within our web of meanings and words, we experience them in a bodily and non-verbal manner, in an interaction that may not be mediated, organised and contained. This affect, the horror of the abject for Kristeva (1982), the intense loss of an object one recognises but cannot locate, or the electric thrill of the unknown, is where the impact of the worn and used lies. These are artefacts that circumvent our capacity to reason with them, to contain and control what they do, artefacts freed from signifier and signified. Unable to ‘read’ an object, we experience it psychically and physically; we cannot silence its insistent murmuring. We are unable to look away.
Today I find a new route. A different pathway to somewhere familiar; so that, though the start and end points are the same, the path is other to me. There is something magical in this tiny triumph. When you have lived somewhere for many years these moments are rare and precious, a secret of the city revealed to you once more. It is raining as I walk home, softly and still unseasonably warm. I walk across the grass in the park, enjoying the soft yielding of the damp earth. When I look down at my feet they are damp and striped with moisture. The skin-tone leather of the shoe (so much darker than my own skin anyway) has absorbed the rain and darkened from toe to waist. Darkened leather and blue white of my own skin cross-crossed over my feet. I am cold.
Out of the shower I slide in to the now dirty flesh tone shoes: I am clean and they are not. As I rush to do housework they bite into the soft flesh of my feet, puffy from the hot shower. I am tired and frustrated by the mess. In a hurry I knock over last night’s wine and droplets fall onto the pale skin-like shoes. I should be angry, staining my work, but I am secretly pleased.
Worn: Imprint, attachment and the affective encounter
For Derrida, trace was the ‘mark of the absence of a presence, an always-already absent present’ (Spivak, preface to Derrida, 1976, xvI); trace is a lack. Though Derrida’s use of the word trace may have some commonalities with my own, his work is largely absent from this research. Derrida’s trace is a linguistic or semiotic concept, one located in language; conversely my use of the word is grounded in the material, in matter and movement. Trace is, in the terminology of this research, the tangible or intangible aspect of a thing left behind when its source or origin is gone.
This concluding chapter draws together the threads of thinking which constitute this research and attempts to bind them, to make them into a whole. It is the aim of this research to begin to unravel the web of connections and affordances that produce our relationships to our own clothing and that of others; to uncover the ways that the worn garment may act upon us, to explore how garments and people may become entwined. This chapter seeks to uncover the particular affect of viewing the used and worn shoe; to examine how the traces of intermingling might impact upon the viewer - how are the marks of an absent body understood? What is the affective power of this absence of presence, this trace?  

Garments are accumulations of agencies, agencies incorporated through both the production and use of the garment. The manifestation of these agencies is apparent in the ways that a garment wears: the creases, folds and scuffs, which are the inevitable outcomes of use. Gesture is preserved within the garment - even when our bodies are gone, traces of motion remain. These marks form a web, a map of experience. The worn garment is a repository of experience, a container of trace. Our relationships with worn or used garments run the gamut from comfortable and familiar, to abject and unknown. The distinction between garments we ourselves knew and wore, and those worn by others, is made more complex by a further difference between those with which we engage through narrative recollection, and those which are experienced as affect. Our inability to reconstruct the gestures and experiences which marked and altered the shoe lend to it a particular affective quality - a dissonance. No matter our relationship to them, for the viewer, worn and used shoes often produce a profound affect. They are uncomfortable, ambiguous.
objects, material traces of our own, or another’s, past and present selves. They may disgust us, uncomfortable and abject, as re-reading a teenage diary, or trigger in us nostalgic longing, the desire to step back in time.

The knowable object

There is an incomprehensibility to the marks of wear which create a dissonance for the viewer- an inability to retrace steps once performed. What is it, to know an artefact? – to come to understand its meaning and its form? In order to comprehend an artefact we must already know of it, be able to place it within our personal network of things, those which surround us and those we internalise. From a fragmentary or partial knowledge produced through sensory engagement, we must summon up memory and contextualise the artefact in order to make it whole. We understand artefacts not as discrete entities but as contingent parts of a much larger network, one which consists both of our material culture and our internal world. In the encounter with the artefact, the work of memory is a task of reconstruction, of rebuilding things no longer present. For Freud the metaphors of archaeology and the archaeologist were central to describing analysis and ‘memory-work’. He considered that analysis:

"resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice … Just as the archaeologist builds up the walls of a building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and position of the columns from depressions in the floor, and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from fragments of memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis. (Freud, 1937, p.259)"

Laplanche (1998) asserted that in using the metaphors of archaeology and reconstruction Freud presents a world in which nothing may be permanently lost. To understand an artefact one must be able to abduct from it (a sensory experience through sight, touch, taste, or sound) and simultaneously contextualise it (memory-work). Thus the artefact is always between these two realms: the perceptual and the subconscious. Memory must be called upon to locate the artefact within both our internal and external worlds. Artefacts that cannot be contextualised through this meeting of perception and recollection, where one or the other is absent or out of balance, create an affect for the viewer. Affect, in this context, is the experience of the artefact out of place. The artefact which cannot be contextualised takes on an
In the work of psychiatrist Van der Kolk on the nature of traumatic memory, certain experiences are retained differently from ‘normal’ experiences. Thus ‘the very nature of traumatic memory is to be stored initially as sensory fragments that have no linguistic components. They only came to develop a narrative of their trauma over time.’ (Van der Kolk, 1999, p.289) and ‘research shows that in contrast to the way that people seem to process ordinary information, traumatic experiences are initially imprinted as sensations or feeling states, and are not collated or transcribed into personal narratives’ (Ibid., p.296). Events that produce high levels of affect create non-representationa
l ‘memories’. Similarly LeDoux (1999) writes that affective experience engages very early our innate responses, responses which, though we may learn to control them, we cannot alter or rewrite.
ambiguous quality. Unable to be placed within our network of things, it may become miasmic, or mesmerising. Certain artworks and religious relics have this quality; by sitting outside the framework of the everyday, they may shock or enchant us, draw us in. Geisbusch (2007), reflecting on Benjamin’s discussion of Dadaism, suggests: ‘Benjamin was alluding to the way Dadaist art had exploded the solemnity and intellectual detachment that formerly characterized the reception of artwork. It is this kind of sensuous “drive-by shooting” that I explore here, though its ammunition is sacred objects rather than art (notwithstanding some overlap between the two categories)’ (Geisbusch, 2007, p.1); affect as the shock of the new.

The affective encounter

For Freud this affect is positioned in opposition to Vorstellung (1915): idea, memory or image, a representational thing. This distinction between affect and representational memory is important; affects do not depend upon recalling an image or word. For Callard and Papolias ‘(the) affective turn is concerned with non-representational and extra-linguistic aspects of subjective experience, aspects that its advocates associate with the very fact of embodiment and the particularities of our physiological responses to the world’ (in Radstone and Schwarz, 2010, p.247).

Just as the ‘material turn’ shifted our thinking towards the body, the environment, and the sensory, the ‘affective turn’ demands a renewed focus upon experience beyond or outside language. For Spinoza, affects could be divided into three categories: desire (or longing), pleasure and pain, and were experiences which occurred in relation to another ‘body’:

The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less … The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects and, consequently, the same images of things. (Spinoza, 1677, (2012) p. 130)

Affects are the outcome of interactions, of engagement with and in the world. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari present the artwork as ‘a bloc of sensation, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects’ (1987, p.164); the art object is always simultaneously sensed and abducted from. There is, I think, a similarity between the art object and the worn garment, as potential loci of affective experience. Deleuze writes of the encounter as the locus of affect, of the relationship of one ‘body’ to another. In his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille Plateaux, Massumi (1987) writes:
83 Massumi's definition of the body does not exclude the mind, but instead views it as part of the whole.
L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include ‘mental’ or ideal bodies). (1987, p.16)

The experience of affect is one of encounter. The affective experience is relational; it is the outcome of our intermingling in the world. Affect is bodily; it is experienced, processed, and produced in the bodily self.85 The bodily encounter is pertinent here; often it is the encounter with an artefact bearing bodily trace which induces affect – affect as a form of object relations. The affective experience is a meeting with the material world; an instance of a collision from which experience occurs. In sensory engagement with the world, we have multiple experiences outside language, yet only some of these induce intense affect. These affects (both negative and positive) occur at points of sensory dissonance or cognitive disjuncture, at moments of not knowing.

We often associate worn shoes with the experience of negative affect – of discomfort, horror or disgust. Worn garments frequently induce in the viewer a discomfort that is difficult to articulate or define. We recoil from stains on dresses and dirty shoes, unable to explain quite why this might be. Often the rationalisation is that they are unclean, and yet the dirt they carry is rarely more than we experience in other encounters with the material world. Though it is true that ‘dirt is matter out of place’ (Douglas, 1966), the affective quality of the worn and used goes beyond displeasure at a disturbed binary. This negative affect recalls Kristeva’s (1982) writing on the abject. For Kristeva, ‘the abject’ is a breakdown of the relationship between the subject and object, a blurring of the lines between self and other. She writes of the abject in the context of membranous or peripheral aspects of the body, those most liable to contamination – of things that have been excreted from the body and are thus simultaneously of the self and other to it. The abject is the risk of intermingling, of confusion and of the loss of the self: ‘Abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it – on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger.’(Kristeva, 1982, p.9) The horror of the abject, may be understood as a fear of losing the self, boundaries blurred, insides spilled outside the body. For Kristeva, the affect of the abject stems from a disruption of the symbolic order. The worn and used shoe presents us with a different kind of intermingling: the intermingling of an ‘other’ (another person’s body or our own anterior selves) and
the garment. This intermingling, this breakdown of boundaries, is not potential but instead is something that has already occurred. While Kristeva’s abject is located in a danger, a potential confusion or mixing of subject and object; in the case of the worn shoe, artefact and user have already mingled, subject and object have already become cleaved. Thus the affect of the worn and used stems not from a threat but from the experience of an already intermingled garment – a boundary already broken down. This affect stems from the very bodiliness of the garment, its imprint, creases and wear. The worn garment is affective, because it is dissonant, because it is both symbolic of an absent body and an intermingled aspect of that same body itself.

Aura and Trace

The worn shoe is at once part of the absent body and separate from it; a shed skin, a discarded aspect of the self. It is never entirely bodily nor fully clean. Inscribed upon it are the marks of previous actions and past selves. Even away from the body it remains a locus of the agencies of those who have laid hands upon it: its users, its makers, and its wearers. This intermingling has an obfuscating effect, as agencies build up, traces come to compete and overlap. These multiple records, the palimpsest-like quality of the worn shoe, create dissonances and disjunctures for the viewer. Viewing these gesture traces, one is unsure which trails to follow, where one ends and the next begins. If the negative affects of viewing the worn garment are rooted in the garment’s capacity to become a ‘severed’ part of the self, then the positive affects are also rooted in this ‘severing’ – the distributed person being made present for the viewer. The worn and used garment is a manifestation of trace, a site upon which multiple absent presences may sit side by side. The worn shoe retains gestures, the immaterial and temporary made material, and also those parts of our body which we shed each day. This trace is an absent body, a body absent but still present for the viewer. These traces disrupt the binaries of there and not there, of animate and inanimate, of person and object. Davidson discussing the affect arising from traces upon burial clothes states:

I like the ways what I found in the pieces eludes the documentary; slips into a silence that is eloquent if you can read its messages. I like the presence of absence, the holes left by stitches, the impressions and the corrosions and the challenge of unpacking incomplete, incoherent remains.
(Davidson, 2013, p.24)

If the cause of this gesture-trace is a now absent body, then the outcomes of viewing these marks, their affects, might be termed ‘aura’. Benjamin presented an
So much so that in the act of looking the stain ‘appears’ on the shroud for the viewers. Didi-Huberman ends the article implying that in fact there may be no such stain.
ambiguous and at times conflicting account of aura as the affect of the artwork at a particular place and time. Aura is an ambiguous term which links magical, religious and perceptual experience. For Benjamin, aura was linked to the irreducible quality of material and spatio-temporal originality. Though aura is most commonly associated with ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (Benjamin, 1936), the idea of aura and the auratic is woven into many of Benjamin’s texts. The most useful definition of aura in the context of this research is that of the artefact’s ‘ability to look back at us’; it is the way that an artefact or artwork might hold us, the viewer, in its gaze and captivate us. Bratu-Hansen (2007) suggests that it is a mistake to classify Benjamin’s concept of aura as solely an aesthetic, and thus art based, category, that ‘genuine aura appears in all things, not just in certain kinds of things, as people imagine’ (Benjamin quoted in Bratu-Hansen, 2007, p.1). Hence mundane or habitual artefacts – worn garments, for example – may in themselves (rather than their representations) be auratic. Bratu-Hansen describes aura as a form of perception that ‘invests’ or endows a phenomenon with the ‘ability to look back at us’, to open its eyes or ‘lift its gaze’ (Bratu-Hansen, 2007, p.4). Is it then possible that worn garments may have an ‘aura’, a quality which allows them to captivate the viewer?

The relic

Examining auratic experience beyond the artwork leads us to the encounter with religious relics. Relics are presented as powerful indexical memory objects: artefacts which were part of a miraculous body, and are still invested with those same miraculous qualities. It could be said that the relic is believed to be invested with exactly the mystical qualities that Benjamin afforded to the auratic artefact; that when one looks at the relic (an object invested with God’s agency), God’s agency looks back at you. Though everyday artefacts, such as clothing, may seem at odds with the power and status afforded to relics, there are multiple areas where the habitual and the holy may overlap. Relics are loci of trace (absent presence) and simultaneously (alleged) indexical records of experience. Didi-Huberman in his discussion of the Turin Shroud explores the analogy between the stains on the shroud as imagined indexical imprints and the photograph as a lightcast of the original object: ‘The holy shroud became the negative imprint of the body of Christ, its luminous index miraculously produced and miraculously inverted in the very act of resurrection, henceforth to be conceived of in photographic terms.’ (1984, p.65) The stains on the shroud are for Didi-Huberman ‘non-iconic, non-mimetic’ indexes of the original experience and this in turn lends them their value. The defining quality of a relic is that it produces for the viewer an affective experience. Relics function as magical or auratic artefacts exactly because they are incomprehensible; they fail to
make sense. There is an unintelligibility to relics, an impossibility to their provenance and function which draws us to them. Relics, as indexes, are beyond representation; they are the thing rather than the image of it. It is this non-representational quality to which Didi-Huberman refers: ‘The non-iconic, non-mimetic nature of this stain guarantees its indexical value. I might add that the word authenticity is common to the vocabulary used by Peirce to describe the index and to the cultural discourse of theologians concerning relics.’ (1984, pp.67-8) Could one compare the affect of the worn and used garment to that of the relic, a similarly indexical artefact? The indexical garment speaks directly to the viewer with an aura-like quality; ‘it looks back at you’. The indexical artefact succeeds in calling forth its previous users: those which have intermingled with it. In looking at the artefact one must engage with the traces of use, and in engaging with these traces one is touched by them. Didi-Huberman writes: ‘If all physical contact calls to mind the act that establishes it (in an indexical relationship), every act calls forth as well, and imperatively, the proper name of the actor: he who left some of his blood on this linen sheet.’ (1984, p.68)

There is, then, a difference between the impact of a representation or substitute and that of an indexical artefact, the material and spatio-temporal originality of the worn artefact being central to its affective power.

**Benjamin and the original**

Central to Benjamin’s discussion of aura is originality, the power of the singular and unique. The contrast between the original and the reproduction is at the heart of ‘The Work of Art In the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936). For Benjamin aura is present in the encounter with original artwork; it is irreducible and inalienable. Returning to Weiner’s writing on Kula, aura becomes the ‘inalienable possession’ of the original artefact, a thing that cannot be taken from it: ‘Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be.’ (Benjamin, 1936, p.50) However Benjamin acknowledged the democratizing nature of the mass-produced, and the fact that the mass-produced may, over time become unique:

Unlike Heidegger for whom technology was fatally out of touch with the body and the earth, Benjamin had no fear of industrial production. In fact, he argued that because mass-produced copies lacked the ‘aura’ of handmade originals, they actually might be preferable, as they would afford audiences and users greater cultural determination. But if a copy is to be saturated with the same cultural value as, say, a traditional pot and weaving, we must have the same sense of ownership and intimacy with mass-produced objects that people of earlier times had with their own material culture.
Benjamin’s objective, therefore, was to update craft’s traditional ‘essence’ for the purposes of modernity. As Terry Eagleton has written, Benjamin’s idea of tradition ‘is in some sense a given, yet it is always constructed from the vantage point of the present’. (Adamson, 2009, p.337)

Though mass-produced items (newspapers, shoes, cars) may start out as near-identical, they are individuated through use and wear. That is to say, ‘things can be said to have “biographies” as they go through a series of transformations from gift to commodity to inalienable possessions, and persons can also be said to invest aspects of their own biographies in things’ (Hoskins in Tilley et al., 2006, p.73). A newspaper, for example, may be read, folded, crumpled, and used to wrap food or broken glass, over the course of a day; it is made original through its entanglements with agencies other than its own. Similarly most mass produced shoes start out as near identical but are quickly individualised by the unique qualities of the wearer’s body, gait and environment. Hoskins, in her comparison of the works of Gell and Benjamin, raises Morin’s (1969) distinction between biographical object and commodity: ‘Though both sorts of objects may be produced for mass consumption, the relation that a person establishes with a biographical object gives it an identity that is localized, particular and individual, while those established with an object generated by an outside protocol are globalized, generalized and mechanically reproduced.’ (Hoskins in Tilley et al., 2006, p.73). This distinction is, I think, arbitrary and unnecessary; commodities become biographical (or entangled) through use and biographical objects may (particularly in the case of relics and museum acquisitions) become commodities. Habitual artefacts become auratic over time. The auratic quality of used clothing lies in the customisation of the mass-produced through wear; the garment not new and immaculate but ‘worn in’. As the garment becomes bodily and entangled with its wearer, it becomes unique; wearing is a form of individualisation. Just as aura is linked to the temporal and geographical specificity of the artwork, the worn object is inseparable from the movements which have produced it; gesture-trace is always original.

Magical and talismanic objects

The worn garment is a record, a non-verbal materialisation of the acts through which it was shaped and formed. Each crease and scuff relates to a gesture, a body, a time and place. This record, original, non-representational and unrepeatable, shares the auratic quality of an artwork, both in its specificity and in its capacity to induce affective experience. The act of wearing transforms a mass-made garment from a copy to an original. The wearer is to the designer or maker of clothes much like the reader is to the author. The ‘interpretation’ and ‘enlivening’ of the garment
Pietz (1985), in the first section of ‘Function of the Fetish’, writes of the ‘irreducible materiality’ of the fetish object. Unlike other magical or talismanic artefacts, the fetish’s power is dependent upon its material form and presence. It does not stand in for another thing or idea (as a crucifix or icon might) but itself acts as direct agent within the encounter. The fetish’s power is not as a sign or stand-in for something else, but is located within the thing - the spirit or power of the fetish resides within its form. The fetish is non-representational; it is the thing itself. Thus the fetish is irreducibly material, it epitomizes the ability of artefacts to act as agents in themselves.
through dressing, styling and use, render it a different artefact for the wearer than for its designer or maker. In this transformation through wearing, the garment becomes cleaved to its user – never fully integrated and yet never fully apart. This cleaving allows for a distribution of the user beyond the bounds of their body; they are constantly present in their empty and discarded clothes. There is something in this distribution of the self into things, and in the draw of their aura, which brings to mind the magical and talismanic artefact. There is a talismanic quality to a well-worn garment, a sense that in the accrued markings of use it has become powerful. We are familiar with the idea that the leather jacket or ripped jeans of a rock star may take on an almost relic-like quality, as though to touch them is to be transported back to the events they witnessed and participated in. To address the garment as relic or talisman is to acknowledge that it is not only an active agent in our interactions with it but a powerful one.

What really characterizes art objects is the way they tend to transcend the technical schemas of the spectator, his normal sense of self-possession, then we can see that there is a convergence between the characteristics of objects produced via the enchanted technology of art and objects produced through the enchanted technology of magic and that in fact these categories tend to collide. (Gell, 1992, p.59)

Talismans, relics and fetishes serve a particular purpose in the world of magical things; we afford them tasks of which we ourselves are not capable or dare not undertake; relics may heal, talismans protect, fetishes settle disputes. This is not to say that I believe the worn and used garment is magical, only that the ways that magic has been used to explain the distribution of person into thing and thing into person is useful here. It is to acknowledge that in a commodity culture we struggle with the transposition of persons and things through use, with the capacity of a thing to act in a person’s place and of another person to be affected by that artefact’s agency.

Stallybrass writes that the African fetish was an object of both fascination and fear for colonial traders: ‘what was demonized in the concept of the fetish was the possibility that history, memory and desire might be materialized in objects that are touched, loved and worn’ (Stallybrass, 1998, p.186). For Stallybrass, magical objects allow for agency abducted from one body to impact upon another; they serve as intermediaries and facilitators between wish and desire. In the case of the fetish this power is brought about through touch. The tactile intermingling of the self and the artefact is what gives it its power. When a person hammers a nail into an Nkisi Nkondi, they are in effect leaving a part of themselves in the artefact
Shoes, in particular are often used as talismans or magical objects. Swann writes: ‘there is much recorded on other shoe superstitions, which are rife wherever shoes are traditionally worn. They are symbols of authority, as in the Old Testament. They are linked with fertility: we still tie them on the back of wedding cars. And they are generally associated with good luck (witness all the holiday souvenirs in the shape of shoes). But most of all they stand in for the person: it has been a common practice from at least the sixteenth century to at least 1966 to throw an old shoe after people “for luck”.’ (Swann, 1996, p.56)

An excellent biblical example of this is Elisha taking on the qualities of Elijah by receiving his cloak (2 Kings 2:1-14).
and through this transposition they are protected. We often talk of clothing in a similarly talismanic manner; from ritual and rites of passage to everyday practice, this intermingling may be used to our advantage. Similarly, we may use another’s garment to conjure up their qualities, to wrap ourselves in the aspects of another person’s personality, and take on their traits. This magic, this enchantment, which the used and worn garment may enact upon us, is reminiscent of Gell’s writing on art and magical objects. In the latter half of Art and Agency, Gell describes the ways that one might construct an anthropology of art by understanding the artist as a ‘skilled technician’. That is to say that the art is a technical system in which we the viewer may recognise skill and in turn be enchanted by it: ‘the power of art objects stems from technical processes they objectively embody: the technology of enchantment is founded on the enchantment of technology’ (Gell, 1998, p.44). The capacity of the affective art object to actively engage the viewer is located, for Gell, in technology or technique. Gell writes of a ‘halo effect of technical difficulty’ (Ibid., p.68): that an object may capture or affect the viewer because they themselves could not produce it. Though one may know of the means through which an art object is produced, the viewer cannot fully comprehend processes of its construction. For Gell, technology itself may be obfuscating, and this obfuscation is a root of enchantment. The process of making creates a dissonance for the viewer, great skill or great complexity creating for the viewer an aura-like experience: ‘It is the way an object is construed as coming into the world which is the source of the power of such objects – their becoming rather than their being.’ (Gell, 1998, p.46)

Skilled bodies

Though Gell writes of art objects, he acknowledges that ‘enchantment is immanent in all kinds of technical activity’ (Ibid., p.44), and thus in the technologies and techniques of the body. The practice of everyday life is the mastery of these ‘techniques of the body’: learning to walk, move and interact in a socialised manner. Mauss writes: ‘I call technique an action which is effective and traditional (and you will see that in this it is no different from a magical, religious or symbolic action). It has to be effective and traditional. There is no technique and no transmission in the absence of tradition. This above all is what distinguishes man from the animals: the transmission of his techniques ...’ (Mauss, 1935, p.76). Though techniques are acquired in the transmission of tradition, they become individuated; our movements are both cultural and personal, our gestures only ever our own. Thus our movements are a form of skilled work, a bringing together of social and bodily knowledge in the performance of the everyday. The worn and used garment, and in particular the worn and used shoe, is made unique through the techniques of the body, the individual’s assimilation and interpretation of bodily cultural practices. The traces of
The idea of the line as gestural is most apparent in writing on the works of action painters such as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning. Art critic Harold Rosenberg wrote of the primacy of movement within painting: ‘In painting, the primary agency of physical motion (as distinct from illusionary representation of motion, as with the Futurists) is the line, conceived not as the thinnest of planes, nor as edge, contour or connective but as stroke or figure (in the sense of “figure skating”). In its passage on the canvas each such line can establish the actual movement of the artist’s body as an esthetic statement. Line, from wiry calligraphy to foot wide flaunts of the house painter’s brush, has played the leading part in the technique of Action Painting, though there are other ways besides line of releasing force on canvas.’ (Rosenberg, 1952, p.22)

Anthropologist Tim Ingold writes of his own research on lines: ‘In doing so I have joined the ranks of draughtsmen, calligraphers, hand writers, storytellers, walkers, thinkers, observers – indeed of practically everyone who has ever lived. For people inhabit, in the first place a world that is made not of things but of lines. After all what is a thing, or indeed a person, if not a tying together of lines.’ (Ingold, 2007, p.5)
the skilled practice of movement are obfuscating; they are unreadable in a manner which is akin to Gell’s technology of enchantment. The particularities of bodily techniques are unintelligible to the viewer: the viewer may understand that we have walked in these shoes, but quite how and why and where is lost to them. These techniques (the technologies of walking and being) are a form of skill. The outputs of this ‘skilled work’, of our gestures, are the marks of wear upon our clothes. Wearing transforms the garment from mass-produced to unique; in the processes of wearing, the garment becomes original. It is commonly understood that fashion is made through the act of dressing, that fashion is a performative ‘fleshy practice involving the body’ (Entwistle and Wilson, 2001, p.4). In the performance of dressing and the practice of everyday life, we are marking and altering our clothes. Just as the line of a pen or paintbrush is fundamentally gestural, informed by the techniques of the body, the marks upon our clothes are the output of our bodily techniques.

A line is the outcome of a gesture, in the practices of writing, drawing and sculpture, and also in practices such as dance or making music. Walking produces lines in two ways: in the line of the body (as Mauss suggested) and in the tracks which are left by our feet, the cartographies of our lives. These lines, our tracks or traces, present an opportunity for retrospective abduction, the retracing of steps. Retracing steps, following a line back to its origin, is the root of many kinds of history – that in recapturing movements (of peoples, objects, land masses and armies) we might fully understand what came to be. Lines of enquiry are just that, after all: steps forward into the unknown or diligent re-tracings of the past. The line is the result of movement and as such is always a form of record. These marks and lines, the records of our everyday experience, are present for the viewer of the worn and used. In looking at our clothes, one may observe the maps of our experience. However, the line of enquiry, the desire to retrace a route back to its origin, to understand the movements which are made manifest in the artefact, cannot always be realised. Though one may address one’s own clothes with a knowledge of how some of the marks were made, or even recognise the gestures of a friend or relative in the creases of a jacket sleeve or the wear of a lapel, the movements of strangers are lost to us. We may view the markings of time, but we cannot necessarily decode their origins.

Cognitive Stickiness

Wear is a form of unintelligible mark making, a language for the most part lost to us. For Gell, the inability to decode or interpret the artwork’s means of production, its ‘indecipherability’ (1998, p.71), is at the root of its affective qualities, its ability to pull in the viewer and hold them: ‘This captivism is the primordial kind of artistic
Stewart’s (1984) interpretation of nostalgia differs here from my own. For Stewart nostalgia is the desire for an idealized (and thus, imaginary or impossible past). This idealized past occludes the real and authentic. Thus for Stewart the nostalgic is always utopian and based in ideology. She proposes that ‘... the past it seeks has never existed except as narrative and hence always absent, that past continually threatens to reproduce itself as a felt lack. Hostile to history and its invisible origins and yet longing for an impossibly pure context of lived experience at a place of origin, nostalgia wears a distinctly utopian face, a face that turns towards a future-past, a past which has only ideological reality’. (Stewart, 1992, p.23). My own interpretation of nostalgia, while acknowledging Stewart’s location of it within narrative and its capacity to relate to imagined pasts, does not necessarily view nostalgia as the realm of the inauthentic so much as of experience mediated by language. The materiality of shoes is of huge importance in folklore and fairy tale,
agency.’ (Ibid., p.69). Just as Benjamin wrote of aura ‘looking back at you’, for Gell captivism is central to the affective impact of the artefact. They ‘use formal complexity and technical virtuosity to create “a certain cognitive indecipherability” (Gell, 1998, p.95) which may tantalize and frustrate the viewer in trying to recognize wholes and parts, continuity and discontinuity, synchrony and succession’ (Hoskins in Tilley et al., 2006, p.78). Gell terms these incomprehensible artefacts ‘mind traps’ (Gell, 1998, p.80), stating that the impossibility of reconstructing the movements which produced them makes them ‘cognitively sticky’. That is to say, we are trapped not simply by the magnitude of the skill, but also by our inability to retrospectively abduct from the artefact.

We cannot retrace fully the process whereby the design came into the world, by the agency of this woman, because we cannot reconstruct her skilled movements (and the intentions guiding them) from the design which has resulted from them. I attribute the cognitive stickiness of patterns to this blockage in the cognitive process of reconstructing the intentionality embodied in artefacts. (Gell, 1998, p.86)

The idea that patterns possess an obfuscating and powerful agency is useful when exploring the affective power of the worn and the used. The patterns of wear, cartographies of gesture and experience, are mesmerising for the viewer, presenting an unreadable map of the past. Interpreting marks of wear as both the result of skilled work (the management of the techniques of the body) and a form of pattern, draws us closer to understanding their affective qualities. The person and the garment are intermingled and the garment remains a distributed aspect of the person, even when no longer worn. The records of this intermingling, of the gestures that produce attachment, are left on the garment as creases, stains, abrasions and tears. These cartographies of gesture, these mesmerizing patterns, are the root of the affective experience of viewing the worn and used – markings, which act upon us not as symbols, or narratives, but as an extra-lingual material interaction, an auratic experience. The affective quality of the worn and used is located not in the capacity to function as a signifier, but in not knowing; it is the experience of the artefact we are unable to ‘read’.

The artefact is simultaneously recognisable and unrecognisable to the viewer; it may be placed within our network of things and yet the gestures which have marked it may not be recollected or regained. The indexical/non-narrative artefact is experienced as affect rather than nostalgia. This difference between the affective and the nostalgic is central to the experience of the worn and used. Nostalgia is rooted in knowing, in not only being able to locate an artefact within our network of
things but within a history or story. Nostalgia relies not only on the familiar but also on the verbal. To have a nostalgic encounter with an artefact is to be able to abduct a narrative from it, to know or imagine from whence it came. Nostalgia takes one on a journey back to a real or imagined past – a retracing of steps. Nostalgia allows, however briefly, a return. This return is reliant upon two things: the presence of a pathway, and knowledge of where one must go; there must be both a route into the memory (the artefact as trigger), and a guide through it. Our memories, the stories about the past that we tell ourselves, are the maps we use to navigate the nostalgic journey. This navigability (the recollective experience) is dependent on the presence of a narrative memory. Our own worn footwear often (although not always) presents us with this experience – a chance to retrace our steps. Though nostalgia is frequently presented as a positive or at least wistful longing, the experience of one’s own garments is not always comfortable. The recollections one may abduct from the worn object may not be pleasant, and the garment imbued with our past bodily selves may be a trigger of shame.

The experience of the affective memory-object is quite other to this. Though the artefact itself may be the same, the abductive experience is not akin to a retracing of steps but to being lost. Rather than offering a pathway to the past the affective experience (of indexical/non-narrative memory object) highlights places that you may never go. Though the trigger is present, there is no route to retrace. Instead the viewer experiences the artefact as a dead end, a shock of experience unbounded by words. Affect is thus a blockage, a path that, however apparent, however visible, may not be followed. The markings on the artefact may make explicit how an artefact was worn and used, but for the unfamiliar viewer it is impossible to translate those markings into a narrative memory. Excluded from a verbally mediated experience, the artefact and the viewer meet in a visceral and bodily manner. If the narrative memory artefact engages the viewer by asking them a question which they may answer, the affective experience is a question to which there is no response. If nostalgia is a route back into the past, then the affective experience is a door slammed shut.

Knowing and not knowing: dissonance and the affective power of the worn

‘I continue to take photographs of scars. I cannot stop because they are so much like a photograph. More than like, they have almost the same quality as a photograph. They are visible events in the past and recorded days. Both the scars and the photographs are the manifestation of sorrow for the many things that can never be retrieved and love for a life that is a remembered present.’ Miyako Ishiuchi (quoted in Gibbons, 2009, p41)
There is a dissonance between the experience of knowing what (the capacity to comprehend and locate the artefact within our network of things) and knowing how (the ability to abduct a specific narrative from the artefact). The affective experience lies in the space between these two forms of knowledge, residing in the gap of the unknown. One may recognise a used artefact and yet never fully comprehend the encounters it embodies. The affective experience of viewing the worn stems from a failure of comprehension; the worn object disrupts the viewing experience.

The intermingling that occurs in the encounter changes the shoe, aspects of the wearer being left behind in it. Artefact and people are always in the process of cleaving, joining together and splitting apart. However, certain artefacts, those we wear or use on a daily basis, intermingle more readily than those we use only occasionally. These objects become layerings of agencies, both material and human. The bounding of the self is complex; wear and touch induce attachment, but also blur the edges of what is and is not us. This ambiguity is present in all objects that become habitual and bodily, an ambiguity as to where user and used begin and end. Central to this research has been the concept of intermingling, that person and artefact become entwined and intermixed through touch and use. Gibbons, writing of the work of Miyako Ishiuchi describes the artefacts in her photographs as ‘objects that might be seen as contiguous with and carriers of traces of her mother’s body... clothes, underwear, shoes hairbrush (still with hairs) used lipsticks etc.’ (Gibbons, 2009, p39) This entanglement (a word resonant with our complex encounters with clothing) is both material and psychic. As the shoe and body meet, the shoe is incorporated into the wearer’s psychic and emotional self, and simultaneously the wearer’s experiences are embedded in the shoe’s material form – body and shoe meeting and transferring matter through touch and wear. It suggests that there is not just one instance of intermingling but many, that each time the shoe and the body meet and touch through wear, the self and the garment mix – that attachment is both cumulative and tactile, a process of touch and of repetition. Through these incorporations, the shoe becomes part of the wearer (or maker) and the wearer (or maker) becomes part of the shoe. The agencies of these actors remain within the other, even when they are separated; the self is distributed through its presence in these worn and habitual things. These distributed parts of the self remain within the garment even away from the body so that they may act upon the viewer or new user. That the worn and used shoe has the power (a power invested through use rather than manufacture, design or cultural signification) to act as an emissary of the absent body: to act for the absent body in different and distant locations.

This research has argued that the particular affective power of the worn and the used shoe is located in its ability to make present the absent body, not as a
coherent narrative but as a trace. These traces, the marks of use and wear, are the manifestations of our intermingling with the garments we wear – these traces embody the experiences which produced them. This research thus suggests that the marks of wear upon our shoes, the scuffs and creases, the smoothing of soles and stretching of toes, become a cartography of our lives: a map of gestures and affordances. These maps of gestures, the temporary and unrepeatable made material, produce a ‘cognitive stickiness’ for the viewer; they work as ‘mind traps’ in a similar way to the art object. Drawing upon Gell’s (1998) anthropology of art, this research suggests that the marks upon the worn shoe, traces of the agencies with which it is intermingled, form patterns which are obfuscating for the viewer. The viewer may comprehend the processes through which these marks were made, but is unable to know where the shoes have walked or what tasks they have performed. Thus these marks take on an obfuscating, pattern-like quality – engaging and yet impossible to decode.

For Gell, the affective power of the artwork lay in its ability to enchant the viewer through its technical prowess, ‘the enchantment of technology’ (skill) and the ‘technology of enchantment’ (magic) becoming one and the same (Gell, 1992). Similarly, the marks upon a shoe produce an affect through their simultaneous familiarity and incomprehensibility, the disjunctures that the knowing and not knowing create. That is not to suggest that the art object and the worn shoe are analogous, but rather that particular affective qualities of the artwork are helpful in interpreting the affect of the worn shoe. Artworks are after all intentional objects, either through their creation or their positioning, while the shoe is made unique unthinkingly in the practice of everyday life. Although my own creative practice may blur the distinction between artwork and functional artefact, what I suggest is that the affect of both types of artefact is rooted in uniqueness, originality, a particularity in time and space.

A central question of this research has been, the value and impact of the used and worn. It suggests that, through wear, the mass-produced (the anonymised commodity, so often separate from its maker in our culture) becomes unique – that this differentiation is the result of the shoe intermingling with its user and becoming a record of their gestures, the performance of their life. The value of the worn is that it embodies experience, the patterns of our lives being manifest in the wornness of our clothes. The mass-produced is appropriated and made powerful through wear. As such, it calls for a reinterpretation of wearing, much in the way that Barthes (1977) suggested a reinterpretation of reading in ‘Death of the Author’. The wearer makes the garment unique not simply through dressing and styling but through the alteration of its material form: wear renders the mass-produced auratic.
This resonance, this affective quality is all around us, we are assailed by it habitually. In our daily life used and worn garments frequently demand we recollect, or assault us with the affect of the unknown. However, my role as maker was to privilege the marks of wear. In doing so and in bringing them into the gallery space, I examine the confluences between the artwork and the worn shoe. By making shoes which function as art objects, I sought to create an encounter for the viewer, to lead them towards the questions that I as a researcher had explored. The exhibition, as an embodiment of the knowledge that I have developed, is dependent upon this encounter: on the relationship between the viewer and the artefacts I have made and worn.

The product of this research is two distinct manifestations of knowledge, which may complement each other but are none-the-less different. The words do not attempt to describe the meanings embodied in the artefacts, or record the experiences that made them through wear and nor do the artefacts illustrate the words. The artefacts, imprinted and bodily, speak for themselves as auto-ethnographic objects, objects which aim to induce an affective encounter for the viewer. The encounter with artefact and with text is always different for the viewer/reader; textual and material meanings may never move seamlessly into one another. There will always be disjunctures and dissonances, things which in one form or another cannot be said. In the introduction to this thesis I wrote it is in these dissonances, the spaces between writing and making, between what can be seen and what can be said, that I hope the new knowledge will unfurl, and that sentiment remains. I hope that these two complementary bodies of work may create knowledge that sits between the textual and material.

As a maker, the decision to make objects that I would damage over time, and in some cases destroy, was complex. Though my shoes were designed to alter through wear, at times as they became ugly or abject, I would panic, unsure whether to carry on. The process often felt risky and uncomfortable, and made me aware how rarely makers see their products change over time. These risks, however, were rewarding; as the marks of my experience built up on the shoes, they became something new, not immaculate or beautiful but bodily and strange. Similarly, wearing was not always comfortable or easy, the shoes were not always what I would choose to wear. Putting on these shoes represented for me a shift, a change in role from artist to performer - to researcher, being in the world. It was often during the performance of wearing that the ideas which underlie this thesis emerged, in walking and wandering, my feet and shoes touching, changing, becoming cleaved. It was through wear and through the experience of my worn and dirty shoes that my
ideas developed, were tested and explored. There were many potential approaches and methodologies to this research question and multiple ways the research could be presented. My choices were based on the belief that material artefacts could speak through their materiality more clearly than words— that objects may affect us deeply, and in this affective process they can generate new forms of knowing. To research material culture by making and wearing is, I think, a logical progression of the material turn. It is to ask artefacts to speak for themselves, and the researcher to engage with the material world in a bodily and embodied form of research.

What emerges from the processes of becoming?

The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis ... On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and re-establishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something imperfect and incomplete. (Benjamin, 2003a, p.45)

The worn garment like the self is always in a process of becoming, somewhere in the space between the new and the lost. The body is continuously ‘making’ the garment through use. It is never finished or complete. At the end of this research it is necessary to draw together the threads which have constituted its making; to gather them together and survey their outcomes. This research has been a process of uncovering; its outcomes are nuanced and mutable. It set out through practice and writing to examine our attachment to shoes, to presence the unspoken relationships we have with the things we wear. Through this process many new questions have arisen: how is the self constituted, what is the relationship between making and wearing, and how is memory embodied in objects?

In consequence, this research does not present a single unified understanding of our attachment to footwear or of the affect of the worn and used shoe. Instead, it invites us to look closely at those things we wear, to acknowledge the complexity of our relationships with them and their capacity to affect us deeply. It highlights the importance and the power of the worn and used within our networks of things, seeking to act as a counterpoint to the dominant discourse which focuses upon the value of the garment as signifier. In a culture where the maintenance and care of clothes have been largely superseded by fast-fashion and the disposable garment, this research asks the viewer to engage with the worn, and through this privileging of the worn it presents a different perspective on our relationship with
garments. It raises the potential for the worn and used to act as disruptive objects; as counterpoints to commodity culture. These artefacts become subversive, the explicitness of wear allowing them to act as a voice outside of the prevalent fetishisation of the new. More broadly there is potential to widen this study beyond shoes and to look at our attachment to other garments and other forms of material culture in a similar way. In particular, garments which bear traces of our engagement with them such as leather jackets, jeans and hats, but also those artefacts worn against the body for long periods of time like watches, wedding rings and glasses - garments which through tactile engagement and emotional attachment become simultaneously part of the self and other to it.

This research set out to highlight the qualities of the worn and the process of wearing; to start a dialogue which positions the worn and used as an important category in our understanding of the things we wear - that garments, and shoes in particular, are not finished when they are first constructed but, through use, are in a constant state of becoming, that they are 'made' with each and every wear. Like any piece of research this thesis and exhibition are the start of a conversation rather than a final statement - a conversation which asks to be continued and developed – to paraphrase Bloch quoted at the start of this chapter, it is a conversation, 'a curve', that asks to be ‘extended into the future’. (Marc Bloch, 1946, p.118)
At times this project was a painful one. To make objects with care that I knew, later, I would destroy. To feel an object once beautiful tipping over the edge from cleanliness to abjection. Feeling the weight of my body obliterate the fruits of my labour.

This research made me more conscious of my body. Of the weight of it, its capacity to crush or break my shoes. It made me acutely aware of the ways I walk, the rhythm of my steps, my right-handed and thus left-footedness. The shoes made to be symmetrical did not wear evenly; they are records of the asymmetry of my body postures and movements.
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Exploring the hidden world of shoes

Palimpsest: the Shoe as Record
Northampton Museum
4 December 2014 – 25 January 2015
Reviewed by Helen Cobby

Ellen Sampson is a PhD student at the RCA whose ambitious and experimental show throws the focus on shoes: shoes that can be (and have been) worn, casts of the insides of old, used shoes and unwearable, statement wood-carved shoes. These objects are shown in the most appropriate location – Northampton being traditionally famous for shoe-making, its museum and archive housing the largest historic collection of footwear in the world.

The exhibition sets out to explore why worn shoes have particular affective powers, and – importantly – sits within Sampson’s broader remit of understanding how and why people engage with ‘things’, a sensibility she feels will allow makers to produce better objects that can be connected to more readily, and in more interesting ways.

The urgency of her delving into this affective life is apparent in the great variety of media she deploys. However her staples are familiar materials with long histories (leather, metal and wood), suggesting a concentration on the truth and purity of tradition, and the harnessing of opportunity in familiar things. In our current culture, seemingly so constantly on the lookout for the new, it is perhaps surprising to be presented with these long-known materials as those we connect with most easily.

Shoes may seem unlikely objects to use as symbols for ideas about the emotive language of tradition and the past, as they are associated with modern consumerism and cheap notions of ‘novelty’. But Sampson requires that we look afresh at these definitions, by focusing on the emotions and habits surrounding the wearing of footwear rather than the purchase of shoes.

Wearing she feels has been neglected in academic research. And old shoes are also often underrepresented in galleries, as they are not aesthetically pleasing objects in any straightforward fashion. This is why Sampson’s exhibition is important: it makes objects and processes visible that are otherwise often hidden.

Many of the shoes are presented as though recently cast off by their wearers, which helps to kindle lively stories in our minds about their past lives. The display labels support this by indicating which shoes were worn for the dance sequences featured in one of the two films (entitled Dance) included here.

Dance is the consequence of experimenting with the ways in which the specially-made shoes are worn down by use, and the body’s physical and emotional responses to this. It dramatically illustrates ideas implied by the show’s title, by playing out tensions between creation and destruction.

By emphasising the beauty of the dance, Sampson also manipulates the definition of ‘palimpsest’, to allow us to think about how imprints and erasures draw us towards objects.

Overall, the exhibition urges a rewriting of the history of shoes and an end to their equation with the superficial, consumerist drives that prevent their identity as social, and even socially critical, objects. I would have liked even more information about the making processes, as well as Sampson’s thoughts about fashion and craft, because I felt that she had a lot more to say about these subjects than the small scope here allowed. But it is a good sign to be walking away with the feeling of wanting to know more.

Helen Cobby is a freelance arts writer, and has just completed a masters at UCL.
Polaroids

Black Pointed Polaroid 1 2015

Tan Copper Sandal Polaroid 1  2015
Polaroids

Tan Copper Sandal Polaroid 1 2015

Tan Sandal Polaroid 1 2015
Fold 2013

Fold #1 2013
Fold #2 2013
Fold #3 2013
Fold #4 2013
Fold #5 2013
Fold #6 2013
Fold #7 2013
Fold #8 2013
Tan Copper Pointed 13  2015
Black Copper Flip Flop 16  2015
Black Copper Pointed 19  2015
Black Sandal 22  2015

Black Copper Flip Flop 14  2015
Black Copper Flip Flop 17  2015
Black Copper Pointed 20  2015
Black Sandal 23  2015

Black Copper Flip Flop 15  2015
Black Copper Pointed 18  2015
Black Copper Pointed 21  2015
Black Sandal 24  2015
Tan Pointed 39 2015
Black Pointed 40 2015
Black Pointed 41 2015

Black Pointed 42 2015
Tan Copper Pointed 43 2015
Tan Copper Pointed 45 2015

Tan Copper Pointed 46 2015
Tan Flip Flop 47 2015
Tan Flip Flop 48 2015

Tan Pointed 49 2015
Tan Pointed 50 2015
Tan Pointed 51 2015

Tan Pointed 52 2015
Tan Pointed 53 2015
Cloth #1 2013

Cloth #4 2013

Cloth #7 2013

Cloth #2 2013

Cloth #5 2013

Cloth #8 2013

Cloth #3 2013

Cloth #6 2013
Cloth 2015

Cloth #9 2013
Cloth #10 2013
Cloth #11 2013

Cloth #12 2013
Cloth #13 2013
Cloth #14 2013

Cloth #15 2013
Cloth #16 2013


New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.


Press.


Films & TV

*Rebecca* (1940) Directed by Hitchcock, A. [Motion Picture]. USA: United Artists

Ring a Ding Dong *Sex and the City*, Season 4, Episode 64. (2002) [Television programme] USA Home Box Office. Broadcast: 27/01/02  30 minutes


*The Wizard of Oz* (1939) Directed by Flemming, V [Motion Picture]. USA: Metro Goldwyn and Meyer

Exhibitions
